NOTICE OF MEETING AND AGENDA
Enforcement and Compounding Committee Meeting
June 4, 2013

Contact Person: Laura Hendricks
(916) 574-7918

Note: This is a combined meeting to discuss enforcement and compounding matters.
An E-Pedigree meeting will occur on June 24, 2013, in Sacramento.

This committee meeting is open to the public and is accessible to the physically disabled. A person who needs a disability-related accommodation or modification in order to participate in the meeting may make a request by contacting Laura Hendricks at (916) 574-7918, by emailing laura.hendricks@dca.ca.gov or sending a written request to Ms. Hendricks at the Board of Pharmacy, 1625 N. Market Blvd., Suite N-219, Sacramento, CA 95834. Providing your request at least five business days before the meeting will help to ensure availability of the requested accommodation.

Note: Pharmacists and pharmacy technicians who attend the full committee meeting can be awarded two hours of CE, in accordance with the board’s CE policy. A maximum of four CE hours can be earned each year by attending the meetings of two different board committees.

DATE: June 4, 2013

PLACE: Department of Consumer Affairs / Hearing Room
1625 N. Market Blvd
Sacramento, CA 95834

This meeting may be cancelled without notice. For verification of the meeting, call (916) 574-7900 or access the Board’s Web site at www.pharmacy.ca.gov.

Discussion and action may be taken on any item on the agenda. The committee may discuss agenda items in any order. Board members who are not on the committee may attend, but may not vote. Time limitations for discussion and comment will be determined by the committee chair.

Agenda

Call to Order 9:30 a.m.

Meeting Materials will be available on the board’s Web site at www.pharmacy.ca.gov by May 30, 2013
I. **Enforcement Matters:**

   a. Enforcement and Compounding Committee Meeting Dates for the Remainder of 2013: September 10 and December 3
   b. Discussion on Whether Emerging Technologies Necessitate Revisions to Title 16, Section 1713 of the California Code of Regulations
   c. Request from California Society of Health-System Pharmacists to Discuss Drug Shortages
   d. Implementation of Penal Code Section 11105 – Board Requirement to Provide Criminal Offender Record Information to an Applicant or Licensee When the Information Is Used as the Basis for an Licensing Decision
   e. National Association of Boards of Pharmacy Report on Sales of Fake and Substandard Medications
   f. NABP Announces Development of Standards for the .pharmacy Generic Top Level Domain for Internet Pharmacy Web Sites

II. **Compounding Matters**

   a. Discussion on Pending California Legislation on Sterile Compounding: Senate Bill 294 (Emmerson) and Assembly Bill 1045 (Quirk-Silva)
   b. Discussion of Recent Federal Reports and Articles Relating to Compounding Pharmacies
      1. *FDA’s Oversight of NECC and Ameridose: A History of Missed Opportunities?*
      3. ASHP Guidelines on Outsourcing Sterile Compounding Services
      4. FDA’s Guidance for FDA Staff and Industry – Marketed Unapproved Drugs, Compliance Policy Guide
      5. U.S. Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee Report: The Case for Clarifying FDA Authority: Large-Scale Drug Compounding and the Ongoing Risk to Public Health
      6. Miscellaneous Articles
   c. Proposed Federal Legislation on Compounding Introduced by the U.S. Senate (S. 959)
   d. Discussion Regarding USP’s 797 Standards and Regulation Requirements of the Board of Pharmacy
   e. Discussion Regarding “Batches”
   f. Discussion of the Board of Pharmacy’s Questions and Answers Document on Compounding
   g. Outcomes of Recent Sterile Compounding Inspections
   h. Recalls of Compounded Drugs Throughout the United States

III. **Closing Comments**

IV. **Public Comment on Items Not on the Agenda/Agenda Items For Future Meetings**

   Note: The committee may not discuss or take action on any matter raised during this public comment section that is not included on this agenda, except to decide whether to place the matter on the agenda of a future meeting. [Government Code Sections 11125, 11125.7(a)]

ADJOURNMENT 4 p.m.
June 4, 2013

To: Members, Enforcement and Compounding Committee

Subject: Agenda Item I(a): Enforcement and Compounding Committee Meeting Dates for the Remainder of 2013

Provided below are the committee dates for the remainder of the year.

- September 10: Sacramento
- December 3: TBD
June 4, 2013

To: Members, Enforcement and Compounding Committee

Subject: Agenda Item I (b): Discussion on Whether Emerging Technologies Necessitate Revisions to Regulations That Govern the Use of Automated Delivery Devices

Background:

Several years ago, the board promulgated regulations (16 California Code of Regulation section 1713) to allow for the use of automated delivery devices, which are markedly like vending machines, to permit the furnishing of refill medication in specified circumstances, to include the requirement that the patient must opt in to use the machine and that the medication to be refilled through the machine is appropriate. The complete conditions are listed below in the bolded segment of section 1713.

1713 Receipt and Delivery of Prescriptions and Prescription Medications Must be To or From Licensed Pharmacy
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Division, no licensee shall participate in any arrangement or agreement, whereby prescriptions, or prescription medications, may be left at, picked up from, accepted by, or delivered to any place not licensed as a retail pharmacy.
(b) A licensee may pick up prescriptions at the office or home of the prescriber or pick up or deliver prescriptions or prescription medications at the office of or a residence designated by the patient or at the hospital, institution, medical office or clinic at which the patient receives health care services. In addition, the Board may, in its sole discretion, waive application of subdivision (a) for good cause shown.
(c) A patient or the patient’s agent may deposit a prescription in a secure container that is at the same address as the licensed pharmacy premises. The pharmacy shall be responsible for the security and confidentiality of the prescriptions deposited in the container.
(d) A pharmacy may use an automated delivery device to deliver previously dispensed prescription medications provided:
(1) Each patient using the device has chosen to use the device and signed a written consent form demonstrating his or her informed consent to do so.
(2) A pharmacist has determined that each patient using the device meets inclusion criteria for use of the device established by the pharmacy prior to delivery of prescription medication to that patient.
(3) The device has a means to identify each patient and only release that patient’s prescription medications.
(4) The pharmacy does not use the device to deliver previously dispensed prescription medications to any patient if a pharmacist determines that such patient requires counseling as set forth in section 1707.2(a)(2).
(5) The pharmacy provides an immediate consultation with a pharmacist, either in-person or via telephone, upon the request of a patient.
(6) The device is located adjacent to the secure pharmacy area.
(7) The device is secure from access and removal by unauthorized individuals.
(8) The pharmacy is responsible for the prescription medications stored in the device.
(9) Any incident involving the device where a complaint, delivery error, or omission has occurred shall be reviewed as part of the pharmacy's quality assurance program mandated by Business and Professions Code section 4125.

(10) The pharmacy maintains written policies and procedures pertaining to the device as described in subdivision (e).

(e) Any pharmacy making use of an automated delivery device as permitted by subdivision (d) shall maintain, and on an annual basis review, written policies and procedures providing for:

(1) Maintaining the security of the automated delivery device and the dangerous drugs within the device.

(2) Determining and applying inclusion criteria regarding which medications are appropriate for placement in the device and for which patients, including when consultation is needed.

(3) Ensuring that patients are aware that consultation with a pharmacist is available for any prescription medication, including for those delivered via the automated delivery device.

(4) Describing the assignment of responsibilities to, and training of, pharmacy personnel regarding the maintenance and filing procedures for the automated delivery device.

(5) Orienting participating patients on use of the automated delivery device, notifying patients when expected prescription medications are not available in the device, and ensuring that patient use of the device does not interfere with delivery of prescription medications.

(6) Ensuring the delivery of medications to patients in the event the device is disabled or malfunctions.

(f) Written policies and procedures shall be maintained at least three years beyond the last use of an automated delivery device.

(g) For the purposes of this section only, "previously-dispensed prescription medications" are those prescription medications that do not trigger a non-discretionary duty to consult under section 1707.2(b)(1), because they have been previously dispensed to the patient by the pharmacy in the same dosage form, strength, and with the same written directions.

At the March 2013 Committee meeting, Mr. Al Carter, speaking on behalf of Walgreens, discussed a request to allow Walgreens to place kiosks in workplace clinics. Several concerns were raised about whether the request would comply with current regulations and whether the Board had the authority to approve the request without specific regulatory changes. The Committee voted to deny the request, and suggested that the Board review the requirements of the regulation at a future meeting.

At this meeting:

The Committee will discuss and evaluate the aforementioned regulation to determine whether changes are necessary to address emerging technologies.
June 4, 2013

To: Members, Enforcement and Compounding Committee

Subject: Agenda Item I(c): Request from California Society of Health-System Pharmacists to Discuss Drug Shortages

Request:

At the March 13, 2013 Committee meeting, Jonathon Nelson, representing the California Society of Health-System Pharmacists (CSHP), addressed the Committee to discuss drug shortages and request the topic be discussed at a future meeting. In the attached letter to the Board dated April 9, 2013, Dawn Benton, CSHP Executive Director and CEO, stated CSHP hopes to partner with the Board to find tangible solutions to the crisis.

A representative of CSHP will attend this meeting.
April 9, 2013

Executive Director Virginia Herold
1625 N Market Blvd, N219
Sacramento, CA 95834

Dear Executive Director Herold:

The California Society of Health-System Pharmacists (CSHP) wishes to bring the issue of drug shortages to the Board’s attention. CSHP hopes to partner with the Board to seek tangible solutions that will help alleviate this crisis.

Drug shortages are harming the ability of hospitals and pharmacists to provide needed medications. The issue has grown to such severity that, as a survey in a recent USA Today article reported, “all of the 240 hospital and clinic pharmacists polled said they had to change or delay treatments because of the shortages” (March 22). While this issue may not be new, it is growing in severity and demands a thoughtful response.

CSHP looks forward to beginning a dialogue with the Board to discuss what can be done to alleviate the shortages in order to ensure that pharmacists have the ability to provide needed medications for their patients.

For questions or to discuss further, please contact either Executive Vice President & CEO Dawn Benton at dawn@cshp.org or Legislative & Regulatory Analyst Jonathan Nelson at 916.447.1033 or jonathan@cshp.org.

Incorporated in 1962, CSHP represents over 4,500 pharmacists, student pharmacists, pharmacy technicians and associates who serve patients and the public through the promotion of wellness, patient safety and optimal use of medications. CSHP members practice in a variety of organized healthcare settings – including, but not limited to, hospitals, integrated healthcare systems, medication therapy management clinics, home healthcare and ambulatory care settings.

Sincerely,

Dawn Benton, MBA
Executive Vice President/CEO
June 4, 2013

To: Members, Enforcement and Compounding Committee

Subject: Agenda Item l(d): Implementation of Penal Code section 11105 – Requirement to Provide a Copy of Criminal Offender Record Information (CORI) to an Applicant or Licensee When Used as the Basis for an Licensing Decision

Background:

As part of its licensing process, the Board is required to conduct a criminal background check to determine whether an applicant has committed acts that would constitute grounds for denial of a license. Applicants must submit their fingerprints to the California Department of Justice (DOJ) who then matches the fingerprints against state and federal criminal history databases. The DOJ provides the results of the background check to the Board who uses the information to help determine the suitability of the applicant for licensure. The Board also receives a notice from the DOJ when a licensee is arrested in California subsequent to initial licensure.

Penal Code section 11105 authorizes the DOJ to release criminal offender record information (CORI) to law enforcement and other authorized agencies such as the Board. The Board cannot share criminal offender record information (CORI), including responses that indicates no criminal history exists, with anyone unless expressly authorized. Individuals have the right to request a copy of their own criminal history record from the DOJ to review for accuracy and completeness, but CORI is not subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act. Release of information to unauthorized individuals can result in civil or criminal penalties pursuant to Penal Code sections 11142 and 11143.

Effective January 1, 2013, however, Penal Code section 11105 (Amended by Stats. 2012, Ch. 256, A.B. 2343) requires authorized agencies to expeditiously furnish a copy of CORI to the person to whom the information relates if the information is the basis for an adverse employment, licensing or certification decision.

The Board implemented procedures on January 1, 2013, to comply with this new requirement and since that time has provided a copy of the CORI to every applicant who has been denied and every licensee who has received a Letter of Admonishment, Citation or has been referred to the Attorney General’s office for disciplinary action based, to some degree, on information contained in the CORI.

ARTICLE 3. Criminal Identification and Statistics

Penal Code § 11105.

(t) Whenever state or federal summary criminal history information is furnished by the Department of Justice as the result of an application by an authorized agency, organization, or individual defined in subdivisions (k) to (p), inclusive, and the information is to be used for employment, licensing, or certification purposes, the authorized agency, organization, or individual shall expeditiously furnish a copy of the information to the person to whom the information relates if the information is a basis for an adverse employment, licensing, or certification decision. When furnished other than in person, the copy shall be delivered to the last contact information provided by the applicant.

(Amended by Stats. 2012, Ch. 256, Sec. 2. Effective January 1, 2013.)
June 4, 2013

To: Members, Enforcement and Compounding Committee

Subject: Agenda Item I (e): National Association of Boards of Pharmacy on Sales of Fake and Substandard Medications

The National Association of Boards of Pharmacy (NABP) issued a report on April 26, 2013 which focused on the global distribution of counterfeit and substandard medications. The report found that the proliferation of these medications was primarily due to illegal distribution by internet pharmacies operating out of compliance with US pharmacy laws.

A copy of the report is provided as an attachment.

The report can be found on the NABP website at:
Internet Drug Outlet Identification Program

Progress Report for State and Federal Regulators: April 2013
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I. INTRODUCTION

Illegal online drug sellers have played a significant role in the global spread of counterfeit and substandard medicine. They pose a public health problem that is indifferent to the jurisdictional boundaries of any one nation, and that must be addressed in cooperation with partners around the world. Recognizing the international scope of this problem, National Association of Boards of Pharmacy® (NABP®) and its member boards are working with regulatory authorities, industry leaders, and stakeholder groups worldwide to protect patient health. These efforts are exemplified in NABP’s application to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to own and operate the .PHARMACY generic Top-Level Domain (gTLD). Domain names in the .PHARMACY gTLD will be available to legitimate online pharmacies and prescription drug-related organizations worldwide. NABP and its partners have made significant progress in recent months to develop best practices for the use of .PHARMACY domain names and to clarify the intent and scope of this initiative.

While the .PHARMACY initiative moves forward on a global scale, NABP’s Internet Drug Outlet Identification Program maintains its primary focus on Web sites selling prescription medicine to patients in the United States. NABP continues to find the vast majority of drug sites (97% of those reviewed) to be operating in contravention with US federal and state pharmacy laws. These sites, identified on the NABP Web site as Not Recommended, are characterized in Section II of this report. These findings and the concerns they raise, however, are not unique to the US. The global scope of the problem, and how the .PHARMACY initiative seeks to address this challenge, is discussed in Section III.
II. RESULTS

A. Findings of Site Reviews: In all, as of March 29, 2013, NABP has conducted initial reviews and, via a subsequent review, verified its findings on 10,421 Internet drug outlets selling prescription medications. Of these, 10,082 (96.74%) were found to be operating out of compliance with state and federal laws and/or NABP patient safety and pharmacy practice standards, and are listed as Not Recommended in the “Buying Medicine Online” section, under Consumers, on the NABP Web site, as well as on NABP’s consumer protection Web site, www.AWARERx.ORG. This Web site is part of the AWARRx® Consumer Protection Program, provided by NABP and the state boards of pharmacy to help educate the public about the risks of Internet drug outlets, and includes news, tips, and links to relevant NABP resources. It should be noted that the research findings NABP reports herein and on the Not Recommended list include the total number of Web sites selling prescription drugs to US patients that NABP staff has reviewed and found to be out of compliance with program standards, including those sites that were found to be noncompliant at the time of review but may since have been deactivated. Thanks to the successes of multistakeholder efforts to shut down rogue sites, many of these sites may now be defunct. It should also be noted that the numbers reported here do not represent the entire universe of Web sites selling prescription drugs illegally, but, rather, a representative sampling of the online environment over the last five years. The 10,082 Internet drug outlets currently listed as Not Recommended on the NABP Web site are characterized as follows:

- 2,347 (23.3%) have a physical address located outside of the US
- 1,523 (15.1%) have a physical address located inside of the US
- 6,212 (61.6%) do not post any address
- 8,861 (87.9%) do not require a valid prescription
- 6,078 (60.3%) issue prescriptions per online consultation or questionnaire only
- 4,847 (48.1%) offer foreign or non-Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved drugs
• 1,591 (15.8%) do not have secure sites, exposing customers to financial fraud and identity theft
• 4,065 (40.3%) have server locations in foreign countries
• 1,123 (11.1%) dispense controlled substances (of these, 1,094 (97.42%) do not require a valid prescription)
• 3,901 (38.7%) do not have a public domain name registration (WHOIS information is registered using a privacy or proxy service)¹

Of the total 10,421 sites reviewed, 257 (2.47%) appear to be potentially legitimate, ie, meet program criteria that could be verified solely by looking at the sites and their domain name registration information. Eighty-two (0.79%) of the 10,421 reviewed sites have been accredited through NABP’s Verified Internet Pharmacy Practice Sites™ (VIPPS®) or Veterinary-Verified Internet Pharmacy Practice Sites™ (Vet-VIPPS®) programs, or approved through the NABP e-Advertiser Approval™ Program. The standards against which NABP evaluates Internet drug outlets are provided in the appendix of this report.

¹ It is noteworthy that the percentage of sites identified as Not Recommended that are registered privately or by proxy (38.7%) is considerably higher than that of domain names overall. This comparison is based on an ICANN study in 2009 that sampled 2,400 domain names and found 429 (18%) of them to be registered using a WHOIS privacy or proxy service. Domain name registration (ie, WHOIS information) is an issue of contention among Internet policy stakeholders. Some have suggested that privacy/proxy services are being abused to obscure the identity of perpetrators that use the domains for illegal activities. Enforcement authorities have encouraged requirements for accurate registrant and contact information in WHOIS records to enable the identification and prosecution of bad actors. NABP considers accurate domain name registration to be an important indicator of accountability and approval standards require accurately registered domain names. Further studies are ongoing in the Internet community to support or refute this correlation.
Findings of NABP Web site reviews, in total, as of March 29, 2013

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<tr>
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<td>Not a Secure Site</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not Based in US</td>
<td>10,082</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not a Public Site</td>
<td>1,591</td>
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<td>Sell Foreign Drugs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not a Secure Site</td>
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<td>Not Based in US</td>
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<tr>
<td>NABP, NABP VIPPS, Vet-VIPPS</td>
<td>10,421</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. **Recommended Internet Pharmacies:** NABP, along with many patient safety advocates, continues to recommend that US patients use Internet pharmacies accredited through the VIPPS and Vet-VIPPS programs when buying medication online. These sites have undergone and successfully completed the thorough NABP accreditation process, which includes a review of all policies and procedures regarding the practice of pharmacy and dispensing of medicine over the Internet, as well as an on-site inspection of facilities used by the site to receive, review, and dispense medicine. Currently, 52 VIPPS and Vet-VIPPS pharmacy sites, representing more than 12,000 pharmacies, are listed as Recommended Internet Pharmacies. Several more applications are in progress.

C. **Accreditation and Approval Programs:** In addition to identifying rogue sites, the Internet Drug Outlet Identification program staff continues to assist in screening applicant Web sites for the VIPPS, Vet-VIPPS, and
e-Advertiser Approval programs. Sites that have received e-Advertiser Approval status do not fill new prescription drug orders via the Internet, and thus, are ineligible for VIPPS, but accept refill requests from their existing customers, provide drug information or pharmacy information, or offer other prescription drug-related services. Sites that have received e-Advertiser Approval status have been found to be safe, reliable, and lawful. These sites are listed on the NABP Web site as Approved e-Advertisers. The standards that NABP uses to screen e-Advertiser Approval Program applicants are posted in the e-Advertiser Approval Program section, under Accreditation, on the NABP Web site. As of March 29, 2012, there were 30 entities listed on the NABP Web site as Approved e-Advertisers, and several more applications are in progress.

III. INTERNATIONAL SCOPE AND DEVELOPMENT OF .PHARMACY gTLD

A. Internet-Fueled Threat of Counterfeit Medicine Warrants Global Action: While the illegal distribution of prescription drugs over the Internet poses many dangers, the threat that most worries public health agencies is the spread of substandard and counterfeit medicine. In its February 2013 report, Countering the Problem of Falsified and Substandard Drugs, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) notes that illegal online drug sellers contribute significantly to the spread of counterfeit and substandard medications worldwide, owing to the poor quality of the products they sell and the lack of official oversight of their operations. “All drugs sold outside the legitimate chains are suspect,” the IOM report states. “This includes medicines sold in unregulated markets and most drugs sold on the Internet.”

On its Web site, INTERPOL highlights the role of the Internet in perpetuating this problem, stating, “The increasing prevalence of counterfeit and illicit goods has been compounded by the rise in Internet trade, where they can be bought easily, cheaply and without a prescription.” INTERPOL announced on March 12, 2013, that, with the support of the pharmaceutical industry, it is expanding the scope of its Medical Product Counterfeiting and Pharmaceutical Crime Unit to combat the global health threat of counterfeit and fake medicines. A representative of INTERPOL participated in a recent meeting of the .PHARMACY gTLD Advisory Committee at NABP Headquarters.

Partnership for Safe Medicines applauds INTERPOL’s enhanced law enforcement effort in a March 12, 2013 news release, stating, “Counterfeit medicines threaten the lives of millions of people around the world, and finding ways to address such a complex, far-reaching issue requires ever-increasing global cooperation.”
The situation is similar the United Kingdom, where the UK’s Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) describes on its Web site an “explosion” in recent years of Web sites selling medicine online, most of which do not meet regulatory standards established in the region to protect patient health. In a March 27, 2013 news release announcing the sentencing of perpetrators in a counterfeit medicines case, MHRA stresses its commitment to “pursuing those involved in the illicit supply of medicines and taking action to ensure the public is protected.” MHRA warns consumers that buying medicines from unauthorized sources significantly increases the risk of getting substandard or fake medicines.

B. International Coalition of Stakeholders Backs .PHARMACY gTLD Initiative: Mindful of the international spread of unapproved, substandard, and counterfeit medicine, and the contributing role that illegal online drug sellers play, NABP it taking steps to establish an online space exclusively for legitimate Internet pharmacies and other trustworthy prescription drug-related organizations. NABP has applied for the .PHARMACY gTLD as a community-based application on behalf of international pharmacy coalitions and national pharmacy associations, representing legitimate online pharmacies and prescription drug-related organizations worldwide.

ICANN’s new gTLD program is expected to vastly alter the Internet landscape with the addition of hundreds of new gTLDs. Not surprisingly, it has led to some confusion and misinformation in relation to new gTLDs, including .PHARMACY. Contrary to misinformation that has appeared recently in some public forums, the .PHARMACY gTLD will not be limited to US pharmacies. It will be available to legitimate online pharmacies and prescription drug-related organizations worldwide. It has been suggested that .PHARMACY would give an unfair advantage to US pharmacies, would work against the interests of the public health, and impede online access to safe and affordable medicine. To clarify, NABP confirms that its intent for .PHARMACY is to ensure that only legitimate Internet pharmacies and related entities – those that adhere to pharmacy laws in the countries where they are based, as well as in the countries where they sell medicine – would be permitted to register in .PHARMACY. This includes legitimate online pharmacies and related entities that are located in countries other than the US. It is the position of NABP, and of the global coalition of stakeholders that has encouraged and supported this initiative, that requiring .PHARMACY registrants to comply with international standards does serve the public interest.

In February 2013, NABP convened its first meeting of the .PHARMACY gTLD Advisory Committee, composed of industry experts representing multiple countries and disciplines.

NABP
The meeting provided a history and overview of ICANN’s new gTLD program, NABP’s impetus and objectives in taking on this initiative, as well as input and perspectives from stakeholders including LegitScript, EAASM, and International Pharmaceutical Federation (FIP). Other industry experts working with NABP on the .PHARMACY initiative are the Canadian National Association of Pharmacy Regulatory Authorities, the US Alliance for Safe Online Pharmacies, Eli Lilly and Company, Merck and Company Inc, INTERPOL, and several of NABP’s member boards of pharmacy.

Discussion at the February meeting focused on establishing a system of governance for the .PHARMACY gTLD that will ensure that it represents the global pharmacy community in the best interest of patient safety. Committee members are also considering a plan to identify and define a universal, common set of standards that would be consistently required of all domain name registrants in the .PHARMACY gTLD. These common standards would be supplemented by national specifications that would be required of registrants in those jurisdictions and may address variant policies relating to patient privacy, controlled substances, prescription requirements, and practitioner license requirements. The committee also discussed the scope of the .PHARMACY gTLD described in the application; domain names in the .PHARMACY gTLD will be available not only to legitimate pharmacies but also to approved schools and colleges of pharmacy, prescription drug manufacturers, patient advocacy groups, and other entities providing pharmacy or prescription drug-related services or information, in the interest of patient safety and the global pharmacy community.

Advisory committee members will hold follow-up discussions in the coming months to define domain name registration criteria, authorized usage policy, and compliance strategy for the .PHARMACY gTLD, as well as partnership opportunities for public outreach and consumer education to build public awareness of, and confidence in .PHARMACY. The advisory committee will reconvene via teleconference and/or Webinar in third quarter 2013 to further discuss the governance, standards, and outreach of the .PHARMACY gTLD.

IV. DISCUSSION

Rogue Internet drug outlets fuel the spread of counterfeit and substandard medicine, along with the public health problems they cause on a global scale. By working in concert with regulatory authorities, law enforcement, industry experts, and patient safety advocates across national borders, NABP seeks to help establish a safe online space where the health care community and patients alike can be sure the medicine they buy online is authentic and safe. The .PHARMACY gTLD, as proposed, will be available to legitimate pharmacies and other prescription drug-related
organizations worldwide that adhere to all applicable pharmacy laws in the countries where they are based and where they do business. Recognizing that international collaboration is needed to protect patient health, NABP and its partners are committed to upholding the integrity of the practice of pharmacy, curtailing the online trade of illicit and counterfeit medications, and ensuring that patients have access to safe and effective prescription drugs. Ultimately, this initiative will assure the health care community and patients worldwide that all pharmacy sites ending in the .PHARMACY gTLD are safe and legitimate. More information about NABP’s application for the .PHARMACY gTLD is available on the NABP Web site at www.nabp.net/programs/pharmacy/pharmacy-and-nabp. For further information on this initiative or the Internet Drug Outlet Identification Program, please contact Melissa Madigan, policy and communications director, via e-mail at mmadigan@nabp.net.
V. APPENDIX

Internet Drug Outlet Identification Program Standards

1. **Pharmacy licensure.** The pharmacy must be licensed or registered in good standing to operate a pharmacy or engage in the practice of pharmacy in all required jurisdictions.

2. **DEA registration.** The pharmacy, if dispensing controlled substances, must be registered with the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

3. **Prior discipline.** The pharmacy and its pharmacist-in-charge must not have been subject to significant recent and/or repeated disciplinary sanctions.

4. **Pharmacy location.** The pharmacy must be domiciled in the United States.

5. **Validity of prescription.** The pharmacy shall dispense or offer to dispense prescription drugs only upon receipt of a valid prescription, as defined below, issued by a person authorized to prescribe under state law and, as applicable, federal law. The pharmacy must not distribute or offer to distribute prescriptions or prescription drugs solely on the basis of an online questionnaire or consultation without a preexisting patient-prescriber relationship that has included a face-to-face physical examination, except as explicitly permitted under state telemedicine laws or regulations.

   **Definition.** A valid prescription is one issued pursuant to a legitimate patient-prescriber relationship, which requires the following to have been established: a) The patient has a legitimate medical complaint; b) A face-to-face physical examination adequate to establish the legitimacy of the medical complaint has been performed by the prescribing practitioner, or through a telemedicine practice approved by the appropriate practitioner board; and c) A logical connection exists between the medical complaint, the medical history, and the physical examination and the drug prescribed.

6. **Legal compliance.** The pharmacy must comply with all provisions of federal and state law, including but not limited to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Federal Controlled Substances Act (including the provisions of the Ryan Haight Online Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act, upon the effective date). The pharmacy must not dispense or offer to dispense medications that have not been approved by the US Food and Drug Administration.

7. **Privacy.** If the pharmacy Web site transmits information that would be considered Protected Health Information (PHI) under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule (45 CRF 164), the information must be transmitted in accordance with HIPAA requirements, including the use of Secure-Socket Layer or equivalent technology for the transmission of PHI, and the pharmacy must display its privacy policy that accords with the requirements of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.

8. **Patient services.** The pharmacy must provide on the Web site an accurate US street address of the dispensing pharmacy or corporate headquarters. The pharmacy must provide on the Web site an accurate, readily accessible and responsive phone number or secure mechanism via the Web site, allowing patients to contact or consult with a pharmacist regarding complaints or concerns or in the event of a possible adverse event involving their medication.
9. **Web site transparency.** The pharmacy must not engage in practices or extend offers on its Web site that may deceive or defraud patients as to any material detail regarding the pharmacy, pharmacy staff, prescription drugs, or financial transactions.

10. **Domain name registration.** The domain name registration information of the pharmacy must be accurate, and the domain name registrant must have a logical nexus to the dispensing pharmacy. Absent extenuating circumstances, pharmacy Web sites utilizing anonymous domain name registration services will not be eligible for approval.

11. **Affiliated Web sites.** The pharmacy, Web site, pharmacy staff, domain name registrants, and any person or entity that exercises control over, or participates in, the pharmacy business must not be affiliated with or control any other Web site that violates these standards.
June 4, 2013

To: Members, Enforcement and Compounding Committee

Subject: Agenda Item I (f): National Association of Boards of Pharmacy (NABP) Announces Development of Standards for the Use of .pharmacy Generic Top Level Domain for Internet Pharmacy Web Sites

According to the NABP, which monitors Web sites selling prescription drugs among its various programs, 97 percent of the 10,300 Internet drug outlets it has reviewed are out of compliance with pharmacy laws and practice standards in the US established to protect patients. Correspondingly, NABP has labeled as “Not Recommended” 10,082 Web sites; nearly half of these are offering foreign or non-FDA approved drugs, and many include counterfeits.

Generic top level domains are the suffix part of a Web site address (e.g., .com, .org, .edu). Late last year, the NABP sought the formal approval to be able to approve anyone using the general top level domain (gTLD) of .pharmacy. Earlier this year, an international group of experts were convened by the NABP to develop parameters for anyone that would be able to use the .pharmacy gTLD. The board’s executive officer was one of the individuals who participated in this process.

The intent is to have the parameters for the .pharmacy gTLD in place by the end of 2013. The press release describing these standards is provided below.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 21, 2013
For more information contact:
Deborah Zak, Communications Manager
847/391-4405; custserv@nabp.net

NABP's .PHARMACY Proposal Passes Initial ICANN Evaluation
Achieves Critical Milestone in Creating Safe Online Pharmacy Space for Consumers Worldwide

Reaching a critical milestone in the generic Top-Level Domain (gTLD) approval process, the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy® (NABP®) application to own and operate the .PHARMACY domain suffix has passed the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) initial evaluation. NABP intends to launch the .PHARMACY gTLD by the end of 2013, and will make the new domain available to legitimate online pharmacies and related entities that are located in the United States as well as in other countries. Passing ICANN's initial evaluation is a key success in realizing the Association's vision - established in partnership with a global coalition of stakeholders - of creating a secure and trustworthy online space for pharmacy, benefiting consumers around the world.
Having reached this key point, NABP will now work toward operationalizing the .PHARMACY gTLD program, as it awaits the final stages of ICANN's evaluation process. Next steps in the process include execution of the registry agreement with ICANN and performance of pre-delegation testing, which ensures that NABP and its technical partners have the capacity to operate the new .PHARMACY gTLD in a stable and secure manner.

"Passing this hurdle in the .PHARMACY application process is a significant success in NABP's initiative to establish a safe online space that will benefit patients and the health care community around the world. With the online distribution of counterfeit and substandard medications posing a growing threat to consumers, NABP is extremely pleased to move forward with its plans for the .PHARMACY gTLD," states NABP President Karen M. Ryle, MS, RPh. "By distinguishing .PHARMACY as a domain space exclusively for appropriately licensed, legitimate Internet pharmacies operating in compliance with international pharmacy standards, NABP aims to protect the global public health from dangers of substandard drugs distributed by rogue online sellers."

With the support of a global coalition of stakeholders, including international pharmacy organizations, regulators, industry experts, and law enforcement agencies, NABP applied to ICANN in June 2012 to own and operate the .PHARMACY gTLD. This global coalition shares the Association's concern about illegal online drug sellers distributing products that endanger patient health worldwide. Thus, in its application, NABP stated the importance of ensuring that only legitimate Web site operators that adhere to pharmacy laws in the jurisdictions in which they are based and to which they sell medicine will be able to register domain names in .PHARMACY.

NABP continues to monitor Web sites selling prescription drugs to patients in the US and as of April 2013, has reviewed over 10,400 Internet drug outlets and found 97% of them to be out of compliance with pharmacy laws and practice standards established in the US to protect the public health. Of these 10,082 Web sites identified as Not Recommended, nearly half offer foreign or non-Food and Drug Administration-approved drugs to US residents, and many of these distribute dangerous counterfeits to unsuspecting consumers. Further, health and regulatory agencies in the US and abroad have reported cases of patients harmed by counterfeit, substandard, and adulterated medications distributed by illegal Internet sellers.

The .PHARMACY application was submitted as part of ICANN's expansion of available gTLDs, which currently include familiar suffixes such as .EDU, .GOV, and .COM. Stakeholders that support NABP's application include many groups in the global pharmacy community. Among the coalition of stakeholders behind this initiative are the Alliance for Safe Online Pharmacies, Eli Lilly and Company, European Alliance for Access to Safe Medicines, Gilead Sciences, Inc, International Pharmaceutical Federation, INTERPOL, Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc, LegitScript, Merck/MSD, National Association of Pharmacy Regulatory Authorities, and state boards of pharmacy.

For more information about NABP and the .PHARMACY application, visit www.nabp.net/programs/pharmacy/pharmacy-and-nabp.

NABP is the independent, international, and impartial Association that assists its member boards and jurisdictions in developing, implementing, and enforcing uniform standards for the purpose of protecting the public health.
May 24, 2013

To: Members, Enforcement and Compounding Committee

Subject: Agenda Item II (a) – Discussion Regarding the Introduction of the Board of Pharmacy’s Sponsored Legislation on Sterile Injectable Compounding, SB 294 (Emmerson) and Assembly Bill 1045 (Quirk-Silva)

Following two large-scale public health emergencies last year in which dangerous products compounded by two out-of-state pharmacies were shipped nationwide, staff suggested modifying existing sterile compounding requirements in California. As a result, Senator Emmerson has authored Senate Bill 294 (SB 294) to carry this Board-sponsored legislation.

Senate Bill 294 will strengthen the Board’s ability to regulate and monitor pharmacies that compound sterile drug products. This legislation would prohibit a pharmacy from compounding or dispensing, and a nonresident pharmacy from compounding for shipment into this state, sterile drug products for injection, administration into the eye, or inhalation, unless the pharmacy has obtained a sterile compounding pharmacy license from the board.

Additionally, on April 22, 2013, Assembly Member Quirk-Silva amended Assembly Bill 1045 to carry provisions that would amend existing law to allow the Board to suspend or revoke a nonresident pharmacy’s license if its license is suspended or revoked in the pharmacy’s home state. It would also require resident and nonresident pharmacies that issue a recall notice regarding a sterile compounded drug to contact the recipient pharmacy, prescriber or patient of the recalled drug and the Board within 24 hours of the recall notice if use of or exposure to the recalled drug may cause serious adverse health consequences or death and if the recalled drug was dispensed or is intended for use in this state.

Attached are the following:

**SB 294 (Emmerson) as Introduced February 15, 2013**
Board of Pharmacy Support Letter, March 25, 2013

**Status of SB 294 as of May 23, 2013:**
Policy: Passed SEN Business, Professions and Economic Development (10-0) on April 1, 2013
Fiscal: Passed SEN Appropriations on May 23, 2013
Floor: *(May be heard as soon as the week of May 27)*

**AB 1045 (Quirk-Silva) as Amended April 22, 2013**
Board of Pharmacy Support Letter, May 10, 2013

**Status of AB 1045 as of May 23, 2013:**
Policy: Passed ASM Business, Professions and Consumer Protection (8-0) on April 25, 2013
Fiscal: Passed ASM Appropriations (13-0) on April 30, 2013
Floor: Passed by the Assembly, and ordered to the Senate: May 23, 2013
SB 294, as introduced, Emmerson. Sterile drug products.

The Pharmacy Law provides for the licensure and regulation of pharmacists and pharmacy corporations in this state by the California State Board of Pharmacy. Existing law requires the board to adopt regulations establishing standards for compounding injectable sterile drug products in a pharmacy. Existing law requires pharmacies to obtain a license from the board, subject to annual renewal, in order to compound injectable sterile drug products. A similar licensing requirement applies to nonresident pharmacies compounding injectable sterile drug products for shipment into California. A violation of the Pharmacy Law is a crime.

This bill would expand these provisions to prohibit a pharmacy from compounding or dispensing, and a nonresident pharmacy from compounding for shipment into this state, sterile drug products for injection, administration into the eye, or inhalation, unless the pharmacy has obtained a sterile compounding pharmacy license from the board. The bill would specify requirements for the board for issuance or renewal of a license, and requirements for the pharmacy as a licensee. By adding additional requirements to the Pharmacy Law concerning sterile drug products, the violation of which is a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.

Existing law specifies the fee for issuance or renewal of a nongovernmental license to compound sterile drug products.

This bill would provide that the fee for a nonresident sterile compounding pharmacy license shall also require payment of the travel expenses incurred by the board in inspecting the pharmacy at least once annually.

The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.

This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION 1. The heading of Article 7.5 (commencing with Section 4127) of Chapter 9 of Division 2 of the Business and Professions Code is amended to read:

Article 7.5. Injectable Sterile Drug Products

SEC. 2. Section 4127 of the Business and Professions Code is repealed.

SEC. 3. Section 4127 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:

4127. A pharmacy that compounds sterile drug products for injection, administration into the eye, or inhalation shall possess a sterile compounding pharmacy license as provided in this article before dispensing the compounded medication.

SEC. 4. Section 4127.1 of the Business and Professions Code is amended to read:

4127.1. (a) A pharmacy shall not compound injectable sterile drug products in this state unless the pharmacy has obtained a sterile compounding pharmacy license from the board pursuant to this section. The license shall be renewed annually and is not transferable.

(b) A license to compound injectable sterile drug products may only be issued for only to a location that is licensed as a pharmacy. Furthermore, the license to compound injectable sterile drug products may only be issued only to the owner of the pharmacy license at that location. A license to compound injectable sterile drug products may not be issued until the location is inspected by the board and found in compliance with this article and regulations adopted by the board.

(c) A license to compound injectable sterile drug products may not be issued or renewed until the location has been inspected by the board and found to be in compliance with this article and regulations adopted by the board.

(d) Pharmacies operated by entities that are licensed by either the board or the State Department of Public Health and that have current accreditation from the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, or other private accreditation agencies approved by the board, are exempt from the requirement to obtain a license pursuant to this section.

(1) Performs an onsite inspection of the premises, and any deficiencies noted are corrected.

(2) Reviews a current copy of the pharmacy’s policies and procedures for sterile compounding.

(3) Reviews the pharmacy’s completed self-assessment form required by Section 1735.2 of Title 16 of the California Code of Regulations.

(4) Is provided with copies of all inspection reports conducted of the pharmacy’s premises, and any reports from a private accrediting agency, conducted in the prior 12 months documenting the pharmacy’s operations.

(5) Receives a list of all sterile medications compounded by the pharmacy since the last license renewal.

(d) A pharmacy licensed pursuant to this section shall do all of the following:

(1) Provide to the board a copy of any disciplinary or other action taken by another state within 10 days of the action.

(2) Notify the board within 10 days of the suspension of any accreditation held by the pharmacy.

(3) Provide to the board, within 24 hours, any recall notice issued by the pharmacy for sterile drug products it has compounded.

(e) Adverse effects reported or potentially attributable to a pharmacy’s sterile drug product shall be immediately reported to the board and the MedWatch program of the federal Food and Drug Administration.
(f) The reconstitution of a sterile powder shall not require a license pursuant to this section if both of the following are met:

1. The sterile powder was obtained from a manufacturer.
2. The drug is reconstituted for administration to patients by a health care professional licensed to administer drugs by injection pursuant to this division.

SEC. 5. Section 4127.2 of the Business and Professions Code is amended to read:

4127.2. (a) A nonresident pharmacy may not compound injectable sterile drug products for shipment into the State of California without a sterile compounding pharmacy license issued by the board pursuant to this section. The license shall be renewed annually and shall not be transferable.

(b) A license to compound injectable sterile drug products may only be issued to a location that is licensed as a nonresident pharmacy. Furthermore, the license to compound injectable sterile drug products may only be issued to the owner of the nonresident pharmacy licensed at that location. A license to compound injectable sterile drug products may not be issued or renewed until the board receives the following from the nonresident pharmacy until the location is inspected by the board and found in compliance with this article and any regulations adopted by the board.

1. A copy of an inspection report issued by the pharmacy’s licensing agency, or a report from a private accrediting agency approved by the board, in the prior 12 months documenting the pharmacy’s compliance with board regulations regarding the compounding of injectable sterile drug products.

2. A copy of the nonresident pharmacy’s proposed policies and procedures for sterile compounding.

(c) Nonresident pharmacies operated by entities that are licensed as a hospital, home health agency, or a skilled nursing facility and have current accreditation from the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, or other private accreditation agencies approved by the board, are exempt from the requirement to obtain a license pursuant to this section.

(d) This section shall become effective on the earlier of July 1, 2003, or the effective date of regulations adopted by the board pursuant to Section 4127.

(c) A license to compound sterile drug products shall not be issued or renewed until the board does all of the following:

1. Performs an onsite inspection of the premises, and any deficiencies noted are corrected. The nonresident pharmacy shall be responsible for payment of reasonable travel expenses incurred by the board in connection with inspecting the pharmacy at least once annually pursuant to subdivision (v) of Section 4400.

2. Reviews a current copy of the nonresident pharmacy’s policies and procedures for sterile compounding.

3. Reviews the pharmacy’s completed self-assessment form required by Section 1735.2 of Title 16 of the California Code of Regulations.

4. Is provided with copies of all inspection reports conducted of the nonresident pharmacy’s premises, and any reports from a private accrediting agency, conducted in the prior 12 months documenting the nonresident pharmacy’s operations.

5. Receives a list of all sterile drug products compounded by the pharmacy within the prior 12 months.

(d) A pharmacy licensed pursuant to this section shall do all of the following:

1. Provide to the board a copy of any disciplinary or other action taken by its state of residence or another state within 10 days of the action.

2. Notify the board within 10 days of the suspension of any accreditation held by the pharmacy.

3. Provide to the board, within 24 hours, any recall notice issued by the pharmacy for sterile drug products it has compounded that have been shipped into, or dispensed in, California.

4. Advise the board of any complaint it receives from a provider, pharmacy, or patient in California.
(e) Adverse effects reported or potentially attributable to a nonresident pharmacy’s sterile compounded drug products shall be immediately reported to the board and the MedWatch program of the federal Food and Drug Administration.

SEC. 6. Section 4400 of the Business and Professions Code is amended to read:

4400. The amount of fees and penalties prescribed by this chapter, except as otherwise provided, is that fixed by the board according to the following schedule:

(a) The fee for a nongovernmental pharmacy license shall be four hundred dollars ($400) and may be increased to five hundred twenty dollars ($520). The fee for the issuance of a temporary nongovernmental pharmacy permit shall be two hundred fifty dollars ($250) and may be increased to three hundred twenty-five dollars ($325).

(b) The fee for a nongovernmental pharmacy license annual renewal shall be two hundred fifty dollars ($250) and may be increased to three hundred twenty-five dollars ($325).

(c) The fee for the pharmacist application and examination shall be two hundred dollars ($200) and may be increased to two hundred sixty dollars ($260).

(d) The fee for regrading an examination shall be ninety dollars ($90) and may be increased to one hundred fifteen dollars ($115). If an error in grading is found and the applicant passes the examination, the regrading fee shall be refunded.

(e) The fee for a pharmacist license and biennial renewal shall be one hundred fifty dollars ($150) and may be increased to one hundred ninety-five dollars ($195).

(f) The fee for a nongovernmental wholesaler license and annual renewal shall be six hundred dollars ($600), and may be increased to seven hundred eighty dollars ($780). The application fee for any additional location after licensure of the first 20 locations shall be two hundred twenty-five dollars ($225) and may be increased to three hundred dollars ($300). A temporary license fee shall be five hundred fifty dollars ($550) and may be increased to seven hundred fifteen dollars ($715).

(g) The fee for a hypodermic license and renewal fee shall be one hundred twenty-five dollars ($125) and may be increased to one hundred sixty-five dollars ($165).

(h) (1) The fee for application, investigation, and issuance of license as a designated representative pursuant to Section 4053 shall be two hundred fifty-five dollars ($255) and may be increased to three hundred thirty dollars ($330).

(2) The fee for the annual renewal of a license as a designated representative shall be one hundred fifty dollars ($150) and may be increased to one hundred ninety-five dollars ($195).

(i) (1) The fee for the application, investigation, and issuance of a license as a designated representative for a veterinary food-animal drug retailer pursuant to Section 4053 shall be two hundred fifty-five dollars ($255) and may be increased to three hundred thirty dollars ($330).

(2) The fee for the annual renewal of a license as a designated representative for a veterinary food-animal drug retailer shall be one hundred fifty dollars ($150) and may be increased to one hundred ninety-five dollars ($195).

(j) (1) The application fee for a nonresident wholesaler’s license issued pursuant to Section 4161 shall be six hundred dollars ($600) and may be increased to seven hundred eighty dollars ($780).

(2) For nonresident wholesalers who have 21 or more facilities operating nationwide the application fees for the first 20 locations shall be six hundred dollars ($600) and may be increased to seven hundred eighty dollars ($780). The application fee for any additional location after licensure of the first 20 locations shall be two hundred twenty-five dollars ($225) and may be increased to three hundred dollars ($300). A temporary license fee shall be five hundred fifty dollars ($550) and may be increased to seven hundred fifteen dollars ($715).

(3) The annual renewal fee for a nonresident wholesaler’s license issued pursuant to Section 4161 shall be six hundred dollars ($600) and may be increased to seven hundred eighty dollars ($780).

(k) The fee for evaluation of continuing education courses for accreditation shall be set by the board at an amount not to exceed forty dollars ($40) per course hour.
(l) The fee for an intern pharmacist license shall be ninety dollars ($90) and may be increased to one hundred fifteen dollars ($115). The fee for transfer of intern hours or verification of licensure to another state shall be twenty-five dollars ($25) and may be increased to thirty dollars ($30).

(m) The board may waive or refund the additional fee for the issuance of a license where the license is issued less than 45 days before the next regular renewal date.

(n) The fee for the reissuance of any license, or renewal thereof, that has been lost or destroyed or reissued due to a name change shall be thirty-five dollars ($35) and may be increased to forty-five dollars ($45).

(o) The fee for the reissuance of any license, or renewal thereof, that must be reissued because of a change in the information, shall be one hundred dollars ($100) and may be increased to one hundred thirty dollars ($130).

(p) It is the intent of the Legislature that, in setting fees pursuant to this section, the board shall seek to maintain a reserve in the Pharmacy Board Contingent Fund equal to approximately one year’s operating expenditures.

(q) The fee for any applicant for a nongovernmental clinic license shall be four hundred dollars ($400) and may be increased to five hundred twenty dollars ($520) for each license. The annual fee for renewal of the license shall be two hundred fifty dollars ($250) and may be increased to three hundred twenty-five dollars ($325) for each license.

(r) The fee for the issuance of a pharmacy technician license shall be eighty dollars ($80) and may be increased to one hundred five dollars ($105). The fee for renewal of a pharmacy technician license shall be one hundred dollars ($100) and may be increased to one hundred thirty dollars ($130).

(s) The fee for a veterinary food-animal drug retailer license shall be four hundred five dollars ($405) and may be increased to four hundred twenty-five dollars ($425). The annual renewal fee for a veterinary food-animal drug retailer license shall be two hundred fifty dollars ($250) and may be increased to three hundred twenty-five dollars ($325).

(t) The fee for issuance of a retired license pursuant to Section 4200.5 shall be thirty-five dollars ($35) and may be increased to forty-five dollars ($45).

(u) The fee for issuance or renewal of a nongovernmental sterile compounding pharmacy license to compound sterile drug products shall be six hundred dollars ($600) and may be increased to seven hundred eighty dollars ($780). The fee for a temporary license shall be five hundred fifty dollars ($550) and may be increased to seven hundred fifteen dollars ($715).

(v) The fee for a nonresident sterile compounding pharmacy license shall also require payment of the travel expenses incurred by the board in inspecting the pharmacy at least once annually. Failure to pay this fee within 30 days shall result in the suspension of the nonresident sterile compounding pharmacy license.

SEC. 7. No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.
March 25, 2013

The Honorable Bill Emmerson  
California State Senate 
State Capitol, Room 5082 
Sacramento, CA 95814

RE: Senate Bill 294 – Support 

Dear Dr. Emmerson:

The California State Board of Pharmacy thanks you for authoring Senate Bill 294 which will strengthen the Board of Pharmacy’s ability to regulate and monitor specialized pharmacies that compound sterile drug products and ship those drugs into California.

In 2001, the California Legislature first enacted specific provisions to strengthen state oversight of sterile drug compounding in pharmacies. The legislation followed the death of three people and multiple hospitalizations due to a pharmacy in California that compounded and distributed a cortisone-based injectable drug that was tainted with meningitis bacteria. The resulting legislation required pharmacies within California to obtain a specialty license if they performed sterile injectable compounding—a license that required annual inspections by board pharmacists before license issuance or renewal. Additional provisions required non-resident pharmacies that shipped sterile injectable drugs into California to also be licensed with this board. However, SB 293 (Torlakson, 2001) carved out an exemption for California and non-resident pharmacies and others to avoid this specialty license if they were accredited or where, in the case of non-resident pharmacies, regulators (other than the Board of Pharmacy) had oversight.

Unfortunately, the tragic incidents that occurred over a decade ago have not ceased. Recently, in June of 2012, a licensed sterile injectable pharmacy located in Florida shipped contaminated products into California and patients here were injured. In September 2012, the New England Compounding Center based in Massachusetts shipped contaminated injectable drugs throughout the country, including California, resulting in the death of more than 50 people and in the illness of more than 700 patients. California was fortunate in that while our patients received products, no deaths or injuries have been reported as a result of these contaminated products. However, in both cases, because the board was unable to inspect these non-resident facilities, the board was not able to ensure that the operations met California’s regulatory requirements.

As introduced, SB 294 would
- Require annual inspections by the board of pharmacy of these specialty pharmacies to ensure that the operations comply with California’s requirements for sterile compounding;
- Expand the types of medications for which a specialty license is required to also include other high-risk types of drugs, such as those administered into the eyes, or inhaled; and
- Ensure California standards are met and enforced for all pharmacies that ship these specialty compounded drug products into California, by requiring board inspections of those who hold a specialty license.
Compounding pharmacies are especially important today to produce needed medications that are in short supply. However, it is equally important that California’s sterile compounding requirements are met by these specialty pharmacies and that they are monitored for compliance. Once again, it is time to strengthen the state’s oversight of pharmacies that compound sterile drug products so that Californians are protected. Senate Bill 294 will provide for such enhanced protection and will ensure that California’s standards are enforced and patients are protected.

Sincerely,

VIRGINIA HEROLD
Executive Officer
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL’S DIGEST

AB 1045, as amended, Quirk-Silva. Animal shelters—Sterile compounding pharmacies.

Existing law, the Pharmacy Law, provides for the licensure and regulation of pharmacies in this state by the California State Board of Pharmacy. A violation of these provisions is a crime.

Existing law provides that a pharmacy located outside this state that ships, mails, or delivers, in any manner, controlled substances, dangerous drugs, or dangerous devices into this state shall be considered a nonresident pharmacy. Existing law prohibits a person from acting as a nonresident pharmacy unless he or she has obtained a license from the board, and authorizes the board to register a nonresident pharmacy that is organized as a limited liability company in the state in which it is licensed. The law also prohibits a resident or nonresident pharmacy from compounding injectable sterile drug products for shipment into this state without a license issued by the board, and authorizes a license to compound injectable sterile drug products to be issued only for a location that is licensed as a nonresident pharmacy.

This bill would provide that if the home state pharmacy license of a nonresident pharmacy is revoked or suspended for any reason, any license issued pursuant to provisions governing the licensing and registration of nonresident pharmacies and authorizing a nonresident pharmacy to compound injectable sterile drug products shall be immediately revoked or suspended by operation of law.

The bill would also require a resident or a nonresident pharmacy that issues a recall notice regarding a sterile compounded drug to contact the recipient pharmacy, prescriber, or patient of the recalled drug and the board
within 24 hours of the recall notice if use of or exposure to the recalled drug may cause serious adverse health consequences or death and if the recalled drug was dispensed or is intended for use in this state. Because a violation of these requirements would be a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.

The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.

This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for a specified reason.

Existing law governs the seizure, rescue, adoption, and euthanasia of abandoned and surrendered animals by animal shelters and rescue organizations.

This bill would make technical, nonsubstantive changes to those provisions by replacing references to a “pound” with references to an “animal shelter” and by replacing references to destroying an animal with references to humanely euthanizing the animal.

Vote: majority  Appropriation: no  Fiscal Committee: noyes  Local Program: noyes

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION 1. Section 4112 of the Business and Professions Code is amended to read:

4112. (a) Any pharmacy located outside this state that ships, mails, or delivers, in any manner, controlled substances, dangerous drugs, or dangerous devices into this state shall be considered a nonresident pharmacy.

(b) A person may not act as a nonresident pharmacy unless he or she has obtained a license from the board. The board may register a nonresident pharmacy that is organized as a limited liability company in the state in which it is licensed.

(c) A nonresident pharmacy shall disclose to the board the location, names, and titles of (1) its agent for service of process in this state, (2) all principal corporate officers, if any, (3) all general partners, if any, and (4) all pharmacists who are dispensing controlled substances, dangerous drugs, or dangerous devices to residents of this state. A report containing this information shall be made on an annual basis and within 30 days after any change of office, corporate officer, partner, or pharmacist.

(d) All nonresident pharmacies shall comply with all lawful directions and requests for information from the regulatory or licensing agency of the state in which it is licensed as well as with all requests for information made by the board pursuant to this section. The nonresident pharmacy shall maintain, at all times, a valid unexpired license, permit, or registration to conduct the pharmacy in compliance with the laws of the state in which it is a resident. As a prerequisite to registering with the board, the nonresident pharmacy shall submit a copy of the most recent inspection report resulting from an inspection conducted by the regulatory or licensing agency of the state in which it is located. If the home state pharmacy license of a nonresident pharmacy is revoked or suspended for any reason, any license issued pursuant to this section shall be immediately revoked or suspended by operation of law.

(e) All nonresident pharmacies shall maintain records of controlled substances, dangerous drugs, or dangerous devices dispensed to patients in this state so that the records are readily retrievable from the records of other drugs dispensed.

(f) Any pharmacy subject to this section shall, during its regular hours of operation, but not less than six days per week, and for a minimum of 40 hours per week, provide a toll-free telephone service to facilitate communication between patients in this state and a pharmacist at the pharmacy who has access to the patient’s records. This toll-free telephone number shall be disclosed on a label affixed to each container of drugs dispensed to patients in this state.

(g) A nonresident pharmacy shall not permit a pharmacist whose license has been revoked by the board to manufacture, compound, furnish, sell, dispense, or initiate the prescription of a dangerous drug or dangerous device, or to provide any pharmacy-related service, to a person residing in California.

(h) The board shall adopt regulations that apply the same requirements or standards for oral consultation to a nonresident pharmacy that operates pursuant to this section and ships, mails, or delivers any controlled substances, dangerous drugs, or dangerous devices to residents of this state, as are applied to an in-state pharmacy that operates pursuant to Section 4037 when the pharmacy ships, mails, or delivers any controlled substances, dangerous drugs, or dangerous devices to residents of this state. The board shall not adopt any
regulations that require face-to-face consultation for a prescription that is shipped, mailed, or delivered to the patient. The regulations adopted pursuant to this subdivision shall not result in any unnecessary delay in patients receiving their medication.

(i) The registration fee shall be the fee specified in subdivision (a) of Section 4400.

(j) The registration requirements of this section shall apply only to a nonresident pharmacy that ships, mails, or delivers controlled substances, dangerous drugs, and dangerous devices into this state pursuant to a prescription.

(k) Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the dispensing of contact lenses by nonresident pharmacists except as provided by Section 4124.

SEC. 2. Section 4127.2 of the Business and Professions Code is amended to read:

4127.2. (a) A nonresident pharmacy may not compound injectable sterile drug products for shipment into the State of California without a license issued by the board pursuant to this section. The license shall be renewed annually and shall not be transferable.

(b) A license to compound injectable sterile drug products may only be issued for a location that is licensed as a nonresident pharmacy. Furthermore, the license to compound injectable sterile drug products may only be issued to the owner of the nonresident pharmacy license at that location. If the home state pharmacy license of a nonresident pharmacy is revoked or suspended for any reason, any license issued pursuant to Section 4112 or this section shall be immediately revoked or suspended by operation of law. A license to compound injectable sterile drug products may not be issued or renewed until the board receives the following from the nonresident pharmacy:

(1) A copy of an inspection report issued by the pharmacy’s licensing agency, or a report from a private accrediting agency approved by the board, in the prior 12 months documenting the pharmacy’s compliance with board regulations regarding the compounding of injectable sterile drug products.

(2) A copy of the nonresident pharmacy’s proposed policies and procedures for sterile compounding.

(c) Nonresident pharmacies operated by entities that are licensed as a hospital, home health agency, or a skilled nursing facility and have current accreditation from the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, or other private accreditation agencies approved by the board, are exempt from the requirement to obtain a license pursuant to this section.

(d) This section shall become effective on the earlier of July 1, 2003, or the effective date of regulations adopted by the board pursuant to Section 4127.

SEC. 3. Section 4127.9 is added to the Business and Professions Code, to read:

4127.9. (a) A pharmacy licensed pursuant to Section 4127.1 or 4127.2, including a pharmacy that is exempt from licensure pursuant to subdivision (d) of Section 4127.1 and subdivision (c) of Section 4127.2, that issues a recall notice regarding a sterile compounded drug shall, in addition to any other duties, contact the recipient pharmacy, prescriber, or patient of the recalled drug and the board within 24 hours of the recall notice if both of the following apply:

(1) Use of or exposure to the recalled drug may cause serious adverse health consequences or death.

(2) The recalled drug was dispensed, or is intended for use, in this state.

(b) A recall notice issued pursuant to subdivision (a) shall be made as follows:

(1) If the recalled drug was dispensed directly to the patient, the notice shall be made to the patient.

(2) If the recalled drug was dispensed directly to the prescriber, the notice shall be made to the prescriber, who shall ensure the patient is notified.

(3) If the recalled drug was dispensed directly to a pharmacy, the notice shall be made to the pharmacy, who shall notify the prescriber or patient, as appropriate. If the pharmacy notifies the prescriber, the prescriber shall ensure the patient is notified.
SEC. 4. No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution because the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIIIB of the California Constitution.

SECTION 1. Section 4827 of the Business and Professions Code is amended to read: 4827.
Nothing in this chapter prohibits any person from:

(a) Practicing veterinary medicine as a bona fide owner of one’s own animals. This exemption applies to the following:

(1) The owner’s bona fide employees.

(2) Any person assisting the owner, provided that the practice is performed gratuitously.

(b) Lay testing of poultry by the whole blood agglutination test. For purposes of this section, "poultry" means flocks of avian species maintained for food production, including, but not limited to, chickens, turkeys, and exotic fowl.

(c) Making any determination as to the status of pregnancy, sterility, or infertility upon livestock, equine, or food animals at the time an animal is being inseminated, providing no charge is made for this determination.

(d) Administering sodium pentobarbital for euthanasia of sick, injured, homeless, or surrendered domestic pets or animals without the presence of a veterinarian when the person is an employee of an animal control shelter and its agencies or humane society and has received proper training in the administration of sodium pentobarbital for those purposes.

SEC. 2. Section 1834.6 of the Civil Code is amended to read: 1834.6.
An abandoned animal, as described in Section 1834.5, shall not be used for scientific or any other type of experimentation, nor shall such an abandoned animal be turned over to an animal shelter or animal regulation department of a public agency.

SEC. 3. Section 1834.7 of the Civil Code is amended to read: 1834.7.
(a) In any animal shelter or animal regulation department of a public or private agency where animals are turned over dead or alive to a biological supply facility or a research facility, a sign (measuring a minimum of 28x21 cm—11x81/2 inches—with lettering of a minimum of 3.2 cm high and 1.2 cm wide—11/4x1/2 inch—(91 point)) stating:

"Animals Turned In To This Shelter May Be Used For Research Purposes or to Supply Blood, Tissue, or Other Biological Products"

shall be posted in a place where it will be clearly visible to a majority of persons when turning animals over to the shelter. This statement shall also be included on owner surrender forms. The owner surrender forms shall also include the definition of "biological supply facility" contained in subdivision (c).

(b) For purposes of this section, "animal research facility" includes any laboratory, firm, association, corporation, copartnership, and educational institution.

(c) For purposes of this section, "biological supply facility" includes any blood bank, laboratory, firm, association, corporation, copartnership, or educational institution that sells biological materials such as blood or animals, either alive or dead, to research facilities, educational institutions, or veterinarians.

SEC. 4. Section 1846 of the Civil Code is amended to read: 1846.
(a) A gratuitous depository must use, at least, slight care for the preservation of the thing deposited.

(b) A gratuitous depository of a living animal shall provide the animal with necessary and prompt veterinary care, adequate nutrition and water, and shelter, and shall treat it humanely and, if the animal has any identification, make reasonable attempts to notify the owner of the animal’s location. Any gratuitous depository that does not have sufficient resources or desire to provide that care shall promptly turn the animal over to an appropriate care facility.
If the gratuitous deposition of a living animal is a public animal shelter, shelter operated by a society for the prevention of cruelty to animals, or humane shelter, the depositary shall comply with all other requirements of the Food and Agricultural Code regarding the impounding of live animals.

SEC. 5. Section 1847 of the Civil Code is amended to read: 1847.
The duties of a gratuitous depositary cease:

(a) Upon restoration by the depositary of the thing deposited to its owner.

(b) Upon reasonable notice given by the depositary to the owner to remove it, and the owner failing to do so within a reasonable time. But an involuntary depositary, under subdivision (b) of Section 1815, may not give notice until the emergency that gave rise to the deposit is past. This subdivision shall not apply to a public animal shelter, a shelter operated by a society for the prevention of cruelty to animals, or a humane shelter. The duty to provide care, as required by Section 1846, continues until the public or private animal shelter is lawfully relieved of responsibility for the animal.

SEC. 6. Section 17003 of the Food and Agricultural Code is amended to read: 17003.
(a) Except as provided in this section, this chapter does not affect any law, ordinance, or regulation regarding estrays, the shelter director, or other animal control officer, or a public animal control agency or shelter within the limits of any city or county where these laws, ordinances, or regulations are in force.

(b) Upon the impounding of any bovine animal, horse, mule, or burro, the shelter director, other animal control officer, or public animal control agency or shelter shall immediately notify the secretary. Upon receipt of that notice, the secretary shall take possession of any bovine animal and shall dispose of it pursuant to this chapter.

(c) Any city, county, or city and county that establishes or has established laws, ordinances, or regulations regarding estrays, may opt to follow those laws, ordinances, or regulations instead of this chapter in the handling of estrays that are not bovine animals in accordance with the applicable laws, ordinances, or regulations of the city, county, or city and county.

(d) This section does not authorize any act that violates Section 597 of the Penal Code.

SEC. 7. Section 31607 of the Food and Agricultural Code is amended to read: 31607.
“Impounded” means taken into the custody of the public animal shelter or animal control department or provider of animal control services to the city or county where the potentially dangerous or vicious dog is found.

SEC. 8. Section 31621 of the Food and Agricultural Code is amended to read: 31621.
If an animal control officer or a law enforcement officer has investigated and determined that there exists probable cause to believe that a dog is potentially dangerous or vicious, the chief officer of the public animal shelter or animal control department or his or her immediate supervisor or the head of the local law enforcement agency, or his or her designee, shall petition the superior court of the county wherein the dog is owned or kept for a hearing for the purpose of determining whether or not the dog in question should be declared potentially dangerous or vicious. A proceeding under this section is a limited civil case. A city or county may establish an administrative hearing procedure to hear and dispose of petitions filed pursuant to this chapter. Whenever possible, any complaint received from a member of the public which serves as the evidentiary basis for the animal control officer or law enforcement officer to find probable cause shall be sworn to and verified by the complainant and shall be attached to the petition. The chief officer of the public animal shelter or animal control department or head of the local law enforcement agency shall notify the owner or keeper of the dog that a hearing will be held by the superior court or the hearing entity, as the case may be, at which time he or she may present evidence as to why the dog should not be declared potentially dangerous or vicious. The owner or keeper of the dog shall be served with notice of the hearing and a copy of the petition, either personally or by first-class mail with return receipt requested. The hearing shall be held promptly within no less than five working days nor more than 10 working days after service of notice upon the owner or keeper of the dog. The hearing shall be open to the public. The court may admit into evidence all relevant evidence, including incident reports and the affidavits of witnesses, limit the scope of discovery, and may shorten the time to produce records or witnesses. A jury shall not be available. The court may find, upon a preponderance of the evidence, that the dog is potentially dangerous or vicious and make other orders authorized by this chapter.

SEC. 9. Section 31622 of the Food and Agricultural Code is amended to read: 31622.
(a) After the hearing conducted pursuant to Section 31621, the owner or keeper of the dog shall be notified in writing of the determination and orders issued, either personally or by first-class mail postage prepaid by the court or hearing entity. If a determination is made that the dog is potentially dangerous or vicious, the owner or...
keeper shall comply with Article 3 (commencing with Section 31641) in accordance with a time schedule established by the chief officer of the public animal shelter or animal control department or the head of the local law enforcement agency, but in no case more than 30 days after the date of the determination or 35 days if notice of the determination is mailed to the owner or keeper of the dog. If the petitioner or the owner or keeper of the dog contests the determination, he or she may, within five days of the receipt of the notice of determination, appeal the decision of the court or hearing entity of original jurisdiction. The fee for filing an appeal, payable to the clerk of the court, is as provided in subdivision (b) of Section 70626 of the Government Code. If the original hearing held pursuant to Section 31621 was before a hearing entity other than a court of the jurisdiction, appeal shall be to the superior court. If the original hearing was held in the superior court, appeal shall be to the superior court before a judge other than the judge who originally heard the petition. The petitioner or the owner or keeper of the dog shall serve personally or by first-class mail, postage prepaid, notice of the appeal upon the other party.

(b) The court hearing the appeal shall conduct a hearing de novo, without a jury, and make its own determination as to potential danger and viciousness and make other orders authorized by this chapter, based upon the evidence presented. The hearing shall be conducted in the same manner and within the time periods set forth in Section 31621 and subdivision (a). The court may admit all relevant evidence, including incident reports and the affidavits of witnesses, limit the scope of discovery, and may shorten the time to produce records or witnesses. The issue shall be decided upon the preponderance of the evidence. If the court rules the dog to be potentially dangerous or vicious, the court may establish a time schedule to ensure compliance with this chapter, but in no case more than 30 days subsequent to the date of the court’s determination or 35 days if the service of the judgment is by first-class mail.

SEC. 10. Section 32001 of the Food and Agricultural Code is amended to read:

32001. All public animal shelters, shelters operated by societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals, and humane shelters, that contract to perform public animal control services, shall provide the owners of lost animals and those who find lost animals with all of the following:

(a) Ability to list the animals they have lost or found on “Lost and Found” lists maintained by the animal shelter.

(b) Referrals to animals listed that may be the animals the owners or finders have lost or found.

(c) The telephone numbers and addresses of other animal shelters in the same vicinity.

(d) Advice as to means of publishing and disseminating information regarding lost animals.

(e) The telephone numbers and addresses of volunteer groups that may be of assistance in locating lost animals.

The duties imposed by this section are mandatory duties for public entities for all purposes of the Government Code and for all private entities with which a public entity has contracted to perform those duties.

SEC. 11. Section 32003 of the Food and Agricultural Code is amended to read:

32003. All public and private animal shelters shall keep accurate records on each animal taken up, medically treated, or impounded. The records shall include all of the following information and any other information required by the California Veterinary Medical Board:

(a) The date the animal was taken up, medically treated, euthanized, or impounded.

(b) The circumstances under which the animal was taken up, medically treated, euthanized, or impounded.

(c) The names of the personnel who took up, medically treated, euthanized, or impounded the animal.

(d) A description of any medical treatment provided to the animal and the name of the veterinarian of record.

(e) The final disposition of the animal, including the name of the person who euthanized the animal or the name and address of the adopting party. These records shall be maintained for three years after the date the animal’s impoundment ended.

SEC. 12. Section 121916 of the Health and Safety Code is amended to read:

121916. (a) Any person or owner of an attack, guard, or sentry dog that operates or maintains a business to sell, rent, or train an attack, guard, or sentry dog shall obtain a permit from the local public agency or private society or animal shelter contracting with the local public agency for animal care or protection services.
(b) Each local agency shall adopt and implement a permit program for the administration of subdivision (a) by the local agency or private society or animal shelter contracting with the local public agency for animal care or protection services. A local agency may charge a fee for the issuance or renewal of a permit required under this section. The fee shall not exceed the actual costs for the implementation of the permit program.

(c) For purposes of this section, "local public agency" means a city, county, or city and county.

(a) Any person violating any provision of this chapter shall be subject to a civil penalty of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) per violation. The action may be prosecuted in the name of the people of the State of California by the district attorney for the county where the violation occurred in the appropriate court or by the city attorney in the city where the violation occurred.

(b) Nothing in this chapter limits or authorizes any act or omission that violates Section 597 of the Penal Code.

(c) Nothing in this chapter shall authorize the seizure of an unweaned bird by a peace officer, officer of a humane society, or officer of an animal shelter or animal regulation department of a public agency.

SEC. 14. Section 597 of the Penal Code is amended to read: 597.
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (c) of this section or Section 599c, every person who maliciously and intentionally maims, mutilates, tortures, or wounds a living animal, or maliciously and intentionally kills an animal, is guilty of a crime punishable pursuant to subdivision (d).

(b) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (a) or (c), every person who overdrives, overloads, drives when overloaded, overworks, tortures, torments, deprives of necessary sustenance, drink, or shelter, cruelly beats, mutilates, or cruelly kills any animal, or causes or procures any animal to be so overdriven, overloaded, driven when overloaded, overworked, tortured, tormented, deprived of necessary sustenance, drink, shelter, or to be cruelly beaten, mutilated, or cruelly killed; and whoever, having the charge or custody of any animal, either as owner or otherwise, subjects any animal to needless suffering, or inflicts unnecessary cruelty upon the animal, or in any manner abuses any animal, or fails to provide the animal with proper food, drink, or shelter, or protection from the weather, or who drives, rides, or otherwise uses the animal when unfit for labor, is, for each offense, guilty of a crime punishable pursuant to subdivision (d).

(c) Every person who maliciously and intentionally maims, mutilates, or tortures any mammal, bird, reptile, amphibian, or fish, as described in subdivision (e), is guilty of a crime punishable pursuant to subdivision (d).

(d) A violation of subdivision (a), (b), or (c) is punishable as a felony by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170, or by a fine of not more than twenty thousand dollars ($20,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment, or alternatively, as a misdemeanor by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than twenty thousand dollars ($20,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment.

(e) Subdivision (c) applies to any mammal, bird, reptile, amphibian, or fish which is a creature described as follows:

1. Endangered species or threatened species as described in Chapter 1.5 (commencing with Section 2050) of Division 3 of the Fish and Game Code.

2. Fully protected birds described in Section 3511 of the Fish and Game Code.

3. Fully protected mammals described in Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 4700) of Part 3 of Division 4 of the Fish and Game Code.

4. Fully protected reptiles and amphibians described in Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 5050) of Division 5 of the Fish and Game Code.

5. Fully protected fish described in Section 5515 of the Fish and Game Code.

This subdivision does not supersede or affect any provisions of law relating to taking of the described species, including, but not limited to, Section 12008 of the Fish and Game Code.

(f) For the purpose of subdivision (c), each act of malicious and intentional maiming, mutilating, or torturing a separate specimen of a creature described in subdivision (e) is a separate offense. If any person is charged with a violation of subdivision (c), the proceedings shall be subject to Section 12157 of the Fish and Game Code.
(g) (1) Upon the conviction of a person charged with a violation of this section by causing or permitting an act of cruelty, as defined in Section 599b, all animals lawfully seized and impounded with respect to the violation by a peace officer, officer of a humane society, or officer of an animal shelter or animal regulation department of a public agency shall be adjudged by the court to be forfeited and shall thereupon be awarded to the impounding officer for proper disposition. A person convicted of a violation of this section by causing or permitting an act of cruelty, as defined in Section 599b, shall be liable to the impounding officer for all costs of impoundment from the time of seizure to the time of proper disposition.

(2) Mandatory seizure or impoundment shall not apply to animals in properly conducted scientific experiments or investigations performed under the authority of the faculty of a regularly incorporated medical college or university of this state.

(h) Notwithstanding any other law, if a defendant is granted probation for a conviction under this section, the court shall order the defendant to pay for, and successfully complete, counseling, as determined by the court, designed to evaluate and treat behavior or conduct disorders. If the court finds that the defendant is financially unable to pay for that counseling, the court may develop a sliding fee schedule based upon the defendant’s ability to pay. An indigent defendant may negotiate a deferred payment schedule, but shall pay a nominal fee if the defendant has the ability to pay the nominal fee. County mental health departments or Medi-Cal shall be responsible for the costs of counseling required by this section only for those persons who meet the medical necessity criteria for mental health managed care pursuant to Section 1830.205 of Title 9 of the California Code of Regulations or the targeted population criteria specified in Section 5600.3 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The counseling specified in this subdivision shall be in addition to any other terms and conditions of probation, including any term of imprisonment and any fine. This provision specifies a mandatory additional term of probation and is not to be utilized as an alternative in lieu of imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 or county jail when that sentence is otherwise appropriate. If the court does not order custody as a condition of probation for a conviction under this section, the court shall specify on the court record the reason or reasons for not ordering custody. This subdivision shall not apply to cases involving police dogs or horses as described in Section 600.

SEC. 15. Section 597.1 of the Penal Code is amended to read: 597.1.

(a)(1) Every owner, driver, or keeper of any animal who permits the animal to be in any building, enclosure, lane, street, square, or lot of any city, county, city and county, or judicial district without proper care and attention is guilty of a misdemeanor. Any peace officer, humane society officer, or animal control officer shall take possession of the stray or abandoned animal and shall provide care and treatment for the animal until the animal is deemed to be in suitable condition to be returned to the owner. When the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that very prompt action is required to protect the health or safety of the animal or the health or safety of others, the officer shall immediately seize the animal and comply with subdivision (f). In all other cases, the officer shall comply with the provisions of subdivision (g). The full cost of caring for and treating any animal properly seized under this subdivision or pursuant to a search warrant shall constitute a lien on the animal and the animal shall not be returned to its owner until the charges are paid, if the seizure is upheld pursuant to this section.

(2) Notwithstanding any other law, if an animal control officer or humane officer, when necessary to protect the health and safety of a wild, stray, or abandoned animal or the health and safety of others, seeks to administer a tranquilizer that contains a controlled substance, as defined in Division 10 (commencing with Section 11000) of the Health and Safety Code, to gain control of that animal, he or she may possess and administer that tranquilizer with direct or indirect supervision as determined by a licensed veterinarian, provided that the officer has met each of the following requirements:

(A) Has received training in the administration of tranquilizers from a licensed veterinarian. The training shall be approved by the California Veterinary Medical Board.

(B) Has successfully completed the firearms component of a course relating to the exercise of police powers, as set forth in Section 832.

(C) Is authorized by his or her agency or organization to possess and administer the tranquilizer in accordance with a policy established by the agency or organization and approved by the veterinarian who obtained the controlled substance.

(D) Has successfully completed the euthanasia training set forth in Section 2039 of Title 16 of the California Code of Regulations.
(E) Has completed a state and federal fingerprinting background check and does not have any drug- or alcohol-related convictions.

(b) Every sick, disabled, infirm, or crippled animal, except a dog or cat, that is abandoned in any city, county, city and county, judicial district, or any other area, or is found roaming where it is known to be a stray or abandoned, shall be seized by the animal control officer to the nearest veterinarian or animal control facility. The veterinarian or animal control facility shall provide care and treatment for the animal in accordance with the laws of the state and the county.

(c)(1) Any peace officer, humane society officer, or animal control officer shall convey all injured cats and dogs found without their owners in a public place directly to a veterinarian known by the officer to be a veterinarian who ordinarily treats dogs and cats for a determination of whether the animal shall be immediately and humanely euthanized or shall be hospitalized under proper care and given emergency treatment.

(2) If the owner does not redeem the animal within the locally prescribed waiting period, the veterinarian may personally perform euthanasia on the animal. If the animal is treated and recover, the veterinarian may keep the animal for purposes of adoption, provided the responsible animal control agency has first been contacted and has refused to take possession of the animal.

(3) Whenever any animal is transferred to a veterinarian in a clinic, such as an emergency clinic that is not in continuous operation, the veterinarian may, in turn, transfer the animal to an appropriate facility.

(4) If the veterinarian determines that the animal shall be hospitalized under proper care and given emergency treatment, the costs of any services that are provided pending the owner's inquiry to the responsible agency, department, or society shall be paid from the dog license fees, fines, and fees for impounding dogs in the city, county, or city and county in which the animal was licensed or, if the animal is unlicensed, shall be paid by the jurisdiction in which the animal was found, subject to the provision that this cost be repaid by the animal's owner. The full cost of caring for and treating any animal seized under this subdivision shall constitute a lien on the animal and the animal shall not be returned to its owner until the charges are paid.

(d) An animal control agency that takes possession of an animal pursuant to subdivision (c) shall keep records of the whereabouts of the animal from the time of possession to the end of the animal's impoundment, and those records shall be available for inspection by the public upon request for three years after the date the animal's impoundment ended.

(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, any peace officer, humane society officer, or any animal control officer may, with the approval of his or her immediate superior, humanely euthanize any stray or abandoned animal in the field in any case where the animal is too severely injured to move or where a veterinarian is not available and it would be more humane to euthanize the animal.

(f) Whenever an officer authorized under this section seizes or impounds an animal based on a reasonable belief that prompt action is required to protect the health or safety of the animal or the health or safety of others, the officer shall, prior to the commencement of any criminal proceedings authorized by this section, provide the owner or keeper of the animal, if known or ascertainable after reasonable investigation, with the opportunity for a postseizure hearing to determine the validity of the seizure or impoundment, or both.

(1) The agency shall cause a notice to be affixed to a conspicuous place where the animal was situated or personally deliver a notice of the seizure or impoundment, or both, to the owner or keeper within 48 hours, excluding weekends and holidays. The notice shall include all of the following:

(A) The name, business address, and telephone number of the officer providing the notice.

(B) A description of the animal seized, including any identification upon the animal.
(C) The authority and purpose for the seizure or impoundment, including the time, place, and circumstances under which the animal was seized.

(D) A statement that, in order to receive a postseizure hearing, the owner or person authorized to keep the animal, or his or her agent, shall request the hearing by signing and returning an enclosed declaration of ownership or right to keep the animal to the agency providing the notice within 10 days, including weekends and holidays, of the date of the notice. The declaration may be returned by personal delivery or mail.

(E) A statement that the full cost of caring for and treating any animal properly seized under this section is a lien on the animal and that the animal shall not be returned to the owner until the charges are paid, and that failure to request or to attend a scheduled hearing shall result in liability for this cost.

(2) The postseizure hearing shall be conducted within 48 hours of the request, excluding weekends and holidays. The seizing agency may authorize its own officer or employee to conduct the hearing if the hearing officer is not the same person who directed the seizure or impoundment of the animal and is not junior in rank to that person. The agency may utilize the services of a hearing officer from outside the agency for the purposes of complying with this section.

(3) Failure of the owner or keeper, or of his or her agent, to request or to attend a scheduled hearing shall result in a forfeiture of any right to a postseizure hearing or right to challenge his or her liability for costs incurred.

(4) The agency, department, or society employing the person who directed the seizure shall be responsible for the costs incurred for caring and treating the animal, if it is determined in the postseizure hearing that the seizing officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe very prompt action, including seizure of the animal, was required to protect the health or safety of the animal or the health or safety of others. If it is determined the seizure was justified, the owner or keeper shall be personally liable to the seizing agency for the full cost of the seizure and care of the animal. The charges for the seizure and care of the animal shall be a lien on the animal. The animal shall not be returned to its owner until the charges are paid and the owner demonstrates to the satisfaction of the seizing agency or the hearing officer that the owner can and will provide the necessary care for the animal.

(g) Where the need for immediate seizure is not present and prior to the commencement of any criminal proceedings authorized by this section, the agency shall provide the owner or keeper of the animal, if known or ascertainable after reasonable investigation, with the opportunity for a hearing prior to any seizure or impoundment of the animal. The owner shall produce the animal at the time of the hearing unless, prior to the hearing, the owner has made arrangements with the agency to view the animal upon request of the agency, or unless the owner can provide verification that the animal was humanely euthanized. Any person who willfully fails to produce the animal or provide the verification is guilty of an infraction, punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred fifty dollars ($250) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000).

(1) The agency shall cause a notice to be affixed to a conspicuous place where the animal was situated or personally deliver a notice stating the grounds for believing the animal should be seized under subdivision (a) or (b). The notice shall include all of the following:

(A) The name, business address, and telephone number of the officer providing the notice.

(B) A description of the animal to be seized, including any identification upon the animal.

(C) The authority and purpose for the possible seizure or impoundment.

(D) A statement that, in order to receive a hearing prior to any seizure, the owner or person authorized to keep the animal, or his or her agent, shall request the hearing by signing and returning the enclosed declaration of ownership or right to keep the animal to the officer providing the notice within two days, excluding weekends and holidays, of the date of the notice.

(6) A statement that the cost of caring for and treating any animal properly seized under this section is a lien on the animal, that any animal seized shall not be returned to the owner until the charges are paid, and that failure to request or to attend a scheduled hearing shall result in a conclusive determination that the animal may properly be seized and that the owner shall be liable for the charges.

(2) The preseizure hearing shall be conducted within 48 hours, excluding weekends and holidays, after receipt of the request. The seizing agency may authorize its own officer or employee to conduct the hearing if the hearing officer is not the same person who requests the seizure or impoundment of the animal and is not junior in rank to that person. The agency may utilize the services of a hearing officer from outside the agency for the purposes of complying with this section.
(2) Failure of the owner or keeper, or his or her agent, to request or to attend a scheduled hearing shall result in a forfeiture of any right to a pre-seizure hearing or right to challenge his or her liability for costs incurred pursuant to this section.

(4) The hearing officer, after the hearing, may affirm or deny the owner's or keeper's right to custody of the animal and, if reasonable grounds are established, may order the seizure or impoundment of the animal for care and treatment.

(h) If any animal is properly seized under this section or pursuant to a search warrant, the owner or keeper shall be personally liable to the seizing agency for the cost of the seizure and care of the animal. Further, if the charges for the seizure or impoundment and any other charges permitted under this section are not paid within 14 days of the seizure, or if the owner, within 14 days of notice of availability of the animal to be returned, fails to pay charges permitted under this section and take possession of the animal, the animal shall be deemed to have been abandoned and may be humanely euthanized by the seizing agency.

(i) If the animal requires veterinary care and the humane society or public agency is not assured, within 14 days of the seizure of the animal, that the owner will provide the necessary care, the animal shall not be returned to the owner and shall be deemed to have been abandoned and may be disposed of by the seizing agency. A veterinarian may humanely euthanize an impounded animal without regard to the prescribed holding period when it has been determined that the animal has incurred severe injuries or is incurably crippled. A veterinarian also may immediately humanely euthanize an impounded animal afflicted with a serious contagious disease unless the owner or his or her agent immediately authorizes treatment of the animal by a veterinarian at the expense of the owner or agent.

(j) No animal properly seized under this section or pursuant to a search warrant shall be returned to its owner until the owner can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the seizing agency or hearing officer that the owner can and will provide the necessary care for the animal.

(k)(1) In the case of cats and dogs, prior to the final disposition of any criminal charges, the seizing agency or prosecuting attorney may file a petition in a criminal action requesting that, prior to that final disposition, the court issue an order forfeiting the animal to the city, county, or seizing agency. The petitioner shall serve a true copy of the petition upon the defendant and the prosecuting attorney.

(2) Upon receipt of the petition, the court shall set a hearing on the petition. The hearing shall be conducted within 14 days of the filing of the petition, or as soon as practicable.

(3) The petitioner shall have the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that, even in the event of an acquittal of the criminal charges, the owner will not legally be permitted to retain the animal in question. If the court finds that the petitioner has met its burden, the court shall order the immediate forfeiture of the animal as sought by the petition.

(4) Nothing in this subdivision is intended to authorize a seizing agency or prosecuting attorney to file a petition to determine an owner's ability to legally retain an animal pursuant to paragraph (3) of subdivision (l) if a petition has previously been filed pursuant to this subdivision.

(l)(1) Upon the conviction of a person charged with a violation of this section, or Section 597 or 597a, all animals lawfully seized and impounded with respect to the violation shall be adjudged by the court to be forfeited and shall thereupon be transferred to the impounding officer or appropriate public entity for proper adoption or other disposition. A person convicted of a violation of this section shall be personally liable to the seizing agency for all costs of impoundment from the time of seizure to the time of proper disposition. Upon conviction, the court shall order the convicted person to make payment to the appropriate public entity for the costs incurred in the housing, care, feeding, and treatment of the seized or impounded animals. Each person convicted in connection with a particular animal may be held jointly and severally liable for restitution for that particular animal. The payment shall be in addition to any other fine or sentence ordered by the court.

(2) The court may also order, as a condition of probation, that the convicted person be prohibited from owning, possessing, caring for, or residing with, animals of any kind, and require the convicted person to immediately deliver all animals in his or her possession to a designated public entity for adoption or other lawful disposition or provide proof to the court that the person no longer has possession, care, or control of any animals. In the event of the acquittal or final discharge without conviction of the person charged, if the animal is still impounded, the animal has not been previously deemed abandoned pursuant to subdivision (h), the court has not ordered that the animal be forfeited pursuant to subdivision (l), the court shall, on demand, direct the release of seized or impounded animals to the defendant upon a showing of proof of ownership.
(2) Any questions regarding ownership shall be determined in a separate hearing by the court where the criminal case was finally adjudicated and the court shall hear testimony from any persons who may assist the court in determining ownership of the animal. If the owner is determined to be unknown or the owner is prohibited or unable to retain possession of the animal for any reason, the court shall order the animal to be released to the appropriate public entity for adoption or other lawful disposition. This section is not intended to cause the release of any animal, bird, reptile, amphibian, or fish seized or impounded pursuant to any other statute, ordinance, or municipal regulation. This section shall not prohibit the seizure or impoundment of animals as evidence as provided for under any other provision of law.

SEC. 17. Section 597e of the Penal Code is amended to read:

597e.

(a) It shall be the duty of an officer of an animal shelter, a humane society, or an animal regulation department of a public agency to assist in a case involving the abandonment or voluntary relinquishment of an equine by the equine's owner. This section does not require an animal shelter, a humane society, or an animal regulation department of a public agency to take actual possession of the equine.

(b) If an animal shelter, a humane society, or an animal regulation department of a public agency sells an equine at a private or public auction or sale, it shall set the minimum bid for the sale of the equine at a price above the current slaughter price of the equine.

(c) (1) This section does not prohibit an animal shelter, a humane society, or an animal regulation department of a public agency from placing an equine through an adoption program at an adoption fee that may be set below the current slaughter price.

(2) A person adopting an equine under paragraph (1) shall submit a written statement declaring that the person is adopting the equine for personal use and not for purposes of resale or resale for slaughter, or holding or transporting the equine for slaughter.

SEC. 18. Section 597f of the Penal Code is amended to read:

597f.

Any person who impounds, or causes to be impounded in any animal shelter, any domestic animal, shall supply it during confinement with a sufficient quantity of good and wholesome food and water, and in default thereof, is guilty of a misdemeanor. In case any domestic animal is at any time so impounded and continues to be without necessary food and water for more than 12 consecutive hours, it is lawful for any person, from time to time, as may be deemed necessary, to enter into and upon any animal shelter in which the animal is confined, and supply it with necessary food and water so long as it remains so confined. That person is not liable for the entry and may collect the reasonable cost of the food and water from the owner of the animal, and the owner of the animal is subject to enforcement of a money judgment for the reasonable cost of food and water.

SEC. 19. Section 597i of the Penal Code is amended to read:

597i.

(3) Every owner, driver, or possessor of any animal, who permits the animal to be in any building, enclosure, lane, street, square, or lot, of any city, city and county, or judicial district, without proper care and attention, shall, on conviction, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. And it shall be the duty of any peace officer, officer of the humane society, or officer of an animal shelter or animal regulation department of a public agency, to take possession of the animal so abandoned or neglected and care for the animal until it is redeemed by the owner or claimant, and the cost of caring for the animal shall be a lien on the animal until the charges are paid. Every sick, disabled, infirm, or crippled animal, except a dog or cat, which shall be abandoned in any city, city and county, or judicial district, may, if after due search no owner can be found thereof, be humanely euthanized by the officer; and it shall be the duty of all peace officers, officers of that society, or officer of an animal shelter or animal regulation department of a public agency to cause the animal to be humanely euthanized on information of that abandonment. The officer may likewise take charge of any animal, including a dog or cat, that by reason of lameness, sickness, feebleness, or neglect, is unfit for the labor it is performing, or that in any other manner is being cruelly treated; and, if the animal is not then in the custody of its owner, the officer shall give notice thereof to the owner, if known, and may provide suitable care for the animal until it is deemed to be in a suitable condition to be delivered to the owner, and any necessary expenses which may be incurred for...
taking care of and keeping the animal shall be a lien thereon, to be paid before the animal can be lawfully recovered.

(b)(1) It shall be the duty of all officers of animal shelters or humane societies, and animal regulation departments of public agencies to convey, and for police and sheriff departments, to cause to be conveyed all injured cats and dogs found without their owners in a public place directly to a veterinarian known by the officer or agency to be a veterinarian that ordinarily treats dogs and cats for a determination of whether the animal shall be immediately and humanely euthanized or shall be hospitalized under proper care and given emergency treatment.

(2) If the owner does not redeem the animal within the locally prescribed waiting period, the veterinarian may personally perform euthanasia on the animal, or, if the animal is treated and recovers from its injuries, the veterinarian may keep the animal for purposes of adoption, provided the responsible animal control agency has first been contacted and has refused to take possession of the animal.

(3) If the veterinarian determines that the animal shall be hospitalized under proper care and given emergency treatment, the costs of any services which are provided pending the owner’s inquiry to the agency, department, or society shall be paid from the dog license fees, fines, and fees for impounding dogs in the city, county, or city and county in which the animal was licensed or if the animal is unlicensed the jurisdiction in which the animal was found, subject to the provision that this cost be repaid by the animal’s owner. No veterinarian shall be criminally or civilly liable for any decision which he or she makes or services which he or she provides pursuant to this section.

(c) An animal control agency which takes possession of an animal pursuant to subdivision (b), shall keep records of the whereabouts of the animal for a 72-hour period from the time of possession and those records shall be available to inspection by the public upon request.

(d) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this section, any officer of an animal shelter or animal regulation department or humane society, or any officer of a police or sheriff’s department may, with the approval of his or her immediate superior, humanely euthanize any abandoned animal in the field in any case where the animal is too severely injured to move or where a veterinarian is not available and it would be more humane to euthanize the animal.

SEC. 19. Section 597u of the Penal Code is amended to read:

(a) No person, peace officer, officer of a humane society, or officer of an animal shelter or animal regulation department of a public agency shall kill any animal by using any of the following methods:

(1) Carbon monoxide gas.

(2) Intracardiac injection of a euthanasia agent on a conscious animal, unless the animal is heavily sedated or anesthetized in a humane manner, or comatose, or unless, in light of all the relevant circumstances, the procedure is justifiable.

(b) With respect to the killing of any dog or cat, no person, peace officer, officer of a humane society, or officer of an animal shelter or animal regulation department of a public agency shall use any of the methods specified in subdivision (a) or any of the following methods:

(1) High-altitude decompression chamber.

(2) Nitrogen gas.

SEC. 20. Section 597v of the Penal Code is amended to read:

No person, peace officer, officer of a humane society, or officer of an animal shelter or animal regulation department of a public agency shall kill any newborn dog or cat whose eyes have not yet opened by any other method than by the use of chloroform vapor or by inoculation of barbiturates.

SEC. 21. Section 599e of the Penal Code is amended to read:

Every animal which is unfit, by reason of its physical condition, for the purpose for which those animals are usually employed, and when there is no reasonable probability of that animal ever becoming fit for the purpose for which it is usually employed, shall be by the owner or lawful possessor of the same, deprived of life within...
12 hours after being notified by any peace officer, officer of said society, or employee of an animal shelter or animal regulation department of a public agency who is a veterinarian, to kill the same; and the owner, possessor, or person omitting or refusing to comply with the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and after that conviction the court or magistrate having jurisdiction of that offense shall order any peace officer, officer of said society, or officer of an animal shelter or animal regulation department of a public agency, to immediately kill that animal; provided, that this shall not apply to an owner keeping any old or diseased animal belonging to him or her on his or her own premises with proper care.
May 10, 2013

The Honorable Sharon Quirk-Silva
Member, California State Assembly
State Capitol, Room 5175
Sacramento, CA 95816

RE: AB 1045 – Support

Dear Assembly Member Quirk-Silva:

I am pleased to advise you that the Board of Pharmacy has established a position of Support on your AB 1045. This bill would strengthen the board’s ability to protect Californians in cases where non-resident pharmacies and non-resident sterile compounding pharmacies lose their pharmacy permit in the home state by allowing the board simply to cancel the corresponding California non-resident permits.

Currently, to revoke a pharmacy permit, the board must take formal disciplinary action to remove the California license where there is no longer regulatory oversight by the home state, unless the non-resident pharmacy requests to cancel its California license. AB 1045 provides for the immediate protection of California’s patients by specifying that when the underlying permit in the home state has been revoked or suspended, the California permit is revoked or suspended by operation of law.

However, we suggest one small amendment to Section 4112(d), to expand the current amendment of ‘revoked or suspended’ to also include ‘canceled’ – thereby enabling cancellation of a non-resident permit by operation of law where the home state license was canceled.

Thank you for your efforts to protect the patients of California by ensuring the removal of a California-issued permit where the home state no longer provides regulatory oversight. Please don’t hesitate to contact me at (916) 574-7913 if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

CAROLYN KLEIN, Manager
Legislation and Regulations
June 4, 2013

To: Members, Enforcement and Compounding Committee

Subject: Agenda Item II (b) – Discussion of Recent Federal Reports and Articles Relating to Compounding Pharmacies

A variety of reports is provided for the committee’s information and discussion relating to compounding pharmacies.


   American Society of Health-System Pharmacists. ASHP guidelines on outsourcing sterile compounding services. Am J Health-Syst Pharm. 2010; 67:757-65. Copyright © 2010, American Society of Health-System Pharmacists, Inc. All rights reserved.
   Printed copies will be made available for the committee members.


6. Miscellaneous Articles
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**FDA Office Abbreviations**

- Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER)
- Division of New Drugs and Labeling Compliance (DNDLC)
- Office of Regulatory Affairs (ORA)
- New England District Office (NWE-DO)
- Office of the Chief Counsel (OCC)
- Office of Criminal Investigations (OCI)

**State of Massachusetts Office Abbreviations**

- Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH)
- Massachusetts Board of Registration in Pharmacy (MBP)
PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT
FDA'S OVERSIGHT OF NECC AND AMERIDOSE: A HISTORY OF MISSED OPPORTUNITIES?

PART I: INTRODUCTION

In the summer and fall of 2012, a Massachusetts company, the New England Compounding Center (NECC), shipped over 17,000 vials of an injectable steroid solution from three contaminated lots to healthcare facilities in 23 states. The sterility of this drug product is critical. To relieve chronic pain, it is often injected into patients' spinal columns. After receiving injections of NECC's contaminated steroid, over 50 people have died from complications associated with fungal meningitis and almost 700 others have been stricken with meningitis or other persistent fungal infections. This outbreak ranks as one of the worst public health crises associated with contaminated drugs in the history of the United States, and exposed a fundamental failure in drug safety oversight.

In early October 2012, the Energy and Commerce Committee Majority and Minority staff received briefings from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH). On November 14, 2012, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations held a hearing to examine the meningitis outbreak and determine whether it could have been prevented. The Subcommittee subpoenaed the President and co-owner of NECC, Barry Cadden, to appear at the hearing. Mr. Cadden asserted his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and refused to testify. The Subcommittee also invited FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg, M.D., and then-Interim Director of the MDPH Lauren Smith, M.D., MPH, to testify about their agencies' oversight of NECC. Further, the Subcommittee heard testimony from Ms. Joyce Lovelace, the wife of the first known victim. This hearing did not resolve the fundamental question posed: could the meningitis outbreak have been prevented?

Prior to the hearing, the MDPH produced thousands of pages of documents relating to NECC and Ameridose, another Massachusetts company owned and operated by the same family as NECC, which was also involved in large-scale production and distribution of drug products nationwide. The documents detailed the MDPH's history with these firms. FDA, however, produced only a limited number of documents requested by the Committee prior to the November 2012 hearing, consisting of inspection reports and the agency's formal correspondence with NECC and Ameridose. No internal FDA communications were included. NECC has produced some documents, but has largely been unable to respond to the Committee's

1 NECC and Ameridose share common ownership and corporate structures. Barry Cadden, his wife, Lisa Conigliaro-Cadden, her brother, Gregory Conigliaro, and his wife, Carla Conigliaro, serve as directors of both companies. NECC is located in Framingham, MA, adjacent to one of the two Ameridose facilities. Ameridose's other facility is located in Westborough, MA.
requests as its files and computers were seized pursuant to a search warrant executed by FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigations (OCI) and the Criminal Division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, beginning on October 16, 2012. As a result of this ongoing criminal investigation, the Committee’s investigative efforts to date have primarily focused on obtaining and reviewing FDA documents.

Since the hearing, the Committee has pressed FDA to produce all of its documents relating to NECC and Ameridose in order to obtain a full picture of FDA’s inspecational history, oversight, and decision-making with respect to these firms. Only after being threatened with the possibility of a subpoena in a February 1, 2013, letter to Commissioner Hamburg, did FDA finally complete its production on March 21, 2013. FDA’s production included internal emails between officials and staff at FDA headquarters and staff in FDA District Offices relating to NECC and Ameridose. It also included memoranda and emails exchanged within FDA’s Office of the Chief Counsel (OCC) relating to the agency’s assessment of its authority over pharmacy compounding. FDA has asserted that all documents and communications responsive to the Committee’s requests have been produced.

After reviewing these documents, Majority Committee staff believes there is a strong basis for Members to pursue answers from FDA on whether this tragedy was preventable had the agency taken action under its existing authorities to address the steady stream of complaints it had received about NECC and its sister company, Ameridose, since issuing a Warning Letter to NECC in December 2006. The answer to this question is critical to solving any underlying problems. Operational and/or systemic flaws must be addressed in order to ensure that if any additional laws are passed or administrative actions are taken, they will actually lessen the chances of history repeating itself.

The documents that FDA produced to the Committee are troubling. Contrary to a statement made by Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick, NECC was not “operat[ing] in the shadows.” NECC and Ameridose had long been the topic of significant discussion within FDA; the link between the two companies was well known. Since late 2004, when FDA last inspected NECC prior to the outbreak, the agency received numerous complaints from a range of healthcare providers—and at least one informant at Ameridose—about the companies’ products and practices, including many that called into question the safety of the drugs the companies produced.

During the Commissioner’s testimony before the Subcommittee in November, and in numerous statements made by her and other FDA officials since, FDA has maintained that uncertainty over its authority prevented the agency from pursuing enforcement actions against companies involved in compounding. For example, in her written statement for the Subcommittee’s hearing on November 14, the Commissioner asserted that “FDA’s ability to take action against compounding that exceeds the bounds of traditional pharmacy compounding and

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poses risks to patients has been hampered by gaps and ambiguities in the law.\textsuperscript{3} She repeatedly mentioned that FDA's authority over compounding pharmacies—even when such entities were engaged in activities that closely resembled those of a drug manufacturer—was questionable. The Commissioner stated that the "legal framework for FDA activities is very, very unclear, untested, and limited\textsuperscript{4}" and that FDA has "ambiguous, fragmented, unclear, and contested authorities in this particular realm of pharmacy and drug manufacturing practice..."\textsuperscript{5} Citing these issues as impediments to FDA's ability to act in the face of mounting patient safety and public health concerns associated with NECC and Ameridose, the Commissioner proposed a new framework for regulating drug compounding operations and asked Congress for additional "authorities to support this new regulatory paradigm."\textsuperscript{6}

FDA has long been steadfast in its assertions of authority over drug manufacturing being conducted under the guise of pharmacy compounding—and that the agency would enforce such authority when entities like NECC and Ameridose were engaged in significant violations of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and jeopardizing public health in the process.\textsuperscript{7} That being said, internal FDA documents do show that the agency has been grappling with its authority over compounding for decades and that this debate came to a head in early 2009, after two different Circuit Courts of Appeals had issued conflicting opinions on the matter. What is troubling, though, is that FDA allowed this uncertainty to essentially paralyze the agency's oversight efforts from 2009 through 2012, even with respect to companies operating well outside the bounds of traditional pharmacy compounding, including NECC and Ameridose.

In the six years following the 2006 Warning Letter, FDA failed to take any enforcement action against NECC or Ameridose despite receiving complaint after complaint, often relating to the safety of the companies' drugs. Though several inspections and related enforcement actions were considered during this time period, they were repeatedly delayed and ultimately cancelled. In fact, in 2011, FDA made an affirmative decision to suspend inspections and enforcement actions relating to compounding operations, including NECC and Ameridose, until the agency finalized new guidance to industry detailing where it would draw the line between pharmacy compounding and drug manufacturing. Regardless of where this line would ultimately have been drawn, based on a review of the documents, it appears evident that NECC and Ameridose had already crossed it.

FDA's recent decisions not to even re-inspect NECC or Ameridose pursuant to any of the complaints the agency received are perplexing, particularly in light of FDA's flurry of


\textsuperscript{5} Id. at 74.

\textsuperscript{6} Id. at 53.

\textsuperscript{7} \textit{See Jane Axelrad, then-Associate Dir. for Policy, & David Horowitz, then-Dir., Off. of Compliance, Center for Drug Evaluation & Research (CDER), FDA, FDA Update on Pharmacy Compounding, Presentation to Int'l Acad. of Compounding Pharmacists (June 9, 2003).}
enforcement activity since the meningitis outbreak involving a number of companies engaged in similar practices. According to FDA, since October 1, 2012, the agency has inspected 50 compounding facilities—issuing Form 483s to approximately 30 firms, resulting in five firms recalling their products, and one firm receiving a Warning Letter. FDA staff informed Committee staff that other regulatory actions are under consideration. Like NECC and Ameridose, several of these companies have long histories with FDA. Prior to these inspections taking place, no new laws were passed and no new regulations or guidance documents were issued.

Part II of this memorandum provides a summary of FDA’s authority over pharmacy compounding and the agency’s related enforcement policies. Parts III and IV will show that, while broader policy discussions about the scope of FDA’s authority were ongoing within the agency, a number of FDA employees and officials grew increasingly concerned about the safety of the products and practices at NECC and Ameridose, based on complaints the agency received. Despite its concerns that these companies were jeopardizing patient safety, FDA took no meaningful action against either company since issuing the 2006 Warning Letter to NECC. While the agency has pointed to confusion over its authority, the documents obtained by the Committee reveal that inefficiency, indecisiveness, skewed priorities, and a lack of leadership are what primarily hampered FDA’s ability to prevent NECC’s products from killing over 50 Americans.

PART II: FDA AUTHORITY OVER PHARMACY COMPOUNDING

FDA has long defined traditional pharmacy compounding as the combining, mixing, or altering of ingredients by a pharmacist in response to a physician’s prescription to create a medication for an individual patient. In 1992, due to FDA’s concerns that certain compounding pharmacies were producing and distributing unapproved new drugs in a manner that was clearly outside the bounds of traditional pharmacy compounding, the agency issued Compliance Policy Guide 7132.16 (1992 CPG). FDA asserted that compounded drugs were not exempt from the requirements of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA or the Act), and while the agency did not intend to initiate enforcement actions against entities involved in traditional pharmacy compounding, it did plan to do so in situations where a company’s activities resembled those of a drug manufacturer. A list of non-exhaustive factors the agency would consider in making these determinations was included.

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8 FDA issues a Form 483 at the end of an inspection when the investigators believe that the observed conditions or practices, in their judgment, may indicate violations of the FDCA or any related regulations. FDA has stated that its goal in issuing a 483 is to have the company act quickly to correct potential violations. The FDA considers the 483 along with an Establishment Inspection Report (EIR), prepared by FDA investigators, and any other information, including any responses received from the company, to determine whether further action is appropriate.

In 1997, based on concerns from compounding pharmacists that, according to the 1992 CPG, they were operating in per se violation of the FDCA, Congress added section 503A to the Act as part of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA). Congress’s intent in doing so was to “bring the legal status of compounding in line with FDA’s longstanding enforcement policy of regulating only drug manufacturing, not ordinary pharmacy compounding.” Section 503A exempts compounded drugs from the new drug requirements and certain adulteration and misbranding provisions of the FDCA so long as certain conditions are met. The conditions listed in the statute parallel the factors included in the 1992 CPG and are intended to limit the exemptions from the FDCA’s requirements to traditional pharmacy compounding. These conditions include that the compounding be performed by a licensed pharmacist or physician, that it is done in response to a patient-specific prescription, and that the compounded product is necessary for an identified patient. Section 503A also required that the physician’s prescription must be unsolicited and the pharmacy must not advertise or promote the compounding of any particular drug.

The provisions related to solicitation and advertising were challenged in court by a group of pharmacists as impermissible regulation of commercial speech. In February 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed and declared that the speech-related provisions were non-severable from the remainder of section 503A and, therefore, the entire section was invalid. In Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357 (2002), the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision with respect to the First Amendment restrictions, but did not rule on the issue of severability.

Because of the uncertainty caused by the Supreme Court’s decision in Western States, FDA re-issued an updated version of its 1992 CPG in May 2002. Compliance Policy Guide, Section 460.200 (2002 CPG) was very similar to the 1992 CPG; it reaffirmed FDA’s authority over compounding under the FDCA and listed nine non-exhaustive “factors the Agency will consider in exercising its enforcement discretion regarding pharmacy compounding,” including compounding copies of drugs that are commercially available and compounding drugs for third parties who resell to individual patients. According to the document: “FDA believes that an increasing number of establishments with retail pharmacy licenses are engaged in manufacturing and distributing unapproved new drugs in a manner that is clearly outside the bounds of traditional pharmacy practice and that violates the Act. Such establishments and their activities are the focus of this guidance. . . . Pharmacies engaged in activities analogous to manufacturing and distributing drugs for human use may be held to the same provisions of the Act as manufacturers.”

In early 2005, another group of pharmacies brought suit—this time in Texas—contesting FDA’s authority to regulate compounded drugs under the FDCA. On appeal, the case reached the Fifth Circuit. In Medical Center Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F. 3d 383 (5th Cir. 2008), the

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12 Western States Medical Center v. Shalala, 238 F. 3rd 1090 (9th Cir. 2001).
14 Id. at 3.
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to be bound by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in *Western States*, and held in July 2008 that the unconstitutional restrictions on commercial speech were in fact severable from the rest of section 503A, which should remain in effect. Therefore, in the Fifth Circuit, compounded drugs are exempt from the new drug, manufacturing, labeling, and other requirements of the FDCA, but only to the extent that the pharmacy complies with the restrictions set out in section 503A. Until the *Medical Center Pharmacy* decision, FDA had been operating under the assumption that section 503A was invalid in its entirety; therefore, as the agency stated in litigation and various correspondence over the previous six years, compounded drugs were subject to the FDCA requirements but FDA would continue to exercise enforcement discretion nationwide, as articulated in the 2002 CPG. After the decision, FDA publicly took the position that it would apply the non-commercial speech related provisions of section 503A in the Fifth Circuit and continue to exercise enforcement discretion with respect to entities located outside the Fifth Circuit. Within FDA, however, debate about the soundness of this approach would continue. These discussions and how they impacted potential enforcement actions against NECC and Ameridose will be addressed throughout this memorandum.

Publicly, FDA has consistently asserted authority over compounding pharmacies engaged in activities more analogous to those of a drug manufacturer. In fact, on June 29, 2012—only days after NECC made and distributed two contaminated batches of methylprednisolone acetate to facilities across the country—FDA released a statement to that effect: “FDA may take enforcement action against compounding pharmacies if warranted. The FDA makes its enforcement decisions about compounded products on a case-by-case basis after considering the particular facts at issue.” In a related letter sent to one large-scale compounding pharmacy on the same day, FDA stated that the agency is “applying its normal enforcement policies for compounded drugs” and that the compounding of large volumes of drugs that are essentially copies of FDA-approved products is one factor “the Agency considers in deciding whether to initiate enforcement action with respect to compounding.” The letter highlighted that these factors are addressed “in both section 503A of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) (21 U.S.C. § 353a) and the Agency’s compliance policy guide (CPG) on pharmacy compounding (CPG Sec. 460.200).” The letter then included a footnote discussing the fact that “the Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have reached different conclusions regarding whether section 503A is invalid or remains in effect.”

In her written statement for the November 14, 2012, Oversight Subcommittee hearing, Commissioner Hamburg cited this Circuit Court split as having “amplified the perceived gaps and ambiguity associated with FDA’s authority over compounding pharmacies.” While there were challenges to FDA’s authority, at no point in time did the agency lack sufficient authority...

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17 Id. at 2.
18 Id.
19 Hamburg Statement, supra note 3.
under the FDCA to take enforcement action against companies that were clearly manufacturing under the guise of compounding and jeopardizing patient safety in the process. Regardless of whether FDA applied and cited to the factors listed in section 503A or the CPG, NECC and Ameridose were operating well outside the scope of traditional compounding pharmacies and squarely within FDA’s authority to take action in response to violations of the FDCA.

PART III: FDA’S OVERSIGHT OF NECC: 2003-2006

NECC first appeared on FDA’s radar in March 2002, when two adverse events were reported to the agency through its MedWatch system. Both adverse events involved patients experiencing meningitis-like symptoms after receiving betamethasone injections from the same lot produced and distributed by NECC. Based on the ensuing inspection, which was conducted with the MDPH, FDA issued NECC a Form 483 on April 16, 2002. FDA focused primarily on two violations: the sterility of the betamethasone product and NECC’s failure to account for records related to the suspect lot of betamethasone, which subsequently tested positive for contamination.20

In October 2002, FDA and State inspectors returned to NECC in response to three MedWatch reports associated with the use of methylprednisolone acetate made by NECC in May 2002. Like betamethasone, methylprednisolone acetate is a steroid solution often injected into the spine to treat pain and swelling. According to FDA’s investigative report, the three MedWatch reports involved patients having to be hospitalized with meningitis-like symptoms. Hospital staff informed FDA that vials from the same lot distributed by NECC were tested at the hospital and confirmed positive for contamination.21 In February 2003, prior to FDA’s issuance of another Form 483 to NECC, a meeting was convened with officials from FDA and the MDPH, at which time it was decided that NECC should be treated as a compounding pharmacy and that the State should take the lead on any further regulatory actions.22

Part III(A) of this memorandum will show that, not long after the February meeting, FDA began to receive additional information about the nature and scope of NECC’s operations that would raise questions about whether the company was in fact operating as a manufacturer, as opposed to a traditional compounding pharmacy. This information would form the basis for an additional inspection beginning in September 2004. As described in Part III(B), FDA’s extraordinary delay in issuing a Warning Letter to NECC pursuant to that inspection interfered with FDA’s efforts to address new complaints that were submitted between the time of the 2004 inspection and a Warning Letter ultimately being issued in December 2006. Moreover, FDA’s failure to address NECC’s January 2007 response to the Warning Letter until almost another two years had passed further complicated FDA’s enforcement efforts. Part III(C) details the

20 See FDA, NEW ENGLAND COMPOUNDING PHARMACY, INC. FORM FDA 483 (Apr. 16, 2002).
21 FDA, INSPECTION REPORT OF NEW ENGLAND COMPOUNDING CENTER, at 4 (Feb. 10, 2003) [hereinafter, "FDA FEB. 10, 2003 INSPECTION REPORT"].
complaints that FDA continued to receive about NECC after the agency replied, on October 31, 2008, to NECC’s response to the Warning Letter. Despite considering several additional inspections of NECC, FDA did not return to the company until the fungal meningitis outbreak.

A. FDA is on Notice that NECC is Operating Outside the Scope of a Traditional Compounding Pharmacy.

FDA has long recognized the importance of traditional pharmacy compounding and acknowledged that the State is primarily responsible for overseeing pharmacies engaged in this often critical practice. However, according to FDA’s policy guidance, “when the scope and nature of a pharmacy’s activities raise the kinds of concerns normally associated with a drug manufacturer and result in significant violations of the new drug, adulteration, or misbranding provisions of the [FDCA], FDA has determined that it should seriously consider enforcement action.” Documents produced to the Committee show that prior to FDA’s issuance of the Warning Letter to NECC the agency understood that the company was substantially engaged in activities resembling those of a drug manufacturer.

As was previously mentioned and discussed at the November 2012 hearing with Commissioner Hamburg, a meeting was convened in February 2003 between FDA and the MDPH, which included representatives from the Massachusetts Board of Registration in Pharmacy (MBP or Massachusetts Board). The purpose of the meeting was to “review the inspectional history of the New England Compounding Center and develop a joint strategy for achieving safe compounding practices at the firm.” At this point in time, FDA and State inspectors had already been to NECC on two separate occasions—in April and October 2002—in response to MedWatch reports associated with patients experiencing meningitis-like symptoms after having been administered NECC-produced betamethasone and methylprednisolone acetate injections.

During the February 2003 meeting, “[a] discussion was held to decide if NECC should be considered a manufacturer or a compounder.” It was decided that “current findings supported a compounding role” and that “the state would be in a better position to gain compliance or take regulatory action against NECC as necessary.” While FDA determined that the Massachusetts Board would take the lead, FDA concluded the meeting by “emphasizing the potential for serious public health consequences if NECC’s compounding practices, in particular those relating to sterile products, are not improved.” Prior to this meeting taking place, David Elder, FDA’s then-Director of Compliance in the New England District Office (NWE-DO) had emailed individuals in the Division of New Drugs and Labeling Compliance (DNDLC) at FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), acknowledging the need for FDA to continue to monitor the situation at NECC and the State’s oversight of the firm. He stated, “We will have further discussions with the state about any future actions with this company – if the state can’t

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23 2002 CPG, supra note 13, at 3.
25 Id. at 2.
26 Id.
27 Id.
or won’t take appropriate action, we will work with your office to devise an appropriate enforcement strategy as we remain concerned with this firm’s operations."28

When asked about FDA’s role at the hearing in November 2012, Commissioner Hamburg stated, "[FDA] tried to provide help and assistance. But the responsibility for assuring compliance with sterility issues was, in fact not our direct responsibility."29 When questioned about whether she thought the State “could have stopped [the meningitis outbreak],” Commissioner Hamburg responded, “They were unsuccessful, and it is, you know, was tragic.”30 What Commissioner Hamburg failed to mention was that the snapshot FDA had of the company in February 2003 was very different from the deep understanding the agency had gained about the nature and scope of NECC’s operations from 2003 up until the outbreak in 2012.

In fact, not long after the February 2003 meeting, a different picture of NECC began to emerge. On May 26, 2004, the Massachusetts Board received an email from a hospital pharmacist in Iowa suggesting that NECC was engaged in manufacturing, not traditional compounding. The pharmacist informed the MBP that “I have been receiving a lot of literature from [NECC] promoting compounded products for cataract surgery... I was told I could easily get 15 patients out of every 3ml dropper of solution, so it would be very economical.”31 The pharmacist then stated, “Though I strongly believe in the right of pharmacists to compound prescriptions for their patients, the distribution of products under these circumstances looks much more like manufacturing than dispensing.”32 Based on other documents produced to the Committee, it appears as though the product being referenced was known as trypan blue, reportedly being used for capsular staining during cataract surgery. The lead attorney for the MBP, Susan Manning, asked the Board’s Executive Director, Charles Young, in response, “Could you clarify what we may not have known about their operation previously that this email tells us? As in what the FDA might not know in their prior assessment that NECC was not a ‘manufacturer’?”33

The MBP forwarded this correspondence to FDA along with a copy of a complaint it had received from a pharmacist in Wisconsin about NECC promoting a potent topical anesthetic cream.34 At this point in time, FDA had in fact already received a complaint from a law firm representing a drug company related to NECC’s promotion of trypan blue. On February 27, 2004, the firm informed FDA that its client had a similar, FDA-approved ophthalmic dye and that, while trypan blue had been approved in certain countries, it was not approved in the U.S.35 Like the complaints that were forwarded to FDA by the MBP, this complaint raised further

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28 E-mail from David Elder, Dir. of Compliance, New England Dist. Off., FDA, to Fred Richman, Dep. Dir., Div. of New Drugs & Labeling Compliance (DNDLC), Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA, et al. (Jan. 23, 2003, 10:48 AM).
29 Hamburg Testimony, supra note 4, at 63-64.
30 Id. at 137.
31 E-mail from Redaction to Mass. Bd. of Registration in Pharmacy (May 26, 2004, 6:16 PM).
32 Id.
34 See E-mail from Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA, to Kathleen Anderson, Acting Team Leader, Compounding Team, DNDLC, Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA (June 23, 2004, 12:42 PM).
35 See E-mail from Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA, to Kathleen Anderson (Feb. 27, 2004, 10:49 AM).
questions about whether NECC was operating as a traditional compounding pharmacy or as a drug manufacturer. It was apparently the complaints related to trypan blue that prompted CDER to send the NWE-DO an inspection assignment for NECC on June 2, 2004, “to obtain information about the firm’s compounding practices, especially as they relate to the compounding of trypan blue products.”

Included in the inspection assignment was an acknowledgement that section 503A of the FDCA had been invalidated by the Western States decision so the inspection was being conducted in accordance with the 2002 CPG. It listed a number of questions that “are consistent with that guidance” for the inspector to answer based on information obtained from NECC. The Ninth Circuit’s invalidation of section 503A, therefore, did not preclude FDA from inspecting NECC and, as described in the 2002 CPG, from considering enforcement actions if “the scope and nature of [the] pharmacy’s activities raise the kinds of concerns normally associated with a drug manufacturer and result in significant violations of the new drug, adulteration, or misbranding provisions of the Act.”

Pursuant to FDA’s observations during this inspection, which began in September 2004 and was again conducted with State inspectors, NECC was issued a Warning Letter more than two years later, on December 4, 2006. The Warning Letter listed a number of practices that FDA inspectors observed during the inspection of NECC, or which were otherwise brought to the agency’s attention, that indicated the company was operating as a manufacturer. In particular, the Warning Letter stated that the firm was compounding copies of commercially available products, pointing to the fact that trypan blue had since been approved by the FDA in December 2004; compounding standardized anesthetic drug products, which was outside the scope of traditional pharmacy compounding; repackaging Avastin, a sterile injectable product being used to treat macular degeneration; and reportedly informing physicians’ offices that using a staff member’s name on prescriptions would suffice, rather than submitting prescriptions to be filled based on the needs of an identified patient.

FDA concluded the Warning Letter by informing the President and co-owner of NECC, Barry Cadden, that “[f]ailure to promptly correct these deviations may result in additional regulatory action without further notice, including seizure or injunction against you and your firm.”

In December 2006, FDA warned Mr. Cadden that a subsequent inspection would be conducted. FDA failed to do so. When asked about this, Commissioner Hamburg testified in November: “We have also been reviewing actions taken in the past with regard to NECC. From our view thus far, we have no reason to believe that any of the specific actions in question, a more timely issuance of the 2006 Warning Letter, or insessional follow-up, would have prevented this tragedy.” She elaborated, “It is very hard to know if any one action that we might have taken could have stopped this terrible tragedy. I wish that I could identify what that would be.”

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37 Id.
38 2002 CPG, supra note 13, at 3.
40 Id. at 5.
41 Hamburg Statement, supra note 3.
42 Hamburg Testimony, supra note 4, at 138.
What Commissioner Hamburg did not discuss was the fact that complaints about NECC continued well after the Warning Letter; that they were often associated with issues different in nature and scope than those addressed in the Warning Letter; that they were at times related to the safety and potency of NECC products; that FDA failed to inform the State about the complaints; and that FDA considered—but never conducted—several additional inspections of NECC and related enforcement actions that very well may have averted this tragedy. Parts II(B) and (C) detail these complaints and contemplated actions.

B. After Issuing the 2006 Warning Letter to NECC, FDA Receives More Complaints About NECC Products and Practices

Following FDA’s September 2004 inspection of NECC to investigate the trypan blue complaints, FDA continued to receive new complaints about the company’s products and practices. On January 14, 2006, Steven Silverman, then-Director of CDER’s Division of New Drugs and Labeling Compliance (DNDLC), was forwarded an email from an individual in Texas detailing NECC’s distribution of multiple-use vials of injectable methotrexate, a drug being used to treat certain types of arthritis and rheumatic conditions. The email stated, “In order to process an order they only need the physician’s name and telephone number. . . . They do not need or desire to have the patient[’]s name.” On a subsequent but related exchange, he attached Samia Nasr, then-Team Leader of CDER’s Compounding Team, and stated, “As we discussed, NECC is a repeat player, so it might deserve attention that other operations wouldn’t merit. But the team is caught up with a range of high-profile issues, so this may need to wait (especially absent reported injury).” No substantive reply to this email was produced to the Committee, though on February 24, 2006, Ms. Nasr was forwarded another NECC solicitation from a consumer safety officer in CDER. This time, in addition to highlighting the firm’s Avastin repackaging services, NECC was offering several compounded sterile injectable products.

In forwarding the solicitation, the consumer safety officer stated, “The scope of their manufacturing seems to be beyond the limited concern we have already identified with the Avastin manipulation!” and “in light of the new information suggesting that the scope of drug manufacturing operations at this firm are expanding, the issuance of the directed inspection request is appropriate.” Ms. Nasr responded, “I do not have any problem with the inspection, we will know what is going on. I think what we were thinking is that if we send a [Warning Letter] now . . . [FDA] will not be able to send a second one. I do not think OCC [Office of the Chief Counsel or Chief Counsel’s Office] will allow us to do that, correct?”

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43 E-mail from Redaction to Steven Silverman, Dir., DNDLC, Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA, et al. (Jan. 14, 2006, 6:49 PM).
44 E-mail from Steven Silverman to Dep. Dir., Div. of Manufacturing & Product Quality, Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA, et al. (Jan 17, 2006, 11:20 AM).
45 See E-mail from Supervisory Consumer Safety Officer, DNDLC, Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA, to Samia Nasr, Team Leader, Compounding Team, DNDLC, Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA, et al. (Feb. 24, 2006, 1:08 PM).
46 Id., and E-mail from Supervisory Consumer Safety Officer to Samia Nasr et al. (Mar. 1, 2006, 9:30 AM).
47 E-mail from Samia Nasr to Supervisory Consumer Safety Officer, et al. (Mar. 2, 2006, 6:05 AM).
The Warning Letter was ultimately sent in December 2006. NECC responded one month later, noting that “the Warning Letter is based on an inspection of NECC that started on September 23, 2004, approximately twenty-eight months ago” and that “[s]ome of the letter’s assertions no longer apply to NECC’s operations.” After disputing FDA’s authority over compounded drugs, Mr. Cadden stated that “NECC does not compound copies of FDA-approved commercially available drugs, introduce unapproved new drugs into interstate commerce, does not need approved [New Drug Applications] before dispensing its compounded medications, and does not process or repackage approved drugs in a manner that would subject us to FDA regulation. Nor are our compounded medications misbranded. NECC dispenses compounded medications upon the receipt of valid prescriptions.”

After reviewing NECC’s letter, Mr. Silverman emailed several colleagues in CDER on January 9, 2007, including Ms. Nasr and CDER’s Director of Compliance at the time, Deborah Autor. He stated, “In my view, NECC’s response is unacceptable. . . . If you disagree, let’s discuss. Otherwise, we need a response to this letter. And given the comments about the timeliness of the Warning Letter (OCC’s fault), we need a response within a reasonable time frame.”

FDA’s response letter was not ultimately sent until October 31, 2008. Soon after the Warning Letter was issued in 2006, however, new complaints about NECC had already begun to arrive. It is apparent from documents produced to the Committee that FDA considered additional inspections and potential enforcement activities throughout this time period, but FDA’s failure to issue a timely response to NECC’s January 2007 reply letter thwarted any agency action.

Soon after FDA received NECC’s response, on February 22, 2007, a compliance officer in the NWE-DO received an envelope of documents from an anonymous sender. The compliance officer forwarded copies of the documents to several of her colleagues in the District Office stating, “It appears from the words she highlighted on the documents, that she wants me to know about other violations of NECC [than those described in the Warning Letter]. . . . I will send the information to CDER. Note that all the documents she sent me pre-date the [Warning Letter]; however, this information can be used for the [Warning Letter] follow-up inspection assignment.” Similar to the NECC solicitation FDA had been forwarded a year earlier, in addition to the Avastin repackaging services being offered, the documents included advertisements for a number of compounded sterile injectable products.

While these complaints did not involve patients being harmed by NECC products, they did provide FDA with additional knowledge about the nature and scope of the company’s operations. On June 25, 2007, however, FDA did receive an adverse event report directly implicating Avastin that had been repackaged by NECC and administered to a patient to treat .

49 Id. at 3.
50 E-mail from Steven Silverman to Deborah Autor, Dir., Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA, et al. (Jan. 9, 2007, 3:20 PM).
macular degeneration. According to the report, the patient had received six monthly doses of Avastin without incident until April 21, 2007, when "the patient developed severe endophthalmitis" and had to undergo emergency eye surgery. The report stated, "The Avastin dose administered prior to event onset was provided to the [reporting physician] by the New England Compounding Center." No communications referring or relating to this complaint were produced to the Committee by FDA. It is not apparent, based on a review of the documents, that FDA did anything in response—let alone re-inspect NECC—despite primarily detailing these very concerns in the Warning Letter: "We are especially concerned with the potential microbial contamination associated with splitting Avastin—a single-use, preservative-free, vial—into multiple doses. When used intravitreally, microbes could cause endophthalmitis, which has a high probability for significant vision loss."

The decision over whether FDA would re-inspect NECC pursuant to the new complaints was clearly being influenced by the agency’s inability to send a timely response to NECC’s January 2007 letter replying to the Warning Letter. Further, the outstanding response was also influencing FDA’s decision whether to inspect Ameridose, NECC’s sister company. On May 21, 2007, CDER drafted an inspection request for the NWE-DO based on a MedWatch report FDA received associated with Ameridose, which made similar complaints to those FDA had already received about NECC. The complaint stated that “Ameridose is engaged in the manufacture of unapproved intravenous solutions that are not dispensed pursuant to a prescription. . . .” When one of the inspectors in the District Office received the request from CDER, he emailed his supervisor asking, “Do we want to inspect with the state this new location under the same or similar management/ownership prior to responding to the NECC response of January 7, 2007?” The supervisor responded that CDER was “aware of the relationship between NECC and Ameridose” but that they “still want[ ] you to go to Ameridose” after calling them to discuss the approach. However, the Ameridose inspection did not ultimately occur until December 2007. Prior to the inspection, the District Office inspector contacted an individual on CDER’s Compounding Team who asked him to obtain information during the inspection to “elaborate on their business relationship/model and anything else that may potentially cause some inspectional hurdles.” This inspection and decisions surrounding it, as well as additional issues with Ameridose and the relationship between the two entities, are subsequently addressed in greater detail in Part IV of this memorandum.

Meanwhile, new complaints directly associated with the safety of NECC products continued. On December 6, 2007, FDA’s Office of Emergency Operations received a call from a

52 FDA ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING SYSTEM (FAERS) (June 25, 2007).
53 Id.
54 FDA Warning Letter, supra note 39, at 3.
56 E-mail from Drug Pre-Approval Manager, New England Dist. Off., FDA, to Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA (June 7, 2007, 9:05 AM).
57 E-mail from Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA, to Drug Pre-Approval Manager, New England Dist. Off., FDA (June 7, 2007, 11:49 AM).
"physician pain specialist who treats patients with epidural injections." The caller stated that "[f]or a period of time, he was treating fibromyalgia patients with epidural injections of betamethasone manufactured by New England Compounding Center" and that "between August 22 and October 5 he noticed that some vials of product were discolored (which he discarded) but others, which appeared normal, were administered and his patients started having problems."

Based on a memorandum drafted by a consumer safety officer in FDA’s New Orleans District Office (NOL-DO) assigned to investigate the complaint, she first visited the physician’s office on December 11, 2007. The memorandum detailed a series of meetings and interviews conducted with the physician and several patients through January 2008, which raised numerous concerns about the activities of the physician and his practices. While the physician failed to produce certain records, dates, and patient information requested, he did state that “greater than 100 patients that were treated with the betamethasone began complaining of increased fibromyalgia pain and moderate to severe flu-like symptoms”; that he noticed “some of the vials of betamethasone appeared to be discolored”; and that “particles [were] floating in the bottom of the vial.” He also said that “the lots in question were received on 8/20/07, 9/17/07, and 9/28/07” and provided the FDA investigator with “vials of the questionable betamethasone” he had not discarded from one of these lots, which she retained for sampling. She ultimately referred the complaint to the NWE-DO “for follow-up as appropriate” on February 25.

It is apparent from subsequent District Office communications produced to the Committee that FDA tested the vials provided by the physician, but those tests did not detect the presence of any bacterial endotoxins and the samples met “FDA requirements for assay and ID.” After reviewing the memorandum and the test results, the NWE-DO compliance officer forwarded the information to Ms. Nasr in CDER on April 1, 2008, and followed up on May 22 asking, “Any decision on any type of follow-up?” No response from Ms. Nasr was produced to the Committee, though this conversation between the District Office and CDER continued for some time. FDA did not re-inspect NECC pursuant to this complaint. Further, based on documents produced to the Committee, it does not appear as though FDA contacted the company or informed the State about these new concerns with NECC’s betamethasone injections.

FDA’s decision not to re-inspect NECC based on this complaint is troubling, given that the initial inspection of NECC in 2002 was triggered by adverse event reports associated with patients experiencing similar symptoms after receiving the same drug. FDA’s delay in resolving the 2006 Warning Letter appears to have influenced the agency’s response. For example, on

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60 Id.
62 Id. at 2.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 3.
65 Id at 1.
66 E-mail from Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA, to Samia Nasr (Apr. 1, 2008, 2:44 PM).
67 May 22, 2008 email from Ota to Nasr.
68 See May 29, 2008 email from Ota to Anderson.
June 17, 2008, FDA received separate, though related, information about betamethasone being made and distributed by NECC. Representatives of a pharmaceutical distributor met with NOL-DO staff to express concerns about compounded betamethasone “being injected in the spinal synovial fluid.”

Three different sizes of NECC vials were shared with NOL-DO staff who forwarded the information to the NWE-DO. Once the NWE-DO compliance officer responsible for NECC received it on June 24, he forwarded it to Ms. Nasr in CDER stating, “The District usually follows up with these memos by inspecting the firms listed in the memo but the NECC [Warning Letter case] is still open and we do not usually re-inspect until an adequate response is received from the firm. I know the last time we spoke you expressed that you might want to issue an assignment to inspect NECC. Please advise on follow-up to the memo?” Ms. Nasr responded, “We received information also about NECC compounding mesotherapy products and we were thinking about inspection. Can we set up a call with you and others to discuss?”

Ms. Nasr informed Mr. Silverman, who at this point had been promoted to Assistant Director of CDER’s Office of Compliance, and Kathleen Anderson, Deputy Director of the DNDLC, that she had spoken with NWE-DO staff about the inspection and the question came up about what they would do “if they find violations and we end up needing to issue another warning letter.” Ms. Anderson replied, “Typically we do not issue a firm a warning letter for the same violation (unless it has been many years since the initial warning letter). Sometimes we issued more than one warning letter to a firm if the letters are to address different unrelated issues. If we have issued multiple letters, for the same or similar problems then we should be considering seizure or injunction rather than another warning letter.”

CDER decided to go forward with the inspection of NECC and began drafting an assignment for the District Office. On June 27, 2008, Ms. Nasr spoke with the compliance officer in the NWE-DO responsible for NECC. The compliance officer informed Mutahar Shamsi, then-Director of Compliance in the District Office, “Today Samia [Nasr] called me and she said she talked with people in [CDER] and they said if the firm is still compounding then we will enjoin the firm.” The assignment was ultimately issued on September 16, 2008, and stated, “The purpose of this inspection request is to investigate the site’s compounding practices, particularly relating to the production of mesotherapy/lipodissolve products.” It is clear from the assignment that in addition to the mesotherapy-specific issues, the inspector was to follow-up on the observations documented in the December 2006 Warning Letter and to investigate the firm’s compounding operations in general. In particular, as indicated by a list of questions for

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69 Memorandum from Compliance Officer, New Orleans Dist. Off., FDA, to File (June 17, 2008).
70 See id.
71 E-mail from Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA, to Samia Nasr (June 24, 2008, 11:38 AM).
72 Mesotherapy products have been advertised as an alternative to liposuction. They have been compounded with phosphatidylcholine. Although phosphatidylcholine is approved by the FDA as a dietary supplement, compounders have prepared the product for injection.
73 E-mail from Samia Nasr to Compliance Officer (June 24, 2008, 11:42 AM).
74 E-mail from Samia Nasr to Kathleen Anderson, et al. (June 25, 2008, 6:43 AM).
75 E-mail from Kathleen Anderson to Samia Nasr (June 25, 2008, 8:48 AM).
76 E-mail from Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA, to Mutahar Shamsi (June 27, 2008, 1:15 PM).
77 Inspection Request, Sample Collection from Consumer Safety Officer, Compounding Team, DNDLC, Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA, to Michael Kravchuck & Gail Costello, at 1 (Sept. 16, 2008).
the inspector to address, sterility was a concern: "Are drug products and supplies stored under appropriate temperature, light, moisture, sanitation, and ventilation conditions?"; "Are sterile products made in an environment that prevents contamination?"; and "What type of in-process or finished product testing is performed and at what frequency?" The assignment concluded, "Based on the determination if the firm is operating as a manufacturer or as a traditional compounding pharmacy, an enforcement action is likely if the firm is operating as a manufacturer."78

Once Mr. Shamsi received the assignment on September 18, 2008, he forwarded it to Deborah Autor in CDER asking, "Did you want to get involved also at the beginning? Since the firm has already received a Warning Letter, further violations should (I hope) lead to a judicial action."79 After hearing from several of her colleagues in CDER, Ms. Autor replied on September 25, "I'm told the [CDER] compounding team is now talking to and collaborating with the District on this hybrid mesotherapy/general compounding inspection. Let me see if the GMP side of my office also wants to engage now to prepare for that part of the inspection."80 She proceeded to reach out to then-Director of CDER's Division of Manufacturing and Product Quality, Rick Friedman, asking for his thoughts, to which he replied, "[W]e could assist with manufacturing and sterility assurance issues in a pre-inspection briefing[.]"81

While CDER appeared ready to go forward with the inspection—despite the fact that the agency had yet to send NECC a response to its January 2007 letter objecting to the findings in the Warning Letter—it is apparent that Mr. Shamsi began to question whether it was wise to inspect the facility prior to issuing the response. On October 1, 2008, he emailed Ms. Autor stating, "I'm wondering whether our lack of a response would hinder any further regulatory action against NECC (if OGC is reluctant to respond to a [Warning Letter], how would they respond to an injunction request?)[.]"82 To a certain extent, Mr. Shamsi's concerns were shared by the NECC compliance officer in the NWE-DO: "If we re-inspect there is no second [Warning Letter.] Next step is to enjoin the firm. . . . Injunctions have time frames and have to be processed quickly. If OCC and CDER cannot agree on a response letter can they agree on an injunction[?]"83

By this point, documents produced to the Committee reveal that FDA staff was frustrated with the time it was taking the FDA Chief Counsel's Office to approve a response to NECC. In fact, in January 2008, Mr. Silverman had asked whether anyone in CDER was having any particularly frustrating interactions with OCC they would like addressed.84 On January 28, Ms. Nasr responded that the Compounding Team was concerned about the "length of time to get

78 Id. at 6.
79 E-mail from Mutahar Shamsi to Deborah Autor (Sept. 18, 2008, 1:44 PM).
80 E-mail from Deborah Autor to Mutahar Shamsi (Sept. 25, 2008, 11:29 PM).
81 E-mail from Rick Friedman, Dir., Div. of Manufacturing & Product Quality, Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA, to Deborah Autor (Sept. 26, 2008, 12:31 AM).
82 E-mail from Mutahar Shamsi to Deborah Autor (Oct. 1, 2008, 8:19 AM).
84 See E-mail from Consumer Safety Officer, FDA, to Samia Nasr, et al. (Jan. 28, 2008, 11:39 AM).
anything cleared by OCC" and specifically cited the NECC response draft that CDER had sent to OCC on August 29, 2007.85

While discussions about inspecting NECC prior to issuing the response letter were ongoing, on October 9, 2008, FDA’s Los Angeles District Office received a complaint about a patient being hospitalized after having been intravenously administered phosphatidylcholine made by NECC.86 Phosphatidylcholine injections are mesotherapy products, which FDA had concerns about NECC making and distributing prior to any adverse event reports having been received. According to the complaint report, after the initial infusion period, the patient “developed [a] burning sensation” and a “swollen arm and hand.”87 After the patient was discharged, he could not swallow food or liquid, vomited, and urinated blood.88 He was “admitted to an emergency room three more times” and “[t]he physician found blood clots in his arm and hand.”89 FDA collected a sample “to be analyzed for microbiological analysis and analyzed for potency and chemical contamination.”90 The NWE-DO was informed about the situation on October 16, 2008. On October 17, Mr. Shamsi emailed the District compliance officer responsible for NECC stating, “We need to make sure the investigator follows up on this.”91 However, according to the compliance officer’s notes from a meeting that took place two days prior, involving officials from CDER, OCC, and the NWE-DO, including Mr. Shamsi, it had already been decided that “OCC will get a response letter to the firm before we do an inspection.”92

On October 31, 2008, more than four years after the underlying inspection and almost two years after NECC responded to the Warning Letter, OCC finally signed off on FDA’s response. The letter “acknowledge[d] and apologize[d] for the significant delay in this correspondence.”93 Like the agency detailed in the Warning Letter, FDA presented an extensive summary of its authority over compounded drugs and the factors the agency would consider in determining whether to exercise enforcement discretion. FDA concluded by stating, “We agree that the length of intervening period was unusual. This in no way diminishes our serious concerns about your firm’s operation. Your firm must promptly correct the violations noted in the December 4, 2006, Warning Letter, and establish procedures to assure that such violations do not occur. Its failure to do so may result in enforcement action including seizure of the firm’s products and/or an injunction against the firm and its principals. In a future inspection, we will confirm the commitments that you made in your response. We also will verify that your firm’s compounding practices are consistent with the policy articulated in the [2002] CPG, and that your firm’s operation is not otherwise at odds with the conditions under which the agency exercises enforcement discretion towards pharmacy compounding.”94 FDA, however, never

85 E-mail from Samia Nasr to Consumer Safety Officer, FDA, (Jan. 28, 2008, 11:45 AM). See also E-mail from Samia Nasr to Consumer Safety Officer, FDA (Jan. 28, 2008, 12:12 PM).
86 See FDA, CONSUMER COMPLAINT/INJURY REPORT, at 1 (Oct. 9, 2008).
87 Id.
88 See id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 3.
91 E-mail from Mutahar Shamsi to Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA (Oct 17, 2008, 7:11AM).
94 Id. at 4.
returned to the firm until the 2012 meningitis outbreak, despite receiving new complaints about NECC’s products and practices.

C. After Closing Out the 2006 Warning Letter, FDA Continues to Receive New Complaints About the Safety of NECC Products and the Company’s Practices

Now that FDA’s response to NECC had been sent, based on communications among FDA staff, there should have been no barrier to FDA conducting an inspection of NECC, especially in light of the additional issues and complaints that had been brought to the agency’s attention while it worked on a response to NECC’s January 2007 letter. On November 4, 2008, however, Mr. Shamsi informed the Director of the NWE-DO Investigations Branch at the time that “CDER would like us to hold off for now” on the inspection that would have covered issues relating to mesotherapy products and general compounding practices. No explanation for this new delay is apparent from the documents produced to the Committee, although FDA staff resumed its debate in February 2009 when the results from the tests of the phosphatidylcholine associated with the hospitalization in California had come back showing the samples were superpotent and displayed signs of degradation.

With further evidence that NECC’s practices were continuing to result in unsafe products, FDA finally seemed prepared to take decisive action. On February 11, 2009, after receiving the test results, the same District compliance officer emailed a number of his colleagues, “CDER wants us to immediately (today) go [to] NECC to determine if the firm is willing to recall the Phosphatidyl choline injection it compounds. The drug is superpotent and not approved and should be recalled. We want to determine the batch size, and where distributed. The recall part should be done immediately and can be separate from the inspection.”

Based on a review of the documents, however, it does not appear as though a recall ever happened. According to a memorandum dated February 17, 2009, a conference call was held with CDER and NWE-DO staff. This memorandum indicates that NECC had yet to be informed about the results of the phosphatidylcholine sample. Apparently, FDA had decided to wait and inform NECC of the test results during an inspection, which was scheduled to take place “around March 23, 2009.” On March 18, however, Ms. Nasr once again informed the District compliance officer to “hold off [on] the inspection.” Ms. Nasr explained that she had spoken with OCC and that “she is working on an inspection assignment to cover 503A and [the] CPG so [we] don’t have to do 2 inspections.” According to the District compliance officer, Ms. Nasr

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95 E-mail from Mutahar Shamsi to Michael Kravchuk, et al. (Nov. 4, 2008, 4:30 PM).
96 Jan 30, 2009, memo from Dunn to Nasr.
97 E-mail from Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA, to Mutahar Shamsi, et al. (Feb. 11, 2009, 7:39 AM).
99 Id. at 1.
"said she is afraid if [the] inspection [is] outside [the] 5th District [the] firm will file [a] petition against [the] FDA."102 It is apparent from this email and additional documents produced to the Committee that in anticipation of having to defend an enforcement action—such as a seizure of products or injunction against the firm—in court, FDA wanted to ensure that observations during an inspection not only addressed the factors listed in the CPG but clearly established that NECC fell outside the safe harbor provided to traditional compounding pharmacies under section 503A.

FDA has confirmed to the Committee that no further inspection of NECC occurred until after the meningitis outbreak had commenced. Towards the end of 2009, FDA received complaints about NECC’s solicitation and distribution of erythromycin without patient-specific prescriptions103 and NECC’s sale of sodium tetradeyl sulfate to a physician in North Carolina for use in treating varicose veins, when there was only one commercially available product indicated for such treatment.104 According to this last complaint report, CDER was aware of “NECC compounding sodium tetradeyl sulfate and will be issuing an assignment for NECC in the future.”105 One year later, in September 2010, Ms. Nasr was informed by an individual with CDER’s Drug Shortage Program about NECC soliciting a certain antibiotic during a shortage, along with a number of other products. This individual stated, “[D]on’t know if there is anything that can be done but thought I would forward it on.” Ms. Nasr replied, “Yes, NECC is under our radar.”106

Based on a review of the documents produced to the Committee, the next complaint associated with NECC was one discussed at some length during the November 2012 hearing with Commissioner Hamburg. On May 10, 2011, FDA’s Denver District Office informed the NWE-DO about a Cease and Desist Order the Colorado Board of Pharmacy issued to NECC “regarding their illegal distribution of compounded drugs to hospitals in the Denver metropolitan area.”107 When Ms. Nasr was made aware of this information on May 11, she forwarded it to others in CDER stating, “Good news.”108

The same day FDA’s Denver District Office informed the New England office of the Cease and Desist Order, the New England District compliance officer responsible for NECC spoke to an optometrist with the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs who was inquiring about whether they could use NECC to repackage Avastin for them into single dose units. This communication is significant, because it once again confirms that FDA understood that NECC was acting more like a manufacturer than a traditional compounding pharmacy. He forwarded a summary of his conversation to Ms. Nasr, copying several of his colleagues, one of whom responded, “I didn’t think they could use firms if profiles were unacceptable? NECC Framingham is profiled as a manufacturer (because we determined they are a manufacturer not a

102 Id.
103 See E-mail from Redaction to Samia Nasr (Sept. 14, 2009, 3:26 PM). See also E-mail from Samia Nasr to Anderson, et al. (Sept. 14, 2009, 3:34 PM).
104 See E-mail from Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA, to Samia Nasr, et al. (Sept. 29, 2009, 6:27 AM).
105 FDA, CONSUMER COMPLAINT/INJURY REPORT, at 3 (Sept. 17, 2009).
106 E-mail from Samia Nasr to Associate Dir., CDER Drug Shortage Program (Sept. 14, 2010, 2:44 PM).
108 E-mail from Samia Nasr to Kathleen Anderson, et al. (May 11, 2009, 6:17 AM).
The compliance officer replied, "You are right. I didn’t think of profiles. And you are right about the repacking, manufacturing, registering, listing and GMPs. I just spoke to Samia Nasr and she said the same thing about repacking that you did that it’s manufacturing and not compounding."110

The understanding FDA had reached with the Massachusetts Board in February 2003 that the State would take the lead in making sure that NECC improved its practices was based on their determination that NECC was operating as a compounding pharmacy. By 2011, FDA was well aware of the fact that this was no longer the case. Though it should have been occurring all along, it was during this time period that communication with the State would have been particularly valuable, as FDA had compiled a list of specific issues and complaints associated with NECC’s practices and products that needed to be addressed. In her written testimony for the November 2012 hearing, Commissioner Hamburg pointed to the fact that “[t]he Massachusetts Board of Pharmacy reinspected NECC in 2011 in response to a letter from the firm indicating that NECC was ‘updating its facility and moving into adjacent space’”; that the “inspection included a tour of the facility, security review, licensing review, and inspection of NECC’s sterile and non-sterile processing areas”; and that the MBP “found the facility to be ‘Satisfactory’.”111

Commissioner Hamburg neglected to mention that by 2011, FDA knew that NECC was operating like a manufacturer and the agency had failed to pass along any information to the Massachusetts Board that would have allowed it to conduct a more informed inspection. The MDPH has asserted to Committee staff that all communications with FDA pertaining to NECC and/or Ameridose have been produced. There is no evidence from any documents produced to the Committee that FDA even knew the State inspection was taking place. Further, in the same section of inspection notes from which Commissioner Hamburg quoted, the Massachusetts Board inspector stated that he left a voicemail for Mr. Cadden on April 22, 2011, prior to the inspection taking place; that Mr. Cadden called him back on April 28 “pushing off” the inspection by two weeks; and that it was ultimately conducted on May 24, 2011—giving NECC more than a month to prepare.112 Given that NECC employees were allegedly instructed to drop everything and clean after the firm’s management became aware that FDA would be inspecting the facility in connection with the meningitis outbreak, Mr. Cadden’s actions are concerning.113

On July 16, 2012, FDA’s Denver District Office again reached out to the NWE-DO, this time informing them that NECC had violated the Colorado Board of Pharmacy’s Cease and Desist Order. The same compliance officer told his colleague that he would “forward this to CDER to see if they want us to do anything.”114 He continued: “OCC at the moment is not

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111 Hamburg Statement, supra note 3.
112 MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, INSPECTION REPORT, at 9 (May 24, 2011).
114 E-mail from Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA, to Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA (July 17, 2012, 8:19 AM).
doing anything with compounding pharmacies because of the recent losses in the southwest. . . .
CDER said last year we may do something at the end of this year with compounding pharmacies.
I recently had a meeting with OCI [FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigations] based on a
complaint they received and they may be doing something with Ameridose. I invited CDER to
the meeting and they were on the speakerphone. They did not want us going to the firm.”

Three things are apparent from this email: 1) FDA continued to grapple with the
implications of the Circuit Court split several years after the Fifth Circuit decision in Medical
Center Pharmacy, and until agency officials agreed on a path forward, oversight would be
minimal; 2) the relationship between NECC and Ameridose was well understood by FDA staff;
and 3) the complaints about NECC’s sister company, Ameridose, were serious in nature and
magnified those already made about NECC. Part IV of this memorandum addresses these points.

PART IV: OVERSIGHT OF NECC’S SISTER COMPANY, AMERIDOSE: 2006 – 2012

Like NECC, its sister company, Ameridose, had a significant history with FDA. FDA
was well aware of the firms’ shared ownership and management. On several occasions, this
factored into FDA’s decision-making about whether and when to take certain actions related to
one of the companies. As FDA’s actions pursuant to the meningitis outbreak indicate, a recent
inspection of one firm may very well have triggered an inspection of the other.

As Part IV will detail, from an enforcement perspective, FDA’s inaction with respect to
Ameridose may be even more egregious than in the case of NECC. Ameridose was different
from NECC in one, fundamental way: it had registered with FDA as a manufacturer and
repackager of drug products. Ameridose’s website states that the company is “[a]n FDA
registered manufacturer” that meets both U.S. Pharmacopeia (USP) compounding standards and
current good manufacturing practice (cGMP) requirements. In addition to being registered
with FDA, the firm was also registered in Massachusetts as a retail pharmacy and had Drug
Enforcement Administration licenses as a manufacturer and retail pharmacy for controlled
substances. According to FDA, Ameridose first registered with the agency in September
2006.

A. After Two Inspections Reveal Problems at Ameridose, FDA’s Plan to Issue a
Warning Letter to the Company is Ultimately Rejected.

Within a year of the company having registered with FDA, the agency “received a report
through its MedWatch system alleging Ameridose is engaged in the manufacture of unapproved

115 Id.
INSPECTION REPORT”].
118 See Memorandum from FDA to Committee staff, Timeline of FDA Interactions with NECC and Ameridose, at 2
(produced to Committee staff on Feb. 1, 2013, per request of Oct. 12, 2012) [hereinafter, “FDA Timeline”].
intravenous solutions that are not dispensed pursuant to a prescription." The complainant who filed the MedWatch report asked FDA to investigate and "determine whether this company is making these products on a sound basis, or whether, as I strongly suspect, they are ignoring cGMPs when preparing these intravenous products. I fear a large-scale epidemic of serious infections may occur caused by these products."

At the same time FDA was examining an NECC complaint forwarded by an anonymous sender, on May 22, 2007, CDER issued an inspection request to the New England District Office for Ameridose. Since FDA's reply to NECC's response to the December 2006 Warning Letter was still pending, NWE-DO staff asked whether this would be an impediment to the Ameridose inspection. Samia Nasr, then-Team Leader of CDER's Compounding Team, informed the primary compliance officer in the District that CDER was "aware of the relationship between NECC and Ameridose" and that they still wanted to proceed with the inspection. According to the draft inspection request for Ameridose, the goal of the assignment was "to obtain current information about the firm's compounding practices, especially as they relate to the compounding of injectable medications."

Despite having drafted an inspection request in May, by September 2007, the FDA inspection of Ameridose had yet to occur. Steven Silverman, then-Assistant Director of CDER's Office of Compliance, emailed Michael Rogers, then-Director of the Division of Field Investigations in FDA's Office of Regulatory Affairs, and Michael Chappell, then-Acting Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs, a list of the "inspections that are the most critical." Mr. Silverman suggested that these inspections had been stalled and noted the impact that failing to inspect could have on the public health. He requested "[a]ny help that you or others can provide in breaking these assignments loose" and stated that "[t]hese are all matters for which we're prepared to take enforcement action and moving them forward will directly benefit public health." Mr. Silverman listed six "compounding inspection assignments"—Ameridose was second on the list.

The Ameridose inspection finally took place in December 2007, though not before additional concerns about the firm's practices were reported to FDA. On November 21, 2007, a representative from the Ohio Board of Pharmacy forwarded CDER a solicitation that Ameridose had sent to hospitals in his State. The Ohio Board representative noted the link between Ameridose and NECC stating, "I have a company named Ameridose (which appears to be a subsidiary or an associate of New England Compounding Center – same or similar corporate officers) who is offering to sell pre-filled syringes to hospitals ... who have purchased ...

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120 FDA, MEDWATCH REPORT, at 2 (May 2, 2007).
121 E-mail from Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA, to Drug Pre-approval Manager, New England Dist. Off. (June 7, 2007, 11:49 AM).
122 May 21, 2007, Inspection Request, supra note 119.
123 E-mail from Steven Silverman to Michael Rogers, Dir., Div. of Field Investigations, Off. of Reg. Affairs, FDA, et al. (Sept. 5, 2007, 4:52 PM).
124 Id.
125 Id.
infusions pumps." He concluded, "[T]his appears to be just another episode of drug manufacturing being self-classified as compounding in order to make everything appear to be legitimate." After several exchanges with an individual with CDER’s Division of Drug Information, the representative from the Ohio Board informed the CDER employee, "I had a conversation with a Greg Conigliaro from Ameridose on Wednesday after I sent you the message. I think he said he was the President of Ameridose. . . . He said that Ameridose, of course, thinks that their preparation of syringes for use in these pumps is perfectly legal. I told him I didn’t think so unless he did it on a patient specific basis by prescription. That did not make him happy[.]" These exchanges were forwarded to Ms. Nasr and others in CDER.

Several days before the Ameridose inspection began on December 7, 2007, CDER raised the company’s connection with NECC and asked the inspector in the NWE-DO to obtain information during the inspection to “elaborate on their business relationship/model and leadership structure and anything else that may potentially cause some inspectional hurdles.” The inspection report that was ultimately filed, however, did not address the question of the companies’ relationship in any depth, other than to list Ameridose’s management structure. The inspection report revealed that Ameridose was engaged in manufacturing activities in that the firm had “made over 610 Lots of products and 38 batches of products of Admixtures for hospitals and packaged them into IV bags, syringes, and vials since they opened in 2006.” This finding prompted an employee on the Compounding Team in CDER to email the Director of the NWE-DO Investigations Branch on March 3, 2008, and request an inspection, stating that “the scope and nature of Ameridose’s activities are outside the bounds of traditional pharmacy practice and more consistent with that of a drug manufacturer. Therefore, as per our conversation today we would like The District to do a full GMP inspection of Ameridose LLC as soon as possible.”

This second inspection of Ameridose did not begin until four months later, in July 2008. In the meantime, the Ohio Board of Pharmacy again reached out to CDER about Ameridose on May 12, this time regarding other sterile injectable products. The Executive Director of the Board stated, “Before the Board issues a Cease & Desist letter to [Ameridose], telling them to stop shipping manufactured products into Ohio under the guise of compounding, I wonder if you could verify for me whether or not this is a legitimately manufactured product that is made by an FDA approved manufacturer?” No substantive reply to this email was produced to the Committee, though the email was forwarded to Ms. Nasr, at which point she notified several of her colleagues that “Ameridose is a pharmacy that we inspected recently and we are waiting for the District to go back for GMP re-inspection.”

126 E-mail from Redaction to CDER DRUG INFO (Nov. 21, 2007, 2:02 PM).
127 Id.
128 E-mail from Redaction to CDER DRUG INFO (Nov. 23, 2007, 12:55 PM).
131 E-mail from Consumer Safety Officer, Compounding Team, DNDLC, Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA, to Michael Kravchuk (Mar. 3, 2008, 3:27 PM).
132 E-mail from Exec. Dir., Ohio St. Bd. of Pharmacy, to CDER DRUG INFO (May 12, 2008, 1:49 PM).
133 E-mail from Samia Nasr to Kathleen Anderson, et al. (July 16, 2008, 9:15 AM).
FDA began its second inspection of Ameridose on July 21, 2008. According to the inspection report, Ameridose had been labeled a “High Risk facility” in advance. Since the previous inspection only seven months before, Ameridose’s operations had considerably expanded. The report stated, “The firm currently markets over 600 products including 7 Antibiotic class, 15 Class II, 1 Class III, 2 Class IV and many Class VI products”\(^\text{134}\) and that their customers include “approximately 500 Hospital Pharmacies located in 49 of the 50 states.”\(^\text{135}\) Summarizing the firm’s operations, the FDA inspector stated, “The firm ships 75% of their product outside of Massachusetts. [Ameridose] stated that all their customers that order the products are affiliated with hospitals. The firm manufactures small orders in Lot sized batches and combines multiple orders of one specific product into Batches of finished product. None of their manufactured or repackaged products are linked to a specific patient prescription.”\(^\text{136}\)

In addition to concerns about the nature of the company’s operations, the FDA inspector also observed several objectionable practices in Ameridose’s facility that were then documented in a Form 483 that FDA issued to the company on August 6, 2008. While all were troubling, the first observation was particularly egregious. According to the Form 483, Ameridose was not waiting to receive test results confirming the strength or sterility of their products before shipping them to customers. Specifically, the Form 483 stated, “Testing and release of drug product for distribution [does] not include appropriate laboratory determination of satisfactory conformance to the identity and strength of each active ingredient prior to release.”\(^\text{137}\) Further, FDA found that there was “no potency or identity test done on the finished drug product, and the product is shipped immediately and prior to the 14 day sterility test results are received by the firm.”\(^\text{138}\) One example provided by the inspector was fentanyl, a narcotic injectable many times more potent than morphine. The inspector retained samples of this product for testing.\(^\text{139}\)

Several individuals in the NWE-DO were alarmed by the Ameridose inspection findings. After reviewing the report, one compliance officer emailed her colleague in the District: “This case bothers me the more I think of it . . . [T]he firm doesn’t conduct potency testing on ANY finished product (only the stock solution, which they subsequently dilute) so I have serious concerns with the potency [of] all their products. Perhaps we should be thinking of getting a health hazard evaluation and getting the firm to recall as many of their products as we can or going out to get more finished product samples. A vast majority of their products are sterile injectable opioids, super potency is a serious concern.”\(^\text{140}\)

By September 10, 2008, the results from the fentanyl samples showed that the product was, in fact, superpotent.\(^\text{141}\) The following day, a compliance officer in the NWE-DO informed

\(^{135}\) Id. at 5.
\(^{136}\) Id. at 3.
\(^{137}\) FDA, AMERIDOSE LLC FORM FDA 483, at 1 (Aug. 6, 2008).
\(^{138}\) Id.
\(^{139}\) See FDA Timeline, supra note 118.
\(^{140}\) E-mail from Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA, to Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA (Sept. 9, 2008, 7:23 PM).
Sophia Pasedis, the Vice President of Regulatory Affairs at Ameridose, about the results. According to a memorandum of the telephone call, the compliance officer told Ms. Pasedis that "FDA is very concerned" and asked what Ameridose was "going to do with the product in the market." According to a memorandum of the conversation, "She said she was going to call her accounts to see if there were any reactions and if there was any product out there. I told her if she was going to [do a] voluntary recall she could call our recall coordinator. She said she would like to first make some calls and then she would call me back." Ms. Pasedis did call him back and, according to the compliance officer, "[She] said 155 bags were made and sent to 5 different facilities. She said all the facilities have ordered the product multiple times. She said one firm ordered 100 bags. She did not think she had to do anything further." When he informed her that Ameridose should consider issuing a recall notice, "She said she could not make a decision until she speaks with one of her bosses and none are answering their cell phones." After stating that he informed Ms. Pasedis they needed to speak first thing in the morning, the compliance officer concluded his memorandum: "The person[ ] did not appear to know what a recall is and we may have problems tomorrow...."

On September 12, FDA spoke with Gregory Conigliaro, co-owner of Ameridose. According to the FDA memorandum summarizing this telephone call, the compliance officer "told Mr. Conigliaro that it was his responsibility as a manufacturer to manufacture a safe and effective product. [He] told Mr. Conigliaro the product fails potency and his product is now adulterated... Mr. Conigliaro said he would do the right thing and send the recall notification to the 5 accounts." The recall was conducted that day. On September 15, 2008, the recall notice was sent to Michael Levy, who succeeded Steven Silverman as the Director of the DNDLC in CDER's Office of Compliance. He stated in response, copying Samia Nasr and Kathleen Anderson, "Thanks. We have a history with this firm.... Maybe it's time for reinspection and possible follow up enforcement action?" During this time period, Mr. Levy was also engaged in discussions about the NECC inspection being considered. On September 19, Samia Nasr emailed him and noted the firms' relationship, stating, "Please remember that [A]meridose and NECC are owned by two brothers."

Even prior to the fentanyl recall, based on observations included in the August 2008 inspection report and corresponding Form 483, CDER had already made the determination that a Warning Letter should be sent to Ameridose and that it "should include both new drug cha[r]ges

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142 Memo of Telephone Conversation between Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA, and Sophia Pasedis, Vice President of Reg. Affairs, Ameridose LLC (Sept. 11, 2008).
143 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Draft Memo of Telephone Call between Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA, and Gregory Conigliaro, Co-owner, Ameridose (Sept. 12, 2008).
148 See E-mail from Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA, to Mutahar Shamsi, et al. (Sept. 12, 2008, 10:34 AM).
149 E-mail from Michael Levy, Dir., DNDLC, Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA, to Rick Friedman, Dir., Div. of Manufacturing & Product Quality, Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA (Sept. 15, 2008, 8:40 PM).
150 E-mail from Samia Nasr to Michael Levy (Sept. 19, 2008, 7:28 AM).
and GMP charges." According to the documents, CDER reviewed the NWE-DO’s draft Warning Letter for several months and ultimately cleared it for Chief Counsel’s Office review in February 2009. Before it was cleared, there were a number of discussions among CDER officials about the nature of Ameridose’s operations and how they would impact potential enforcement actions. For example, after reviewing the latest draft of the Warning Letter on January 23, 2009, Michael Levy asked his Deputy, Kathleen Anderson, whether Ameridose was “a hospital outsourcer like CAPS [Central Admixture Pharmacy Services]? If so, haven’t we avoided bringing new drug charges against these firms?” Ms. Anderson replied, “Yes, it appears to be a type of outsourcer, but Ameridose has several important differences. We haven’t brought new drug charges against outsourcers that are manipulating/reconstituting FDA approved drugs as a hospital pharmacy typically does and that are not making copies of FDA approved drugs. Ameridose on the other hand [sic] is using bulk APIs to make stock solutions of their own versions of drugs, including many that are copies of approved drugs.” Levy responded, “OK, got it. Thanks.”

On March 4, 2009, one of the lawyers in the Chief Counsel’s Office informed CDER and the NWE-DO that they would approve the Warning Letter to Ameridose, but that “OCC’s clearance is on hold pending . . . a final determination as to whether clarifications are needed” to a paragraph discussing FDA’s enforcement policy with respect to entities located outside the Fifth Circuit. This issue had yet to be resolved six months later, at which point CDER made the decision to disapprove the Warning Letter on September 1, 2009. When the NWE-DO compliance officer responsible for Ameridose informed Mutahar Shamsi, then-Director of Compliance in the NWE-DO, of the decision, he noted the impact that the Circuit Court split and the resulting delay had on FDA’s willingness to issue a Warning Letter to Ameridose, stating, “The activity notes say the [Warning Letter] case was put on hold due to conflicting court rulings related to Pharmacy Compounding and CDER is not proceeding with issuance of this [Warning Letter] because it has now been 1 year since the district[’]s inspection of the firm.”

Angered by the news that the Warning Letter would not be issued because CDER and OCC could not agree on a path forward, Mr. Shamsi emailed Alyson Saben, FDA’s Deputy Director of Enforcement, and other officials in the agency, asking whether they could discuss the decision and stating, “NWE-DO spent a lot of time developing this case last year and having it ‘closed’ for nebulous reasons is troubling. . . . This is quite frustrating since I thought we had a good [Warning Letter]. I’ve told our [Investigations Branch] to not bother inspecting compounding pharmacies if we aren’t going to act on the violations.” Ms. Saben forwarded

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151 E-mail from Consumer Safety Officer, Compounding Team, DNDLC, Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA, to Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA (Sept. 9, 2008, 11:00 AM).
152 E-mail from Michael Levy to Kathleen Anderson, Dep. Dir., DNDLC, Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA (Jan. 23, 2009, 10:21 PM).
153 E-mail from Kathleen Anderson to Michael Levy (Jan. 24, 2009, 7:53 AM).
154 E-mail from Michael Levy to Kathleen Anderson (Jan. 24, 2009, 9:55 AM).
155 E-mail from General Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel (OCC), FDA, to Michal Levy, et al. (Mar. 4, 2009, 5:49 PM).
156 See E-mail from Div. of Info. Resources Mgmt. to Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA, et al. (Sept. 1, 2009, 11:13 AM).
158 E-mail from Mutahar Shamsi to ORA DCB Advisory Comm. (Sept. 1, 2009, 11:52 AM) (emphasis added).
Mr. Shamsi’s email to Michael Levy, copying Deborah Autor and others in CDER. She stated, “As I recall … CDER was moving forward with developing a prioritized list of ongoing/open pharmacy compounding cases for which we are prepared to move forward/refresh the evidence in light of [then-Acting Commissioner of FDA] Dr. Sharfstein’s decision to proceed with 503A. At that time, we discussed that CAPS [Central Admixture Pharmacy Services], PharMEDium and A[p]h[othe]Cure were on the short list. Could you provide us with a status check on your current thinking and what this means for other cases such as Ameridose?”159

After hearing about the decision on Ameridose, Douglas Stearn, then-Director of the Division of Compliance Policy in FDA’s Office of Enforcement, reached out to Mr. Shamsi on September 2, and indicated that FDA might be prepared to initiate enforcement actions against compounding operations. Mr. Stearn stated, “CDER is changing on this issue. Now is an ideal time to push.”160 The next day, Mr. Stearn emailed Michael Levy and Kathleen Anderson and noted, “There are a number of districts that have voiced concerns about some compounders that had previous OAI [Official Action Indicated] inspections. One thing that I have heard is that some of these compounders have serious sterility issues, which I understand … CDER sees as a central public health issue. It seems to me these districts would welcome the opportunity to work with CDER on choosing and focusing on compounding firms that have the issues CDER has identified.”161

FDA’s indecision about how to address compounding operations in light of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Medical Center Pharmacy significantly deterred enforcement actions against companies, including Ameridose, even when the agency knew they were engaged in manufacturing and jeopardizing public health in the process.

B. From 2009-2012, FDA Fails to Take Action While Complaints about Ameridose’s Products and Practices Continue to Mount

It is apparent from documents produced to the Committee that senior officials at FDA were discussing how to address growing concerns about Ameridose and similar companies while also grappling with what the Fifth Circuit’s decision to uphold the non-speech related provisions of section 503A meant for the agency. FDA considered at length whether the agency should apply section 503A only in the Fifth Circuit and continue to exercise enforcement discretion elsewhere, or whether it should uniformly apply section 503A nationwide, except in the Ninth Circuit, where the agency would exercise enforcement discretion regarding compounding that satisfies the criteria in section 503A. While the agency has since asserted that the former course

159 E-mail from Alyson Saben, Dep. Dir., Off. of Enforcement, Off. of Reg. Affairs, FDA, to Deborah Autor, et al. (Sept. 2, 2009, 12:11 PM). On February 10, 2012, the Department of Justice, at the request of FDA-OCI, charged AphertheCure Inc., a company located in Dallas, TX, with two misdemeanor criminal violations of the FDCA in connection with their interstate shipment of two lots of misbranded injectable products that led to the deaths of three people in 2007. After the meningitis outbreak, in February and March 2013, FDA inspected four PharMEDium Services, LLC facilities, and four CAPS facilities, issuing Form 483s in each instance. See http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofGlobalRegulatoryOperationsandPolicy/ORA/ORAElectronicReadingRoom/ucm340853.htm.
161 E-mail from Douglas Stearn to Kathleen Anderson, et al. (Sept. 3, 2009, 8:54 AM) (emphasis added).
of action would be followed, based on a review of the documents, it is apparent that FDA ultimately made the decision to pursue the latter. Prior to formally announcing this new agency position, however, FDA determined that new guidance and regulations needed to be drafted to provide a clear framework that FDA would use to differentiate between pharmacy compounding and drug manufacturing—a process that was still ongoing several years later and which was almost completed at the time of the fungal meningitis outbreak in September 2012. Unfortunately, enforcement actions stalled while the agency debated whether and how to conduct inspections or bring actions against compounding operations in the interim.

Meanwhile, CDER and NWE-DO staff was becoming increasingly concerned about Ameridose. On October 27, 2009, CDER received an anonymous email from an informant within the company: “July/August 2008 the FDA came to Ameridose LLC in Framingham, MA for an inspection. The company performed illegal and unethical actions. They directed the testing facilities they use to change reports, based on the drug[ ] results. They forged documents, forced employees to direct others to do so... [Gregory Conigliaro] silently directs people to change results, doctor the findings but hides in his office... VP is Sophia Pasedis, Pharm D all licenses are in her name, she too is fraudulent [sic].” FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigations (OCI) ultimately forwarded the email to Mutahar Shamsi on December 7, who replied, copying Samia Nasr, “Thanks for the info. We are waiting for an assignment from CDER to go out and will follow up on this. Ameridose has been on our radar for quite some time.”

Based in part on this complaint, FDA documents demonstrate that the agency was preparing to inspect Ameridose, though the inspection would again be delayed. After further discussing the informant’s claims with Ms. Nasr over the telephone, Mr. Shamsi emailed several individuals in the NWE-DO and OCI, stating that “CDER will be issuing an assignment for Ameridose after an outsourcing guidance document has been cleared through CDER.” He then decided, “Let’s wait until we get an assignment from CDER before we proceed on our side because if we forward anything down to OCC it will not proceed quickly. Obviously if we get information of an imminent health hazard we’ll have to go out. I don’t see that here yet.”

The documents indicate that CDER did not begin drafting the inspection request until April 2010 and that it was primarily to follow up on the issues raised in the Form 483 and the draft Warning Letter, both of which were based on the previous GMP inspection in 2008. The assignment was received by the NWE-DO on April 28, 2010, though it was not scheduled to take place until July. In the interim, CDER received another new complaint about Ameridose in

162 E-mail from druginfo@fda.hhs.gov to CDER DRUG INFO (Oct. 27, 2009, 6:47 PM).
163 E-mail from Mutahar Shamsi to Resident Agent in Charge, Off. of Crim. Investigations (OCI), FDA, et al. (Dec. 7, 2009, 4:54 PM).
164 E-mail from Mutahar Shamsi to Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA, et al. (Dec. 8, 2009, 11:54 AM).
165 Id.
166 See E-mail from Consumer Safety Officer, Compounding Team, DNDLC, Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA to Samia Nasr (Apr. 15, 2010, 2:44 PM).
early June that altered the focus of the discussions. This complaint was made by a manufacturer and related to “Ameridose’s pre-mixed nicardipine injection products.”\(^{168}\)

The new complaint complicated FDA’s previously planned inspection of Ameridose. On July 6, 2010, a member of CDER’s Compounding Team reached out to the primary compliance officer in the District Office informing him that CDER was “still trying to discuss with [the Office of the Chief Counsel] on how to approach the firm” and asking that he keep CDER up to date on whether the state independently “decide[s] to inspect [the] site in regards to the nicardipine.”\(^{169}\) It is clear from the documents that a decision was made to accompany the State to Ameridose on July 8, but the FDA inspector was told to focus exclusively on the commercial complaint related to the nicardipine injections. According to the FDA inspector’s report, “This inspection did not include review of corrective actions to the previous FDA 483. This was a directed inspection specifically to cover the admixing and distribution of Nicardipine IV.”\(^{170}\) The inspector’s report and her related comments indicate that she questioned whether Ameridose was in fact a compounding pharmacy, as the assignment referenced. Throughout the report, the inspector used the terms “manufactures” and “manufacturing” and her statement of jurisdiction held that the “firm currently repacks and manufactures prescription drug products which are FDA regulated drug products.”\(^{171}\) While forwarding her colleague notes from the inspection, the inspector stated, “I was looking on their website to see if they identify themselves as a compounding pharmacy – they don’t. It states in multiple places that they are an FDA registered manufacturer. I didn’t see ‘compounding’ anywhere.”\(^{172}\)

Soon after the inspection, the NWE-DO received an anonymous complaint from a “pharmacist in the manufacturing department” at Ameridose. The informant specifically raised concerns about the safety of Ameridose products.\(^{173}\) This individual contacted the District Office about his concerns on at least three separate occasions in July and August 2010. During this initial call, “He explained that he recently became aware of some potential GMP issues and he wanted to bring them to our attention.”\(^{174}\) According to a memorandum of the call, the informant raised concerns about contamination, stating that “[approximately] a week and a half ago, they were making a batch of succinylcholine. . . . He stated that after a few lots, someone observed particulates in the bag. He stated that they determined the particulates to be ‘angel hair’ and pieces of the bag itself. He stated that he was not sure if the previous lots made from the same batch were released.”\(^{175}\) According to the related complaint report, it was also the informant’s “opinion that the quality assurance program [had] been downsized and deprioritized.”\(^{176}\)

\(^{168}\) E-mail from Consumer Safety Officer, Compounding Team, DNDLC, Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA, to Supervisory Consumer Safety Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA (June 9, 2010, 4:12 PM).

\(^{169}\) E-mail from Consumer Safety Officer, Compounding Team, DNDLC, Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA, to Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA (June 9, 2010, 4:12 PM).

\(^{170}\) FDA, ESTABLISHMENT INSPECTION REPORT, at 1 (July 8, 2010).

\(^{171}\) Id at 3.

\(^{172}\) E-mail from Investigator, New England Dist. Off., FDA, to Investigator, New England Dist. Off., FDA (July 9, 2010, 2:58 PM).

\(^{173}\) See Memorandum of Teleconference between Redaction and Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA (July 13, 2010).

\(^{174}\) Id.

\(^{175}\) Id.

\(^{176}\) FDA, CONSUMER COMPLAINT/INJURY REPORT (July 13, 2010).
After the inspection limited to the nicardipine complaint was completed, the District compliance officer responsible for Ameridose asked CDER about the broader inspection assignment that was issued in April and scheduled to begin on July 26, 2010. CDER’s response was that it “should be put on hold for now” and that they “need[ed] to resolve the nicardipine issue with the firm first before we do a full inspection.”

On June 8, July 7, and at least one more time on July 22, 2010, an attorney for the company who had filed the commercial complaint about Ameridose’s nicardipine distribution reached out to Deborah Autor, then-Director of Compliance at CDER, asking why FDA had yet to take any action against Ameridose. On July 23, Ms. Autor forwarded the chain of emails to Kathleen Anderson and Samia Nasr, copying other CDER officials, and asking, “What’s your assessment of this situation?” Ms. Anderson replied that the New England District Office had just inspected Ameridose pursuant to the nicardipine complaint but acknowledged there were other issues with the company that needed to be addressed, which would factor into the agency’s course of action. She explained, “It is my understanding that Ameridose is a state licensed pharmacy and it’s [sic] operation is similar to CAPS. We will determine next steps based on what is found during the inspection, whether the firm is operating outside of 503A and the CPG, what the state plans, and the status of the nicardipine issue, etc.”

While this debate ensued within the agency, FDA continued to receive complaints associated with the safety of Ameridose products. On July 23, 2010—the same day of the exchange between Ms. Anderson and Ms. Autor—FDA received a MedWatch report about a nurse administering half of a syringe of dextrose 50% made by Ameridose to a patient before noticing “a white precipitate below the rubber plunger” which “extended about ¼ inch along the plunger’s base.” No additional details were provided and no related communications were produced to the Committee regarding this complaint. Again, based on the documents produced to the Committee, it appears as though the complaint essentially went unnoticed.

A few weeks later, on August 16, 2010, the Ameridose informant again contacted the NWE-DO but this time raised new and more alarming concerns about Ameridose’s practices and their potential impact on the safety of the company’s products. At least one of his claims, documented in a District Office memorandum, was shockingly similar to the violations FDA found when it inspected both NECC and Ameridose after the fungal meningitis outbreak began. According to the memorandum, the informant alleged that not only was the Ameridose sales team “assisting in labeling operations in a clean room” but that “one of the 3 clean rooms had a positive result for mold growth.” The informant also alleged that Ameridose was tampering with its sampling procedures, stating that the company would “clean the area first before taking

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177 E-mail from Consumer Safety Officer, Compounding Team, DNDLC, Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA, to Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA (July 14, 2010, 8:56 AM).
178 See Letter from Counsel to Deborah Autor (June 8, 2010) and Letter from Counsel to Deborah Autor (July 8, 2010). See also E-mail from Counsel to Deborah Autor (July 22, 2010, 11:28 AM).
179 E-mail from Deborah Autor to Samia Nasr, et al. (July 23, 2010, 4:52 PM).
180 E-mail from Kathleen Anderson to Deborah Autor (July 23, 2010, 4:59 PM).
181 FDA, MEDWATCH REPORT (July 23, 2010).
the [environmental] sample[s].” 183 Although the informant admitted that he was not aware of any illnesses or complaints resulting from these activities, he also stated that “he would not be in a position to know this type of information” and some of the information he had provided FDA was second or third hand.” 184 The compliance officer wrote, “I explained that FDA takes complaints such as his very seriously and that we would need to evaluate the information he provided. I asked if he was aware of any other issues that would cause a public health safety concern. He said no, but that he would contact us if he became aware of similar issues. I asked if he contacted any other offices such as the State of MA or the Board of Pharmacy. He stated he had not but would plan on doing so. We discussed that FDA is still seeking jurisdiction over compounding pharmacies.” 185

The compliance officer sent her memorandum to several of her District Office colleagues, even though it was her understanding that “FDA may not be in a position to follow-up at this time[.]” 186 In an email, the compliance officer specifically asked if they should share the information with the state. 187 This email, along with the memorandum, was forwarded to Samia Nasr in CDER. Ms. Nasr questioned the informant’s claims, stating that she was “not sure about his complaint since he said that this information was second or third hand. What’s this mean? [H]e heard it from someone else? [A]nd I am wondering when he says manufacturing area, does he mean[s] no prescriptions?” 188 The compliance officer responded, “Yes, 2nd hand means he heard it from someone else which is unreliable.” 189

Four days later, on August 20, 2010, the informant contacted the District Office again, this time to provide “additional information regarding the mold finding at Ameridose on 8/5/10.” 190 According to a memorandum of the call, the informant stated that the mold was found in “the hood in which operations took place.” 191 Again, this information was forwarded to Samia Nasr in CDER who, in response, asked the compliance officer, “Would it help if I set up a meeting with OCC to discuss possibility of full inspection?” 192 The compliance officer replied, “I don’t think so because in his second call he stated he is not directly involved with these findings and is obtaining his information from someone at the firm.” 193 Ms. Nasr simply stated, “Ok, thanks.” 194

Based on documents produced to the Committee, it does not appear that FDA took any steps to investigate or follow up on these claims, nor is there any evidence that FDA referred them to the State. FDA was still determining, though, what it should do in response to the

183 Id.
184 Id. at 2.
185 Id.
187 See id.
188 E-mail from Samia Nasr to Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA (Aug. 17, 2010, 10:34 AM).
191 Id.
192 E-mail from Samia Nasr to Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA (Aug. 23, 2010, 11:00 AM).
nicardipine situation. On October 15, 2010, the attorney who had previously reached out to Deborah Autor on several occasions emailed her again and expressed his frustration with FDA’s failure to take action against Ameridose in regard to the nicardipine complaint. The attorney pointed out that “[i]t has now been more than four months since we called this serious situation to your attention, yet to date we have seen no evidence that the agency has taken any enforcement action to protect patients and preserve the integrity of FDA’s drug review and approval system. In the meantime, Ameridose continues to expand its production and distribution of its unapproved drug product, thus increasing the potential risks to patients.”

Three days later, on October 18, 2010, Ms. Autor received an unrelated letter from an attorney representing PharMEDium Services LLC, regarding Ameridose’s practices and requesting that the agency “clarify its policies with respect to this category of compounding pharmacies.” PharMEDium’s letter makes plain that other companies with large-scale compounding operations were well aware of Ameridose’s efforts to skirt regulation and were trying to distance themselves from Ameridose’s practices, understanding the impact such practices could have on patient safety. According to PharMEDium’s attorney, “A principal issue is whether such compounders may utilize active pharmaceutical ingredients (API) (bulk powders) in lieu of commercially available injectable drug products (sterile vials) from approved new drug manufacturers or registered old drug manufacturers, as starting materials in this process. If those providing compounding services are permitted to do this, it will drastically change the way such preparations are compounded nationwide and put the manufacture of large quantities of sterile drugs for use in compounding in the hands of those who are not approved or ‘regulated’ to perform that operation.” The letter went on to detail Ameridose’s compounding practices and—in PharMEDium’s view—FDA’s inaction in response. It concluded in part, “Ameridose and others starting with bulk API can no longer be considered outsourcers when their compounding operations bear no resemblance to those of a hospital pharmacy, and instead resemble drug manufacturing.”

If there was ever any doubt, by the end of 2010, it should have been abundantly clear to FDA that Ameridose was not operating as a traditional compounding pharmacy. Not only did FDA understand the nature and scope of Ameridose’s practices, it was well aware of the dangers they were posing. Based on the documents produced to the Committee, FDA officials reacted as though Ameridose was a nuisance it could not figure out how to resolve, rather than a ticking time bomb.

C. Despite an Increasing Number of Complaints, FDA Decides to Further Delay Action against Ameridose until after New 503A Guidance is Drafted

While FDA worked to resolve the issues raised by the nicardipine complaint, the agency had effectively tabled conducting a broader inspection of Ameridose to follow up on the concerning observations documented in the previous inspections and to investigate the issues raised by the company informant, among the other complaints. Once FDA was informed on

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195 E-mail from Counsel to PharMEDium Services LLC to Deborah Autor (Oct. 15, 2010, 4:37 PM).
196 Letter from Counsel to Deborah Autor, at 1 (Oct. 18, 2010).
197 Id. (emphasis added).
198 Id. at 3.
January 14, 2011, that a settlement had been reached between Ameridose and the commercial complainant in the nicardipine matter, the agency turned its attention to the various other complaints that it had received since the July 2008 inspection and failed to address. After learning of the nicardipine settlement on January 20, Samia Nasr noted that CDER staff was scheduled “to meet with OCC in two weeks to discuss full inspection of Ameridose since we have several complaints regarding its practice.” This February 4, 2011, meeting between representatives from CDER, OCC, and the NWE-DO was the first of several discussions to address the “[c]ompilation of complaints towards Ameridose.” Less than two weeks later, they would have another complaint to add to the list.

A representative from the Institute of Safe Medication Practices (ISMP) informed FDA on February 15, 2011, of an issue ISMP had been made aware of during an ongoing shortage of 23.4% sodium chloride, a common electrolyte replenisher. According to a medication error report, which had been submitted to ISMP’s website with a photocopied Ameridose label, the pharmacist complainant had “great concerns over the safety” of the sodium chloride product. The complainant stated that the “drug is filled into an empty Hospira bag. This bag can be directly attached to any IV line and infused undiluted into a patient. The warning says ‘May need to dilute’. There is no circumstance where this product would not need to be diluted prior to infusion. The commercial product is filled into vials and the cap reads ‘MUST BE DILUTED’. It is not labeled as Sodium Chloride USP, nor does it say that it is sterile. As a practicing pharmacist, I am shocked that such a product would be allowed to be distributed for use in the United States.”

The patient safety implications of the latest Ameridose complaint were immediately clear to Michael Levy, then-Director of the DNDLC in CDER’s Office of Compliance. Upon receiving the complaint, he forwarded it Samia Nasr and asked her to have someone look into it, stating that “it should be a priority.” Ms. Nasr responded to Mr. Levy, copying Kathleen Anderson, and informed him that CDER was “trying to get OCC to let us go and inspect Ameridose.”

A member of CDER’s Compounding Team echoed Mr. Levy’s concerns about patient safety to Ms. Nasr. In an email dated February 16, 2011, the Compounding Team member explained the nature of the risk posed, noting that “[t]he 100 ml bags of 23.4% NaCl that Ameridose is compounding are extremely dangerous. How is Ameridose even obtaining these empty Hospira 100mg bags? The way that these bags appear and are labeled is very misleading. To me it appears that these bags are made by Hospira. . . . And to say that ‘Caution Concentration: may need dilute’ is an understatement. This must be diluted! And they should

199 See Letter from Counsel to Deborah Autor (Jan. 14, 2011).
200 E-mail from Samia Nasr to Kathleen Anderson, et al. (Jan. 20, 2011, 1:56 PM).
201 E-mail from Reg. Operations Officer, Compounding Team, DNDLC, Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA, to Samia Nasr, et al. (Feb. 4, 2011, 11:07 AM).
202 See E-mail from President, ISMP, Dir., Div. of Medication Errors Prevention and Analysis, Off. of Surveillance and Epidemiology, CDER, FDA, et al. (Feb. 15, 2011, 9:59 AM).
203 E-mail from ISMP Mailsender to Pharmacy Technician Analyst, ISMP (Feb. 14, 2011, 5:00 PM).
204 Id. (emphasis added).
205 E-mail from Michael Levy to Samia Nasr (Feb. 15, 2011, 6:00 PM).
206 E-mail from Samia Nasr to Michael Levy, et al. (Feb. 16, 2011, 6:13 PM).
further warn that this bag should not be directly infused to the patient. This is unbelievable! *I think this is a disaster waiting to happen.* In a subsequent exchange, Ms. Nasr stated, “Let us see if OCC agrees on inspecting.”

Before OCC could weigh in on the ISMP complaint, ISMP informed FDA later that day that they had reached out to Ameridose and the company had agreed to revise the label. According to the Compounding Team employee who was alarmed by what she had learned earlier in the day, “The labeling looks much better.” While she still had concerns “given Ameridose’s past history,” she felt as though they could be addressed “when we do a full inspection of the firm in the future.” Whether such an inspection would ever occur, however, was still an open question at the agency.

After a March 4, 2011, discussion about Ameridose between CDER, OCC, and the NWE-DO, an employee on CDER’s Compounding Team sent an email to the group titled, “Reasons to go inspect Ameridose,” which listed many of the concerns FDA had with the company, including its labeling, its lack of patient-specific prescriptions, and its practices as they relate to sterile injectable products. Documents produced to the Committee show that lawyers in the Chief Counsel’s Office were debating which concerns CDER had already detailed could constitute actionable violations under the FDCA, in advance of the full inspection being considered. The debate about whether FDA should even conduct such an inspection of Ameridose, however, would continue throughout the summer of 2011. Finally, on September 15, 2011, a Compounding Team employee emailed others in CDER, noting that they had decided to hold off on the Ameridose inspection. According to this email, FDA would not proceed with an inspection “until we issue the 503A guidance. . . . Plan is to re-inspect Ameridose 6 months after issuance of a 503A guidance.” FDA’s decision to assert its authority under section 503A of the FDCA, except in the Ninth Circuit, was previously touched upon and will be subsequently addressed in greater detail, particularly with respect to the impact it had on FDA’s oversight of NECC and Ameridose.

While FDA turned its attention to working on the 503A guidance, the complaints about Ameridose continued. In fact, on August 9, 2011, a new series of anonymous phone calls from

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207 E-mail from Consumer Safety Officer, Compounding Team, DNDLC, Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA, to Samia Nasr (Feb. 16, 2011, 10:01 AM) (emphasis added).
208 E-mail from Samia Nasr to Consumer Safety Officer, Compounding Team, DNDLC, Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA (Feb. 16, 2011, 10:42 AM).
209 See E-mail from President, ISMP, to Dir., Div. of Medication Errors Prevention and Analysis, Off. of Surveillance and Epidemiology, CDER, FDA, et al. (Feb. 16, 2011, 2:34 PM).
210 E-mail from Consumer Safety Officer, Compounding Team, DNDLC, Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA, to Samia Nasr (Feb. 16, 2011, 2:56 PM).
211 Id.
212 See E-mail from Reg. Operations Officer, Compounding Team, DNDLC, Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA, to Samia Nasr, et al. (Mar. 4, 2011, 10:12 AM).
213 E-mail from Consumer Safety Officer, Compounding & Pharmacy Practices Team, Div. of Prescription Drugs, Off. of Unapproved Drugs & Labeling Compliance (OUDLC), Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA, to Consumer Safety Technician, OUDLC (Sept. 15, 2011, 3:46 PM). By September 2011, the Office of Compliance appears to have been restructured, resulting in the Compounding Team—formerly within the Division of New Drugs and Labeling Compliance—being renamed the Compounding and Pharmacy Practices Team within the Office of Unapproved Drugs and Labeling Compliance, Division of Prescription Drugs.
an Ameridose employee had begun. It is not clear whether this was the same informant who had spoken with NWE-DO staff on several occasions a year earlier. According to the initial NWE-DO report, the anonymous Ameridose employee stated that “when packages are dropped on the floor employees are told to pick up and ship” and that “the bubble wrap is stored directly on the floor and that this room is dirty and is never cleaned.” The NWE-DO employee who received the complaint labeled the firm in question “Manufacturer” and marked it “Surveillance Information for Next [Establishment Inspection].” This informant would continue to contact FDA with new concerns through mid-November, though that informant was not the only person doing so.

Based on a review of the documents, since November 2010, individuals from the California Health Department and Board of Pharmacy had been in contact with FDA’s Los Angeles District Office about concerns they had with Ameridose shipping repackaged succinylcholine, a neuromuscular blocking agent used in surgery. According to the State representatives, Ameridose was shipping the product with significantly different expiration dates than the branded product and doing so without corresponding package inserts. The issue resurfaced in September 2011, when an employee from the Department of Public Health had asked FDA whether “Ameridose received premarket approval for the succinylcholine product” and noted that they were “concerned with microbial contamination, as well as stability of product, associated with the repackaging (from the original manufacturers) of the Ameridose products.” These concerns were shared with Tamara Ely, the new leader of CDER’s Compounding Team, on September 28, 2011.

One month later, the documents indicate that an anonymous Ameridose employee had also contacted FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigations regarding similar concerns as those previously raised with the NWE-DO. On October 21, 2011, Amber Wardwell, who succeeded Mutahar Shamsi as NWE-DO Compliance Branch Director, informed her colleagues that “OCI has sent over a referral for [an] informant at Ameridose in Westboro [sic]” which involved allegations that “sales people [were] in [the] clean area filling product” and that Ameridose “continue[d] to repack Avastatin [sic] without FDA license.” Nonetheless, CDER was steadfast in its position that it would not inspect Ameridose and investigate complaints until the compounding guidance was finalized. For example, when the District compliance officer primarily responsible for Ameridose reached out to CDER’s Compounding Team on October 24 to discuss the informant’s claims, one of the Compounding Team employees asked Tamara Ely whether she should “schedule something and let him know that we aren’t actively pursuing

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214 FDA, CONSUMER COMPLAINT/INJURY REPORT, at 1 (Aug. 9, 2011).
215 Id. at 3.
216 See E-mail from Supervising Inspector, Cal. Bd. of Pharmacy, to Supervisory Consumer Safety Officer, Los Angeles Dist. Off., FDA (Nov. 18, 2010, 9:03 AM).
218 See E-mail from Tamara Ely, Team Leader, Compounding & Pharmacy Practices Team, Div. of Prescription Drugs, OUDLC, Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA, to Supervisory Consumer Safety Officer, Los Angeles Dist. Off., FDA (Sept. 28, 2011, 5:51 AM).
anything at this time... Ms. Ely responded, “I will handle it so you can focus on all things 503[A] [guidance].” According to a subsequent email from the District compliance officer to Amber Wardwell, Ms. Ely informed the compliance officer that “CDER is in the process of drafting guidance on compounding and manufacturing” and that no inspections would be conducted until it was issued. Ms. Ely directed the compliance officer to interview the informant and forward the notes from the interview, but acknowledged that the District Office “should not immediately follow-up but wait until the guidance is out, and then inspect as directed by CDER.” The compliance officer concluded: “She said no compounding facility is slated to be inspected in 2012.”

The next day, October 25, 2011, the compliance officer had his colleague contact the informant to set up an interview, as directed by Ms. Ely. Although the informant agreed to meet with the compliance officer and several of his colleagues on October 31, the interview was ultimately postponed until November 3 and, in the end, was brief. According to the interview notes, the informant was “concern[ed] about [the] consequences of speaking w/ FDA [in terms of] retaliation, future employment, personal safety – legal expenses if [it] goes to court, personal law suit.” Although FDA staff agreed to look into whistleblower protections, the Ameridose informant decided not to meet with them again after speaking with his lawyer.

On November 17, 2011—only one day after the informant declined to meet with FDA again—the agency received an adverse event report associated with an Ameridose product. This report stated that three pregnant women who were in labor had complained of poor pain control after receiving epidural fentanyl injections subsequently determined to have been made and distributed by Ameridose. The women ultimately had C-sections. The reporting physician or hospital pharmacist stated that they had “[n]otified [Ameridose] for investigation” and had “attempted to contact Ameridose numerous times over the last several weeks to find the outcome of the investigation.” On January 24, 2012, FDA received an additional report associated with fentanyl produced and distributed by Ameridose. This time, the complaint related to confusing labeling resulting in “2 near misses” where nurses had stated that “they almost gave their patient’s [sic] 100mcg instead of 50mcg.”

The next day, January 25, 2012, FDA received another report via its adverse event reporting system, this time involving a heparin product. According to the complaint, a hospital
had a patient that the doctor had ordered a Heparin drip for. The patient had a bag and the labs came back that their level had not changed. They increased the drip and rechecked labs [and] still no change. They changed the bag [and followed the] same processes and still not level. Pharmacy had lab test the . . . 2 bags . . . and neither bag had any Heparin in [it]. These bags were made by Ameridose, a compounding pharmacy in Framingham, MA.\(^{231}\)

On March 12, 2012, another adverse event report was submitted to FDA, again involving potency issues with pain medications produced by Ameridose. Again, according to the complaint, "Ameridose was contacted about the potential problem and is conducting an investigation."\(^{232}\) Less than two weeks later, on March 23, 2012, FDA received yet another report involving another "Hospital Close-call" associated with confusing Ameridose labeling.\(^{233}\)

No other documents or communications related to this five-month string of adverse event reports associated with Ameridose products were produced to the Committee, suggesting that FDA did not take any further steps to investigate them, let alone re-inspect the company’s facilities. Based on the MDPH’s assertion to Committee staff, none of these complaints were forward to the State either.

On May 24, 2012, one of the inspectors from the NWE-DO who had previously visited Ameridose was contacted by a special agent in FDA’s OCI. According to notes from the call, the agent was "interested in setting up [a] meeting to discuss Ameridose."\(^{234}\) The inspector then emailed a supervisor in the District Office informing her that "[OCI] had recently received a complaint for Ameridose" and that the agent "would like to set up a time to meet with me to discuss what I saw at the firm and ask a few other questions about our inspection there."\(^{235}\) The compliance officer primarily responsible for Ameridose informed his contact at CDER about the request, who replied by copying Pamela Lee—"the new [Team Leader] for the compounding team."\(^{236}\) It is apparent from the documents that a teleconference was scheduled and ultimately occurred on June 5, 2012. Representatives from OCI, CDER, and the NWE-DO participated.\(^{237}\)

Based on notes from the call, the "anonymous complaint" that generated the discussion was "from HHS [U.S. Department of Health and Human Services] IG" and involved "drugs [being] misbranded, [and] not complying with GMPs."\(^{238}\) The notes also indicate that Ms. Lee informed the group that CDER was "revising guidelines so enforcement actions [were] on hold unless [there was] clear harm or fraud."\(^{239}\) After the call, Pamela Lee followed up with one of the participating NWE-DO compliance officers about the discussion. She asked what the compliance officer "meant when [she] said Ameridose did not have patient-specific prescriptions

\(^{231}\) Id.
\(^{232}\) FDA ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING SYSTEM (FAERS) (Jan. 25, 2012).
\(^{233}\) FDA ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING SYSTEM (FAERS) (Mar. 23, 2012).
\(^{235}\) E-mail from Investigator, New England Dist. Off., FDA, to Supervisory Consumer Safety Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA (May 24, 2012, 10:01 AM).
\(^{237}\) See Notes of Investigator, New England Dist. Off., FDA (June 5, 2012).
\(^{238}\) Id.
\(^{239}\) Id.
for approximately 99% of their drugs but instead had ‘physician orders’.

240 E-mail from Pamela Lee, Senior Regulatory Operations Officer, Compounding & Pharmacy Practices Team, Div. of Prescription Drugs, OUDLC, Off. of Compliance, CDER, FDA, to Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA (June 5, 2011, 3:21 PM).

241 E-mail from Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA, to Pamela Lee (June 5, 2011, 3:34 PM).

The compliance officer responded by clarifying that aside from certain dialysis patients, “The[re] are no patient/physician orders. There is nothing signed by MD’s except for the dialysis orders.”

242 E-mail from Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA, to Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA (July 17, 2012, 8:19 AM).

243 E-mail from Compliance Officer, New England Dist. Off., FDA, to Pamela Lee, et al. (July 17, 2012, 8:35 AM).


245 FDA, CONSUMER COMPLAINT/INJURY REPORT (Oct. 5, 2012).
On November 1, 2012, FDA announced that Ameridose was conducting a voluntary recall of all of its unexpired products in circulation based on “the preliminary results of the FDA’s ongoing inspection, which has raised concerns for the FDA about a lack of sterility assurance...”\(^{246}\) On November 9, 2012, FDA issued Gregory Conigliaro a Form 483, documenting the agency’s observations during the inspection of Ameridose beginning on October 10.\(^{247}\) The observations included in this twenty-page document are too numerous to address in this memorandum. In summarizing the document, one FDA spokesperson stated that the firm “fails to test finished product for potency, failed to investigate complaints for ineffective products, failed to investigate violations of their own environmental sampling plan and fails to adequately maintain equipment and facilities used to manufacture sterile drug products.”\(^{248}\) For more reasons than one, this statement does not even begin to tell the whole story.

**PART V: CONCLUSION**

It can and should be stipulated that the fungal meningitis outbreak would not have occurred if not for a company whose management was willing to consistently cut corners and prioritize the expansion of their business over the safety of their products. That being said, NECC was not operating in the shadows. NECC had been on FDA’s radar since 2002 and never left.

One of FDA’s fundamental reasons for existence is to protect the public health by assuring the safety of our nation’s drug supply. With respect to NECC and Ameridose, documents produced to the Committee raise serious questions about whether FDA repeatedly failed in its core mission. The documents also indicate that it was by sheer chance that NECC products caused these deaths and illnesses, as opposed to products produced and distributed by Ameridose. FDA employees were well aware of the link between these two companies. The agency’s inaction in the face of years of complaints and red flags associated with the safety of both companies’ products and underlying practices had a tragic ending. While nobody could have fully anticipated the scope of this terrible outbreak, FDA was on notice that something like this might occur.

Issues with the safety of NECC and Ameridose products and practices aside, by 2012 FDA had a deep understanding of the nature and scope of the companies’ business; the agency knew that both NECC and Ameridose were engaged in activities that strongly suggested they were operating as drug manufacturers. Had the companies long ago crossed any line FDA could conceivably have drawn in the sand to differentiate pharmacy compounding from drug manufacturing? Even if FDA was so unsure of its authority to initiate enforcement actions against these companies after the Circuit Court split, was there anything in the law that precluded them from informing the State about the litany of complaints the agency had independently

\(^{246}\) FDA, Ameridose Q&A, *supra* note 244.


received about NECC and Ameridose and strongly encouraging State action for the sake of patients across the country?

The Committee is committed to ensuring that something like this never happens again. If additional legislation is needed so FDA can adequately enforce the pertinent provisions of the FDCA with respect to companies that label themselves compounding pharmacies, yet are engaged in large-scale manufacturing and distribution activities, the Committee will work on such legislation. That being said, additional authority will not necessarily solve the fundamental issues within FDA that allowed this tragedy to unfold right under the agency’s nose. Guidance documents will always need to be updated. Clarifying regulations will always need to be drafted. Statutory authority will always need to be defended. How many complaints, red flags, and close calls does FDA need to accumulate before protecting the public health outweighs any of these other activities?
TO: Margaret A. Hamburg, M.D.
Commissioner of Food and Drugs

FROM: Stuart Wright
Deputy Inspector General
for Evaluation and Inspections

SUBJECT: Memorandum Report: High-Risk Compounded Sterile Preparations and Outsourcing by Hospitals That Use Them, OEI-01-13-00150

This memorandum report provides information about the extent to which acute-care hospitals used compounded sterile preparations (CSPs) and purchased them from outside sources in 2012. It also describes the steps that hospitals take to ensure the quality of CSPs.

SUMMARY

We surveyed a nationally representative sample of acute-care hospitals that participated in Medicare in 2012. This survey focused on hospital use of compounded sterile preparations (CSPs). CSPs are sterile compounded drugs that are generally administered to patients via injection or infusion. We found that in 2012, 92 percent of hospitals used CSPs. Of those hospitals that used CSPs, 92 percent used sterile-to-sterile products and only 25 percent used higher risk nonsterile-to-sterile products. Nonsterile-to-sterile products composed less than 1 percent of CSPs used in 2012. Of the hospitals that used nonsterile-to-sterile CSPs, 85 percent outsourced at least some of these products (i.e., purchased them from outside pharmacies).

Ensuring an adequate supply of CSPs was very important to hospitals when determining whether to outsource CSPs. Many hospitals cited shortages of commercial products (68 percent), the availability of CSPs with extended shelf lives (62 percent), and CSP stability (69 percent) as very important factors when deciding whether to outsource CSPs. Also, hospitals took limited steps to ensure the quality of outsourced CSPs but had few problems with the quality of products from outside pharmacies. Few hospitals (11 of 236 hospitals in our sample) reported problems with product contamination; however, as shown by the meningitis outbreak in the fall of 2012, any instance of product contamination has the potential for serious consequences. Finally, we found that 56 percent of hospitals made changes or planned to make changes to CSP sourcing practices in response to that meningitis outbreak.
BACKGROUND

A recent nationwide meningitis outbreak caused by contaminated injections, which were compounded by the New England Compounding Center (NECC), raised major concerns about the use of compounded drugs supplied by outside pharmacies. The meningitis outbreak and its aftermath revealed a gap in information about hospitals' use of drugs supplied by such pharmacies. Hospitals may have outsourcing arrangements with multiple outside pharmacies and may also compound drugs within their own pharmacies.

Pharmaceutical compounding is the creation of a prescription drug tailored to meet the needs of an individual patient. For example, a compounding pharmacist may produce a version of a drug without an ingredient to which a patient may be allergic, or the pharmacist might create a liquid form of a drug for a patient who is unable to swallow a pill. Traditionally, pharmacies compounded a drug upon receipt of a prescription for an individual patient. However, recent trends in drug compounding have included the large-scale production of certain drugs to help ease shortages of drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and to meet the sourcing needs of some hospitals.

Compounded Drugs

There are two broad categories of compounded drugs: nonsterile preparations and sterile preparations. (In this report, we refer to the latter as compounded sterile preparations, or CSPs.) Nonsterile preparations, such as ointments applied to the skin or capsules or pills that a patient takes orally, are lower risk products. Their production is subject to less stringent standards than those for sterile preparations.

CSPs are higher risk products that are generally administered to patients via injection or infusion. Preparation of CSPs requires more expertise and more extensive safety measures. Risks associated with CSP preparation include the use of the wrong medium or the wrong concentration for mixture, contamination with pathogens, and human error. CSPs may be divided into two types based on their components and the method of preparation:

- **Sterile-to-sterile CSPs** are prepared from sterile products, which a pharmacist constitutes. Sterile-to-sterile products are considered to carry a high risk of contamination in their preparation.
- **Nonsterile-to-sterile CSPs** carry the highest risk of contamination. These products are prepared from one or more nonsterile ingredients that must be mixed together and then sterilized. The products from NECC that led to the outbreak fell into this category. Nonsterile-to-sterile compounding requires extensive safety precautions, including specialized staff training, positive and negative flow sterile rooms, sterile laminar hoods, and daily cleaning and disinfection.

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1 In this report, the term “outside pharmacy” refers to any outside compounding pharmacy from which a hospital or medical center purchases compounded drugs.
Because of CSPs’ greater risk, this study focuses on hospital use of both kinds of CSPs, rather than the lower risk nonsterile preparations, such as ointments and capsules.

**United States Pharmacopoeia**
The United States Pharmacopoeia (USP) is an official compendium of drug standards in the United States. The USP chapter 797 (USP 797) provides product safety and quality standards for preparing CSPs. Pharmacies have widely adopted USP 797 standards. FDA has limited authority to inspect pharmacies and enforce compliance with current standards for good manufacturing practices; therefore, it largely defers to the States for regulating and inspecting pharmacies.

**METHODOLOGY**

We identified 4,867 acute-care hospitals operating in 2012 that participated in Medicare. From this population we selected a simple random sample of 300 hospitals. After we eliminated 2 ineligible hospitals, the sample consisted of 298 acute-care hospitals. We developed and used an online questionnaire to determine the extent and nature of hospital use of CSPs and outsourcing, including the extent to which hospitals outsource versus prepare onsite, and challenges in outsourcing and preparing CSPs. In January 2013, we mailed a letter to the director of pharmacy services for each sampled hospital requesting that he/she complete the online questionnaire. We followed up with each nonrespondent with a reminder letter and telephone calls. We received responses from 236 hospitals, an overall response rate of 79 percent.

In addition, we interviewed stakeholders, including four practicing hospital pharmacists and officials of the trade association that represents hospital pharmacists.

Appendix A contains the sample sizes, point estimates, and 95-percent confidence intervals for all statistics in this report, as well as other data gathered in the survey.

**Limitations**

All data in this report are self-reported, and we did not independently verify them.

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3 The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §§ 201(j) and (g)(1)(A) (21 U.S.C. §§ 321(j) and (g)(1)(A)) (defining the terms “official compendium” and “drug”).
7 Pursuant to Section 1861 of the Social Security Act, to participate in Medicare, hospitals must demonstrate that they meet the Medicare Conditions of Participation during onsite inspections conducted by State survey and certification agencies and hospital accreditors with Medicare deeming authority.
8 Because of a law enforcement request, we did not contact six acute-care hospitals.
Standards
This study was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

RESULTS

In 2012, only one-quarter of hospitals used higher risk nonsterile-to-sterile CSPs, whereas almost all hospitals used sterile-to-sterile products.

Overall, 92 percent of hospitals used CSPs in 2012. Hospitals of all sizes used CSPs and some used them extensively (Table 1). For example, we interviewed a pharmacy director of a large teaching hospital who reported that his hospital uses around 2,500 doses of CSPs per day. Ninety-two percent of hospitals used sterile-to-sterile CSPs. Twenty-five percent of hospitals used higher risk nonsterile-to-sterile CSPs.

Table 1: Use of Compounded Sterile Preparations by Hospital Size, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hospital Size</th>
<th>Number of Doses of CSPs Administered in Hospitals Mean (95% Confidence Interval)</th>
<th>Number of Doses of Nonsterile-to-Sterile CSPs Administered in Hospitals Mean (95% CI)</th>
<th>Number of Doses of Sterile-to-Sterile CSPs Administered in Hospitals Mean (95% CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fewer Than 50 Beds</td>
<td>3,065 (1,878–4,252)</td>
<td>67 (10–124)</td>
<td>2,947 (1,766–4,127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=81)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–99 Beds</td>
<td>18,008 (6,930–29,086)</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>18,001 (6,925–29,077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=40)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=69)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300 Beds and Above</td>
<td>206,086 (111,647–300,526)</td>
<td>666 (310–1,021)</td>
<td>205,421 (111,080–299,761)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=43)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>


*We were unable to project an estimate for this data field because we did not have a valid 95-percent confidence interval.

Nonsterile-to-sterile preparations composed less than 1 percent of CSPs used in hospitals in 2012. Only 16 percent of hospitals with fewer than 50 beds used these products. Nonsterile-to-sterile CSPs have a higher risk of contamination than other CSPs because pharmacists prepare them from nonsterile components that must be sterilized prior to administration. When we asked hospitals which kinds of nonsterile-to-sterile CSPs they commonly used, they named both product types and modes of administration. Hospitals in our sample commonly used nonsterile-to-sterile opioids, steroids, electrolytes, and diuretics. Hospitals in our sample also reported using nonsterile-to-sterile CSPs for intrathecal pain pumps and epidurals.

Sterile-to-sterile preparations composed over 99 percent of CSPs used by hospitals in 2012. When asked about commonly used sterile-to-sterile CSPs, hospitals in our sample reported using antibiotics, opioids, epidurals, oxytocics, total parenteral nutrition, and cardioplegic solutions.
Of the hospitals that used higher risk CSPs in 2012, 85 percent purchased at least some of these products from outside sources. Of the hospitals that used nonsterile-to-sterile CSPs in 2012, only 36 percent prepared any of these products onsite (Table 2). USP 797 standards for preparing nonsterile-to-sterile CSPs are more stringent than those for sterile-to-sterile CSPs, and a few hospitals in our sample (5 out of 236) reported that they cannot make these products onsite because their facilities do not meet USP 797 standards. Overall, most hospitals (75 percent) that used any CSPs used a combination of outsourcing and onsite preparation to obtain these products.

### Table 2: Hospital Sourcing of Compounded Sterile Preparations, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product Type</th>
<th>Percentage of Hospitals That Outsourced</th>
<th>Percentage of Hospitals That Prepared Onsite</th>
<th>Percentage of Hospitals That Both Outsourced And Prepared Onsite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All CSPs</td>
<td>79.4% (74.1%–84.6%)</td>
<td>95.0% (92.1%–97.8%)</td>
<td>74.7% (69.2%–80.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=218 Hospitals That Used CSPs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonsterile-to-Sterile CSPs</td>
<td>84.7% (75.8%–93.7%)</td>
<td>35.6% (23.7%–47.5%)</td>
<td>20.3% (10.3%–30.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=59 Hospitals That Used Nonsterile-to-Sterile CSPs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sterile-to-Sterile CSPs</td>
<td>76.9% (71.4%–82.3%)</td>
<td>95.4% (92.6%–98.1%)</td>
<td>72.2% (66.4%–78.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=216 Hospitals That Used Sterile-to-Sterile CSPs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Of the hospitals that purchased nonsterile-to-sterile CSPs from outside pharmacies, 63 percent contracted with one pharmacy, 20 percent contracted with two, and 16 percent with three (see Table A4 in Appendix A). Most hospitals (67 percent) that purchased nonsterile-to-sterile CSPs from outside pharmacies used at least one pharmacy located in another State.

For those hospitals that used sterile-to-sterile CSPs, 77 percent purchased sterile-to-sterile products from at least one outside pharmacy. Of these hospitals that purchased sterile-to-sterile CSPs from outside pharmacies, 41 percent contracted with one outside pharmacy, 50 percent contracted with two or three pharmacies, and 9 percent contracted with four or five pharmacies (see Table A5 in Appendix A). As with nonsterile-to-sterile products, most of these hospitals purchased sterile-to-sterile CSPs from at least one out-of-State pharmacy: 45 percent used one out-of-State pharmacy, 41 percent used two or three out-of-State pharmacies, and 3 percent used four or five out-of-State pharmacies.

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9 The 95-percent confidence intervals for these three percentage estimates are 50.1 to 76.4 percent, 9.4 to 31.4 percent, and 6.2 to 26.4 percent, respectively.

10 The 95-percent confidence interval for the 67-percent estimate is 54.6 to 80.1 percent.
**Hospitals consider factors related to ensuring an adequate supply of CSPs as very important when determining whether to outsource CSPs**

Hospitals cited shortages of commercial products as a very important factor when deciding whether to outsource CSPs (see Table A6 in Appendix A). Outsourcing CSPs may be necessary to ensure the ready availability of products during such shortages. A few hospitals in our sample (15 of 236) indicated that they outsource CSPs only when commercial products are unavailable because of a shortage and the cost of producing the CSP onsite would be prohibitive. One pharmacy director stated that his hospital had outsourced more CSPs in 2012 than in previous years because of growing shortages of commercially available products.

When asked how an abrupt shortage of CSPs from outside pharmacies would affect delivery of care and risk to patients, 48 percent of hospitals stated that a shortage of outsourced CSPs would have a non-life-threatening but great impact on delivery of care in their hospitals (see Table A8 in Appendix A). An additional 11 percent responded that such a shortage would cause life-threatening, major disruptions.

Hospitals also regarded CSP stability and the need for CSPs with extended shelf lives as very important factors when deciding whether to outsource CSPs. A pharmacy’s ability to provide products with extended shelf lives was also important to hospitals when selecting a particular outside pharmacy (see Table A7 in Appendix A). This suggests that hospitals rely on outsourcing to provide commonly used products for which the exact demand may be unpredictable. According to pharmacists with whom we spoke, CSPs prepared onsite often have limited shelf lives or must be refrigerated. In many cases, outside pharmacies can provide products that have undergone stability testing and have extended shelf lives. Outsourcing these CSPs enables hospitals to have product on hand when needed with less waste. A few hospitals in our sample (6 out of 236) noted that the option of outsourcing CSPs with extended shelf lives is particularly important because they do not have pharmacies that operate 24 hours a day.

In deciding to outsource, hospitals considered other factors as important in ensuring a supply of CSPs. Hospitals cited the ability to prepare CSPs onsite, such as lack of necessary equipment, shortage of trained staff, and lack of physical facilities to prepare CSPs as important when deciding whether to outsource CSPs (see Table A6 in Appendix A). In fact, only 56 percent of hospitals had a USP 797-compliant clean room for preparing CSPs. When deciding whether to outsource, hospitals also considered whether CSPs were high risk or required nonsterile-to-sterile preparation.

**Hospitals took limited steps to ensure the quality of outsourced CSPs, but they also rarely had problems with CSP quality**

Most hospitals that outsourced CSPs required that outside pharmacies comply with USP 797 (83 percent) and reviewed quality reports provided by outside pharmacies (71 percent, Table 3). Of the hospitals that outsourced CSPs, few conducted their own site visits at outside pharmacies (22 percent) or reviewed independent quality.  

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*The term “CSP stability” refers to the extent to which the preparation retains the same properties and characteristics that it possessed at the time of its preparation throughout its period of storage and use.*
assessments of the outside pharmacies used (27 percent). Some hospitals in our sample (14 out of 236) also reported that they lacked the resources, access, or expertise to assess the quality of outside pharmacies and therefore must rely on State Boards of Pharmacy to assess them.

### Table 3: Steps That Hospitals That Outsourced Compounded Sterile Preparations Took To Ensure Quality in 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality Step</th>
<th>Percentage of Hospitals That Reported Taking Quality Step for Some or All Outside Pharmacies They Contracted With</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Required Compliance With USP 797</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reviewed Quality Reports Provided by the Outside Pharmacy</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reviewed Quality Reports Provided by a Third Party</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conducted Onsite Visits at the Outside Pharmacy</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tested CSPs Provided by Outside Pharmacy</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although hospitals took limited steps to ensure the quality of outsourced CSPs, 42 percent of hospitals were very confident that the steps taken were adequate. An additional 47 percent were only somewhat confident that these steps were adequate. However, 12 percent of hospitals were not at all confident in the quality of products from outside pharmacies. Most hospitals (64 percent) that outsourced CSPs had no problems or concerns with outside pharmacies in 2012, and of those that had problems, many were related to product availability (73 percent). Few hospitals (11 of 236 hospitals) in our sample reported problems with product contamination; however, as shown by the meningitis outbreak in fall 2012, any instance of product contamination has the potential for serious consequences.

Half of all hospitals made changes or planned to make changes to CSP sourcing practices in response to the fall 2012 meningitis outbreak

Overall, 56 percent of hospitals made changes to CSP sourcing practices in 2012 or plan to make changes in 2013. This includes hospitals that use only sterile-to-sterile products and hospitals that use higher risk nonsterile-to-sterile products. Some changes were related to the way in which hospitals outsource CSPs (see Table A14 in Appendix A). Outsourcing changes that hospitals made or plan to make included decreasing CSP outsourcing, requesting more information on product quality from outside pharmacies, and contracting with different outside pharmacies.

Hospitals also made or planned changes to the way they prepare CSPs in-house. Many hospitals increased or plan to increase quality control mechanisms in the hospital pharmacies and hospital capacity to prepare CSPs in-house. Making such changes while complying with USP 797 may be resource intensive for hospitals. About half of hospitals ranked cost (47 percent) and space limitations (49 percent) as major challenges to

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12 Percentages for hospital confidence in the quality of CSPs purchased from outside sources add up to 101 percent because of rounding. See Table A10 in Appendix A for exact percentages.

13 The 95-percent confidence interval for the 73-percent estimate is 61.8 to 83.4 percent.
USP 797 compliance. A few hospitals in our sample (6 out of 236) reported that becoming fully compliant with USP 797 would require a building redesign or new construction.

CONCLUSION

Our review shows that the use of compounded sterile products is widespread in hospitals, although the use of the highest risk products—those involving preparation of sterile products from nonsterile components—is limited to about one-quarter of hospitals, most commonly larger facilities.

Although most hospital pharmacies prepared sterile-to-sterile products onsite, hospitals outsource most nonsterile-to-sterile CSPs. Hospitals tend to rely upon a limited number of external pharmacies for these CSPs, especially for nonsterile-to-sterile products. Often these pharmacies are located in other States.

Many factors go into a hospital pharmacy’s decision to outsource CSPs. Among these are the need to ensure a ready supply of products in the event of shortages and the need for products with extended shelf lives, which require sophisticated equipment and testing that may not be readily available on the hospital premises.

The meningitis outbreak in the fall of 2012 has spurred hospital pharmacies to make some changes, such as seeking additional information from outside pharmacies about quality practices, or even expanding their own internal compounding capacity. For the most part, hospitals remain confident about the quality of outsourced CSPs. Nevertheless, the meningitis outbreak raises questions about whether this confidence is well placed and emphasizes the need to stay vigilant about procedures for compounding and outsourcing CSPs.

OIG will pursue additional work to further examine the safety and quality of pharmaceutical compounding in hospitals, including work examining Federal oversight mechanisms.

This report is being issued directly in final form because it contains no recommendations. If you have comments or questions about this report, please provide them within 60 days. Please refer to report number OEI-01-13-00150 in all correspondence.
APPENDIX A

Complete Results From Office of Inspector General Survey of Acute-Care Hospitals That Participated in Medicare in 2012

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Table A1: Hospital Demographic Information, 2012

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hospital Size</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Percentage of Hospitals (95% Confidence Interval (CI))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fewer Than 50 Beds</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>34.8% (28.8%–40.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–99 Beds</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.2% (12.5%–21.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100–299 Beds</td>
<td></td>
<td>29.6% (23.9%–35.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300 Beds and Above</td>
<td></td>
<td>18.5% (13.6%–23.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Room in Hospital</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>91.5% (88.0%–95.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensive Care Unit in Hospital</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>72.6% (67.1%–78.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dialysis Performed at Hospital</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>47.7% (41.4%–53.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A2: Use of Compounded Sterile Preparations by Hospital Size, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Hospitals That Used Compounded Sterile Preparations (CSPs)</th>
<th>Hospitals That Used Nonsterile-to-Sterile CSPs</th>
<th>Hospitals That Used Sterile-to-Sterile CSPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage (95% CI)</td>
<td>Percentage (95% CI)</td>
<td>Percentage (95% CI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Hospitals</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>92.4% (89.1%–95.7%)</td>
<td>25.1%* (19.7%–30.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fewer Than 50 Beds</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81.5% (73.2%–89.7%)</td>
<td>16.0% (8.8%–25.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–99 Beds</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>95.0% (88.4%–100.0%)</td>
<td>5.0% (0.6%–16.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100–299 Beds</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>98.6% (95.8%–100.0%)</td>
<td>25.0% (15.3%–37.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300 Beds and Above</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>100.0% (91.8%–100.0%)</td>
<td>60.5% (46.2%–74.7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The sample size for this estimate is 235.
### Table A3: Total Doses of Compounded Sterile Preparations Used in 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage of Total CSPs (95% CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Doses of CSPs (n=236)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonsterile-to-Sterile CSPs (n=235)</td>
<td>0.34% (0.2%−0.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sterile-to-Sterile CSPs (n=236)</td>
<td>99.6% (99.5%−99.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table A4: Use of Outside Pharmacies by Hospitals Outsourcing Nonsterile-to-Sterile Compounded Sterile Preparations in 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Outside Pharmacies Used</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Hospitals That Outsourced Nonsterile-to-Sterile CSPs Percentage (95% CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Outside Pharmacies</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>63.3% (50.1%−76.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.4% (9.4%−31.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>16.3% (6.2%−26.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-of-State Pharmacies</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>32.7% (19.9%−45.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>51.0% (37.4%−64.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.3% (5.9%−27.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.0% (0.1%−10.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Outside Pharmacies Used</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Hospitals That Outsourced Sterile-to-Sterile CSPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage (95% CI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Outside Pharmacies</td>
<td>165</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>40.6% (33.3%–47.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>36.4% (29.2%–43.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.9% (8.8%–19.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.7% (3.0%–10.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.4% (0.1%–4.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-of-State Pharmacies</td>
<td>163</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.0% (6.4%–15.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>44.8% (37.3%–52.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>33.1% (26.1%–40.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.0% (3.9%–12.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.8% (0.4%–5.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.2% (0.1%–4.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table A6: Factors Important to Hospitals When Deciding Whether To Outsource Compounded Sterile Preparations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage (95% CI)</td>
<td>Somewhat Important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>68.6% (62.7%–74.5%)</td>
<td>19.9% (14.8%–25.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability of CSP</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>68.6% (62.7%–74.5%)</td>
<td>19.9% (14.8%–25.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortages of Commercial Products</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>68.1% (62.2%–74.0%)</td>
<td>22.7% (17.4%–28.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for Ready-to-Administer Form of CSP</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>67.0% (61.0%–72.9%)</td>
<td>20.7% (15.6%–25.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for Product With Extended Shelf Life</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>61.9% (55.8%–68.1%)</td>
<td>23.5% (18.1%–28.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product-Testing Requirements</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>61.4% (55.2%–67.6%)</td>
<td>23.2% (17.9%–28.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product is High Risk or Problem Prone To Prepare</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>53.7% (47.4%–60.0%)</td>
<td>27.5% (21.9%–33.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inability of Hospital Pharmacy To Produce CSPs in Quantity Needed</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>46.9% (40.6%–53.2%)</td>
<td>27.2% (21.6%–32.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP Requires Nonsterile-to-Sterile Preparation</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>47.1% (40.8%–53.5%)</td>
<td>18.1% (13.2%–22.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for Specialized Products</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>45.6% (39.3%–51.9%)</td>
<td>30.7% (24.9%–36.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Necessary Equipment To Prepare CSP in-House</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>38.9% (32.7%–45.0%)</td>
<td>23.6% (18.2%–28.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of Time Needed To Produce CSP in-House</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>39.3% (33.1%–45.5%)</td>
<td>36.7% (30.6%–42.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictability of Demand for CSP</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>35.4% (29.3%–41.4%)</td>
<td>45.0% (38.7%–51.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Physical Facilities To Prepare CSP in-House</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>34.8% (28.8%–40.8%)</td>
<td>26.9% (21.3%–32.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workflow Management</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>33.6% (27.7%–39.6%)</td>
<td>38.4% (32.3%–44.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Problems With Outsourced CSPs</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>27.8% (22.1%–33.5%)</td>
<td>22.0% (16.7%–27.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of Producing Product in-House</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>27.5% (21.9%–33.1%)</td>
<td>49.8% (43.5%–56.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortage of Staff Trained to Prepare CSP</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>26.8% (21.2%–32.4%)</td>
<td>33.8% (27.8%–39.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Problems Preparing CSP in-House</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>20.0% (14.9%–25.1%)</td>
<td>21.8% (16.5%–27.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table A7: Factors Important to Hospitals When Selecting a Particular Outside Pharmacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th>Percentage (95% CI)</th>
<th>Somewhat Important</th>
<th>Percentage (95% CI)</th>
<th>Not Important</th>
<th>Percentage (95% CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Product</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>88.6%</td>
<td>(84.6%−92.6%)</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>(0.9%−5.3%)</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>(4.8%−11.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacy Expertise in Preparing Product</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>87.3%</td>
<td>(83.1%−91.5%)</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>(2.4%−8.1%)</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>(4.1%−10.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacy Reputation</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>83.8%</td>
<td>(79.2%−88.5%)</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>(5.9%−13.3%)</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>(3.4%−9.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacy Accreditation</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>79.0%</td>
<td>(73.9%−84.2%)</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>(9.2%−17.9%)</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>(4.1%−10.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection History With State Board of Pharmacy</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>77.5%</td>
<td>(72.2%−82.8%)</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>(8.9%−17.5%)</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>(5.6%−12.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product Availability</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
<td>(70.1%−81.0%)</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>(12.3%−21.8%)</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>(4.1%−10.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacy’s Ability To Provide Products With Extended Shelf Life</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>71.1%</td>
<td>(65.3%−76.8%)</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>(13.9%−23.8%)</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>(6.3%−13.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacy Responsiveness</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>(60.7%−72.6%)</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>(19.5%−30.5%)</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>(4.8%−11.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacy’s Delivery Schedule</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>(44.3%−57.0%)</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
<td>(31.4%−43.7%)</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>(7.7%−15.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product Cost</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>37.4%</td>
<td>(31.3%−43.6%)</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
<td>(42.1%−54.8%)</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>(9.7%−18.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital’s Own Site Inspection of Pharmacy</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>(18.1%−28.8%)</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
<td>(33.6%−46.0%)</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
<td>(30.6%−42.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Staff Preference</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>(1.2%−5.8%)</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>(25.3%−37.0%)</td>
<td>65.4%</td>
<td>(59.3%−71.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table A8: Hospital Beliefs About the Effect of an Abrupt Shortage or Loss of Supply of Compounded Sterile Preparations From Outside Pharmacies on Risk to Patients and Delivery of Care in the Hospital (n=235)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Level of Risk to Patients and Disruption of Care</th>
<th>Percentage of Hospitals (95% CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life-Threatening, Major Disruptions</td>
<td>11.5% (7.5%−15.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Life-Threatening, But Still Great Impact</td>
<td>48.1% (41.9%−54.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Impact, an Inconvenience</td>
<td>16.6% (12.0%−21.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Impact at All</td>
<td>23.8% (18.5%−29.1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A9: Steps That Hospitals Outsourcing Compounded Sterile Preparations To Ensure Quality in 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality Step</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Performed Quality Step for All Outside Pharmacies</th>
<th>Performed Quality Step for Some Outside Pharmacies</th>
<th>Did Not Perform Quality Step</th>
<th>Not Applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Required Compliance With USP 797</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>76.7% (70.6%−82.9%)</td>
<td>6.4% (2.8%−10.0%)</td>
<td>14.0% (8.9%−19.0%)</td>
<td>2.9% (0.5%−5.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reviewed Quality Reports Provided by Outside Pharmacy</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>48.5% (41.2%−55.8%)</td>
<td>22.8% (16.7%−28.9%)</td>
<td>26.3% (19.9%−32.7%)</td>
<td>2.3% (0.1%−4.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reviewed Quality Reports Provided by Third Party</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>16.5% (11.0%−21.9%)</td>
<td>10.0% (5.6%−14.4%)</td>
<td>67.6% (60.8%−74.5%)</td>
<td>5.9% (2.4%−9.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conducted Onsite Visits at Outside Pharmacy</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>7.0% (3.3%−10.7%)</td>
<td>15.1% (9.9%−20.3%)</td>
<td>72.7% (66.2%−79.2%)</td>
<td>5.2% (2.0%−8.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tested CSPs Provided by Outside Pharmacy</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>5.8% (2.4%−9.3%)</td>
<td>3.5% (0.8%−6.2%)</td>
<td>86.0% (80.9%−91.0%)</td>
<td>4.7% (1.6%−7.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A10: Hospital Confidence in Steps Taken To Ensure Quality of Compounded Sterile Preparations Purchased From Outside Pharmacies in 2012 (n=221)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Confidence</th>
<th>Percentage of Hospitals (95% CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Confident</td>
<td>41.6% (35.3%−48.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Confident</td>
<td>46.6% (40.2%−53.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at All Confident</td>
<td>11.8% (7.6%−15.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A11: Hospitals That Outsourced Compounded Sterile Preparations and Had Problems or Concerns With Outside Pharmacies in 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problems or Concerns</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Had Problem or Concern Percentage (95% CI)</th>
<th>Did Not Have Problem or Concern Percentage (95% CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any Problem or Concern With Outside Compounding Pharmacies</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>35.7% (28.7%–42.7%)</td>
<td>64.3% (57.3%–71.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Product Availability</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>72.6% (61.8%–83.4%)</td>
<td>27.4% (16.6%–38.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems With Product Delivery</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>42.6% (30.5%–54.7%)</td>
<td>57.4% (45.3%–69.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product Contamination</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>18.0% (8.6%–27.4%)</td>
<td>82.0% (72.6%–91.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems With Product Potency</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>8.2% (1.5%–14.9%)</td>
<td>91.8% (85.1%–98.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A12: Hospital Ability to Prepare Compounded Sterile Preparations Onsite, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Percentage of Hospitals (95% CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals With a USP 797-Compliant Clean Room</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>56.2% (50.0%–62.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals With a Barrier Isolator for Preparing CSPs</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>54.2% (48.0%–60.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Compliance With USP 797 Requirements for Risk Level of CSPs Prepared Onsite</td>
<td>228</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully Compliant</td>
<td></td>
<td>59.6% (53.4%–65.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly Compliant</td>
<td></td>
<td>29.8% (24.0%–35.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Compliant</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.1% (3.1%–9.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at All Compliant</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.4% (1.8%–7.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A13: Hospital-Identified Challenges To Meeting Compliance With USP 797 Standards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Major Challenge</th>
<th>Minor Challenge</th>
<th>Not a Challenge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(95% CI)</td>
<td>(95% CI)</td>
<td>(95% CI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space Limitations</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>49.1% (42.8%–55.5%)</td>
<td>27.0% (21.4%–32.6%)</td>
<td>23.9% (18.5%–29.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>47.4% (41.1%–53.7%)</td>
<td>30.3% (24.5%–36.1%)</td>
<td>22.4% (17.1%–27.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Needed Equipment</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>25.4% (19.9%–30.9%)</td>
<td>35.5% (29.5%–41.6%)</td>
<td>39.0% (32.9%–45.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Staff</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>22.4% (17.1%–27.6%)</td>
<td>43.4% (37.2%–49.7%)</td>
<td>34.2% (28.2%–40.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Skill Set</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>11.0% (7.0%–14.9%)</td>
<td>45.6% (39.3%–51.9%)</td>
<td>43.4% (37.2%–49.7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A14: Hospitals That Have Made or Plan To Make Changes to Sourcing Practices for Compounded Sterile Preparations in Response to the Fall 2012 Meningitis Outbreak

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Changes Made</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Percentage of Hospitals (95% CI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hospitals That Either Changed or Plan To Change CSP Sourcing Practices</strong></td>
<td>232</td>
<td>56.0% (49.8%–62.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hospitals That Changed CSP Sourcing Practices in 2012</strong></td>
<td>233</td>
<td>45.9% (39.7%–52.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Changes Made</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreased Outsourcing of CSPs</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>78.3% (70.7%–85.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requested More Information From Outside Compounding Pharmacies on Product Quality</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>61.9% (52.9%–71.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased Quality Control Mechanisms in Hospital Pharmacy</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>54.8% (45.5%–64.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased Hospital Capacity To Prepare CSPs Onsite</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>51.9% (42.6%–61.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracted With Different Outside Pharmacy</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>50.5% (41.2%–59.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hospitals That Plan To Change CSP Sourcing Practices in 2013</strong></td>
<td>234</td>
<td>38.5% (32.4%–44.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planned Changes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request More Information From Outside Compounding Pharmacies on Product Quality</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>84.1% (76.6%–91.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase Quality Control Mechanisms in Hospital Pharmacy</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>74.7% (65.8%–83.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease Outsourcing of CSPs</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>56.8% (46.7%–66.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase Hospital Capacity To Prepare CSPs Onsite</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>54.5% (44.4%–64.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract With Different Outside Pharmacy</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>51.7% (41.6%–61.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

High-Risk Compounded Sterile Preparations and Hospital Outsourcing (OEI-01-13-00150)
Guidance for FDA Staff and Industry

Marketed Unapproved Drugs – Compliance Policy Guide

Sec. 440.100
Marketed New Drugs Without Approved NDAs or ANDAs

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Food and Drug Administration
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER)

September 19, 2011
Compliance
Guidance for FDA Staff and Industry

Marketed Unapproved Drugs Compliance Policy Guide

Sec. 440.100
Marketed New Drugs Without Approved NDAS or ANDAs

Additional copies are available from:
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U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Food and Drug Administration
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER)

September 19, 2011
Compliance
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This guidance represents the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) current thinking on this topic. It does not create or confer any rights for or on any person and does not operate to bind FDA or the public. You can use an alternative approach if the approach satisfies the requirements of the applicable statutes and regulations. If you want to discuss an alternative approach, contact the FDA staff responsible for implementing this guidance. If you cannot identify the appropriate FDA staff, call the appropriate number listed on the title page of this guidance.

I. INTRODUCTION

This Compliance Policy Guide (CPG) describes how we intend to exercise our enforcement discretion with regard to drugs marketed in the United States that do not have required FDA approval for marketing. This is a revision of a guidance of the same name that was issued in June 2006. The guidance has been revised to state that the enforcement priorities and potential exercise of enforcement discretion discussed in the guidance apply only to unapproved new drugs (including new drugs covered by the Over-the-Counter (OTC) Drug Review), except for licensed biologics and veterinary drugs, that are commercially used or sold prior to September 19, 2011.

FDA’s guidance documents, including this guidance, do not establish legally enforceable responsibilities. Instead, guidances describe the Agency’s current thinking on a topic and should be viewed only as recommendations, unless specific regulatory or statutory requirements are cited. The use of the word should in Agency guidances means that something is suggested or recommended, but not required.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Reason for This Guidance

For historical reasons, some drugs are available in the United States that lack required FDA approval for marketing. A brief, informal summary description of the various

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1 This guidance has been prepared by the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) at the Food and Drug Administration.

2 For the purposes of this guidance, the term “commercially used or sold” means that the product has been used in a business or activity involving retail or wholesale marketing and/or sale.
categories of these drugs and their regulatory status is provided in Appendix A as general background for this document. The manufacturers of these drugs have not received FDA approval to legally market their drugs, nor are the drugs being marketed in accordance with the OTC drug review. The new drug approval and OTC drug monograph processes play an essential role in ensuring that all drugs are both safe and effective for their intended uses. Manufacturers of drugs that lack required approval, including those that are not marketed in accordance with an OTC drug monograph, have not provided FDA with evidence demonstrating that their products are safe and effective, and so we have an interest in taking steps to either encourage the manufacturers of these products to obtain the required evidence and comply with the approval provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the FD&C Act) or remove the products from the market. We want to achieve these goals without adversely affecting public health, imposing undue burdens on consumers, or unnecessarily disrupting the market.

The goals of this guidance are to (1) clarify for FDA personnel and the regulated industry how we intend to exercise our enforcement discretion regarding unapproved drugs and (2) emphasize that illegally marketed drugs must obtain FDA approval.

B. Historical Enforcement Approach

FDA estimates that in the United States today perhaps as many as several thousand drug products are marketed illegally without required FDA approval. Because we do not have complete data on illegally marketed products, and because the universe of such products is constantly changing as products enter and leave the market, we first have to identify illegally marketed products before we can contemplate enforcement action. Once an illegally marketed product is identified, taking enforcement action against the product would typically involve one or more of the following: requesting voluntary compliance; providing notice of action in a Federal Register notice; issuing an untitled letter; issuing a Warning Letter; or initiating a seizure, injunction, or other proceeding. Each of these actions is time-consuming and resource intensive. Recognizing that we are unable to take action immediately against all of these illegally marketed products and that we need to make the best use of scarce Agency resources, we have had to prioritize our enforcement efforts and exercise enforcement discretion with regard to products that remain on the market.

In general, in recent years, FDA has employed a risk-based enforcement approach with respect to marketed unapproved drugs. This approach includes efforts to identify illegally marketed drugs, prioritization of those drugs according to potential public health concerns or other impacts on the public health, and subsequent regulatory follow-up. Some of the specific actions the Agency has taken have been precipitated by evidence of safety or effectiveness problems that has either come to our attention during inspections or been brought to our attention by outside sources.

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3 This rough estimate comprises several hundred drugs (different active ingredients) in various strengths, combinations, and dosage forms from multiple distributors and repackagers.
III. FDA’S ENFORCEMENT POLICY

In the discussion that follows, we intend to clarify our approach to prioritizing our enforcement actions and exercising our enforcement discretion with regard to unapproved, illegally marketed drug products.

The enforcement priorities and potential exercise of enforcement discretion discussed in this guidance apply only to unapproved drug products that are being commercially used or sold as of September 19, 2011. All unapproved drugs introduced onto the market after that date are subject to immediate enforcement action at any time, without prior notice and without regard to the enforcement priorities set forth below. In light of the notice provided by this guidance, we believe it is inappropriate to exercise enforcement discretion with respect to unapproved drugs that a company (including a manufacturer or distributor) begins marketing after September 19, 2011.

For unapproved drugs commercially used or sold as of September 19, 2011, FDA’s enforcement priorities are described below.

A. Enforcement Priorities

Consistent with our risk-based approach to the regulation of pharmaceuticals, FDA intends to continue its current policy of giving higher priority to enforcement actions involving unapproved drug products in the following categories:

- **Drugs with potential safety risks.** Removing potentially unsafe drugs protects the public from direct and indirect health threats.

- **Drugs that lack evidence of effectiveness.** Removing ineffective drugs protects the public from using these products in lieu of effective treatments. Depending on the indication, some ineffective products would, of course, pose safety risks as well.

- **Health fraud drugs.** FDA defines health fraud as "[t]he deceptive promotion, advertisement, distribution or sale of articles . . . that are represented as being effective to diagnose, prevent, cure, treat, or mitigate disease (or other conditions), or provide a beneficial effect on health, but which have not been scientifically proven safe and effective for such purposes. Such practices may be deliberate or done without adequate knowledge or understanding of the article" (CPG Sec. 120.500). Of highest priority in this area are drugs that present a direct risk to health. Indirect health hazards exist if, as a result of reliance on the product, the consumer is likely to delay or discontinue appropriate medical treatment. Indirect health hazards will be evaluated for enforcement action based on section 120.500, Health Fraud - Factors in Considering Regulatory Action (CPG Sec. 120.500). FDA's health fraud CPG outlines priorities for evaluating regulatory actions against indirect health hazard products, such as whether the therapeutic claims are significant, whether there are any scientific data to support the safety and
effectiveness of the product, and the degree of vulnerability of the prospective user group (CPG Sec. 120.500).

Drugs that present direct challenges to the new drug approval and OTC drug monograph systems. The drug approval and OTC drug monograph systems are designed to avoid the risks associated with potentially unsafe, ineffective, and fraudulent drugs. The drugs described in the preceding three categories present direct challenges to these systems, as do unapproved drugs that directly compete with an approved drug, such as when a company obtains approval of a new drug application (NDA) for a product that other companies are marketing without approval (see section III.C, Special Circumstances – Newly Approved Product). Also included are drugs marketed in violation of a final and effective OTC drug monograph. Targeting drugs that challenge the drug approval or OTC drug monograph systems buttresses the integrity of these systems and makes it more likely that firms will comply with the new drug approval and monograph requirements, which benefits the public health.

Unapproved new drugs that are also violative of the Act in other ways. The Agency also intends, in circumstances that it considers appropriate, to continue its policy of enforcing the preapproval requirements of the FD&C Act against a drug or firm that also violates another provision of the FD&C Act, even if there are other unapproved versions of the drug made by other firms on the market. For instance, if a firm that sells an unapproved new drug also violates current good manufacturing practice (CGMP) regulations, the Agency is not inclined to limit an enforcement action in that instance to the CGMP violations. Rather, the Agency may initiate a regulatory action that targets both the CGMP violation and the violation of section 505 of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. 355). This policy efficiently preserves scarce Agency resources by allowing the Agency to pursue all applicable charges against a drug and/or a firm and avoiding duplicative action. See United States v. Sage Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 210 F.3d 475, 479-80 (5th Cir. 2000).

Drugs that are reformulated to evade an FDA enforcement action. The Agency is also aware of instances in which companies that anticipate an FDA enforcement action against a specific type or formulation of an unapproved product have made formulation changes to evade that action, but have not brought the product into compliance with the law. Companies should be aware that the Agency is not inclined to exercise its enforcement discretion with regard to such products. Factors that the Agency may consider in determining whether to bring action against the reformulated products include, but are not limited to, the timing of the change, the addition of an ingredient without adequate scientific justification (see, for example, 21 CFR 300.50 and 330.10(a)(4)(iv)), the creation of a new combination that has not previously been marketed, and the claims made for the new product.

B. Notice of Enforcement Action and Continued Marketing of Unapproved Drugs

FDA is not required to, and generally does not intend to, give special notice that a drug product may be subject to enforcement action, unless FDA determines that
notice is necessary or appropriate to protect the public health.\textsuperscript{4} The issuance of this guidance is intended to provide notice that any product that is being marketed illegally is subject to FDA enforcement action at any time.\textsuperscript{5} The only exception to this policy is, as set forth elsewhere, that generally products subject to an ongoing DESI\textsuperscript{6} proceeding or ongoing OTC drug monograph proceeding (i.e., an OTC product that is part of the OTC drug review for which an effective final monograph is not yet in place) may remain on the market during the pendency of that proceeding\textsuperscript{7} and any additional period specifically provided in the proceeding (such as a delay in the effective date of a final OTC drug monograph).\textsuperscript{8} However, once the relevant DESI or OTC drug monograph proceeding is completed and any additional grace period specifically provided in the proceeding has expired, all products that are not in compliance with the conditions for marketing determined in that proceeding are subject to enforcement action at any time without further notice (see, for example, 21 CFR 310.6).

FDA intends to evaluate on a case-by-case basis whether justification exists to exercise enforcement discretion to allow continued marketing for some period of time after FDA determines that a product is being marketed illegally. In deciding whether to allow such a grace period,\textsuperscript{9} we may consider the following factors: (1) the effects on the public health of proceeding immediately to remove the illegal products from the market (including whether the product is medically necessary and, if so, the ability of legally marketed products to meet the needs of patients taking the drug); (2) the difficulty associated with conducting any required studies, preparing and submitting applications, and obtaining approval of an application; (3) the burden on affected parties of

\textsuperscript{4} For example, in 1997, FDA issued a Federal Register notice declaring all orally administered levothyroxine sodium products to be new drugs and requiring manufacturers to obtain approved new drug applications (62 FR 43535, August 14, 1997). Nevertheless, FDA gave manufacturers 3 years (later extended to 4 (65 FR 24488, April 26, 2000)) to obtain approved applications and allowed continued marketing without approved new drug applications because FDA found that levothyroxine sodium products were medically necessary to treat hypothyroidism and no alternative drug provided an adequate substitute.

\textsuperscript{5} For example, FDA may take action at any time against a product that was originally marketed before 1938, but that has been changed since 1938 in such a way as to lose its grandfather status (21 U.S.C. 321(p)).

\textsuperscript{6} The Drug Efficacy Study Implementation (DESI) was the process used by FDA to evaluate for effectiveness for their labeled indications over 3,400 products that were approved only for safety between 1938 and 1962. DESI is explained more fully in the appendix to this document.

\textsuperscript{7} OTC drugs covered by ongoing OTC drug monograph proceedings may remain on the market as provided in current enforcement policies. See, for example, CPG sections 450.200 and 450.300 and 21 CFR part 330. This document does not affect the current enforcement policies for such drugs.

\textsuperscript{8} Sometimes, a final OTC drug monograph may have a delayed effective date or provide for a specific period of time for marketed drugs to come into compliance with the monograph. At the end of that period, drugs that are not marketed in accordance with the monograph are subject to enforcement action and the exercise of enforcement discretion in the same way as any other drug discussed in this CPG.

\textsuperscript{9} For purposes of this guidance, the terms grace period and allow a grace period refer to an exercise of enforcement discretion by the Agency (i.e., a period of time during which FDA, as a matter of discretion, elects not to initiate a regulatory action on the ground that an article is an unapproved new drug).
immediately removing the products from the market; (4) the Agency's available enforcement resources; and (5) any special circumstances relevant to the particular case under consideration. However, as stated above, FDA does not intend to apply any such grace period to an unapproved drug that was introduced onto the market after September 19, 2011.

C. Special Circumstances — Newly Approved Product

Sometimes, a company may obtain approval of an NDA for a product that other companies are marketing without approval.¹⁰ We want to encourage this type of voluntary compliance with the new drug requirements because it benefits the public health by increasing the assurance that marketed drug products are safe and effective — it also reduces the resources that FDA must expend on enforcement. Thus, because they present a direct challenge to the drug approval system, FDA is more likely to take enforcement action against remaining unapproved drugs in this kind of situation. However, we intend to take into account the circumstances once the product is approved in determining how to exercise our enforcement discretion with regard to the unapproved products. In exercising enforcement discretion, we intend to balance the need to provide incentives for voluntary compliance against the implications of enforcement actions on the marketplace and on consumers who are accustomed to using the marketed products.

When a company obtains approval to market a product that other companies are marketing without approval, FDA normally intends to allow a grace period of roughly 1 year from the date of approval of the product before it will initiate enforcement action (e.g., seizure or injunction) against marketed unapproved products of the same type. However, the grace period provided is expected to vary from this baseline based upon the following factors: (1) the effects on the public health of proceeding immediately to remove the illegal products from the market (including whether the product is medically necessary and, if so, the ability of the holder of the approved application to meet the needs of patients taking the drug); (2) whether the effort to obtain approval was publicly disclosed;¹¹ (3) the difficulty associated with conducting any required studies, preparing and submitting applications, and obtaining approval of an application; (4) the burden on affected parties of removing the products from the market; (5) the Agency's available enforcement resources; and (6) any other special circumstances relevant to the particular case under consideration. To assist in an orderly transition to the approved product(s), in implementing a grace period, FDA may identify interim dates by which firms should first...

¹⁰ These may be products that are the same as the approved product or somewhat different, such as products of different strength.

¹¹ For example, at the Agency’s discretion, we may provide for a shorter grace period if an applicant seeking approval of a product that other companies are marketing without approval agrees to publication, around the time it submits the approval application, of a Federal Register notice informing the public that the applicant has submitted that application. A shortened grace period may also be warranted if the fact of the application is widely known publicly because of applicant press releases or other public statements. Such a grace period may run from the time of approval or from the time the applicant has made the public aware of the submission, as the Agency deems appropriate.
cease manufacturing unapproved forms of the drug product, and later cease distributing the unapproved product.

The length of any grace period and the nature of any enforcement action taken by FDA will be decided on a case-by-case basis. Companies should be aware that a Warning Letter may not be sent before initiation of enforcement action and should not expect any grace period that is granted to protect them from the need to leave the market for some period of time while obtaining approval. Companies marketing unapproved new drugs should also recognize that, while FDA normally intends to allow a grace period of roughly 1 year from the date of approval of an unapproved product before it will initiate enforcement action (e.g., seizure or injunction) against others who are marketing that unapproved product, it is possible that a substantially shorter grace period would be provided, depending on the individual facts and circumstances.\(^\text{12}\)

The shorter the grace period, the more likely it is that the first company to obtain an approval will have a period of de facto market exclusivity before other products obtain approval. For example, if FDA provides a 1-year grace period before it takes action to remove unapproved competitors from the market, and it takes 2 years for a second application to be approved, the first approved product could have 1 year of market exclusivity before the onset of competition. If FDA provides for a shorter grace period, the period of effective exclusivity could be longer. FDA hopes that this period of market exclusivity will provide an incentive to firms to be the first to obtain approval to market a previously unapproved drug.\(^\text{13}\)

### D. Regulatory Action Guidance

District offices are encouraged to refer to CDER for review (with copies of labeling) any unapproved drugs that appear to fall within the enforcement priorities in section III.A. Charges that may be brought against unapproved drugs include, but are not limited to, violations of 21 U.S.C. 355(a) and 352(f)(1) of the FD&C Act. Other charges may also apply based on, among others, violations of 21 U.S.C. 351(a)(2)(B) (CGMP), 352(a) (misbranding), or 352(o) (failure to register or list).

\(^{12}\) Firms are reminded that this CPG does not create any right to a grace period; the length of the grace period, if any, is solely at the discretion of the Agency. For instance, firms should not expect any grace period when the public health requires immediate removal of a product from the market, or when the Agency has given specific prior notice in the Federal Register or otherwise that a drug product requires FDA approval.

\(^{13}\) The Agency understands that, under the Act, holders of NDAs must list patents claiming the approved drug product and that newly approved drug products may, in certain circumstances, be eligible for marketing exclusivity. Listed patents and marketing exclusivity may delay the approval of competitor products. If FDA believes that an NDA holder is manipulating these statutory protections to inappropriately delay competition, the Agency will provide relevant information on the matter to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). In the past, FDA has provided information to the FTC regarding patent infringement lawsuits related to pending abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs), citizen petitions, and scientific challenges to the approval of competitor drug products.
APPENDIX

BRIEF HISTORY OF FDA MARKETING APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS AND CATEGORIES OF DRUGS THAT LACK REQUIRED FDA APPROVAL

Key events in the history of FDA's drug approval regulation and the categories of drugs affected by these events are described below.

A. 1938 and 1962 Legislation

The original Federal Food and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906, first brought drug regulation under federal law. That Act prohibited the sale of adulterated or misbranded drugs, but did not require that drugs be approved by FDA. In 1938, Congress passed the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the FD&C Act), which required that new drugs be approved for safety. As discussed below, the active ingredients of many drugs currently on the market were first introduced, at least in some form, before 1938. Between 1938 and 1962, if a drug obtained approval, FDA considered drugs that were identical, related, or similar (IRS) to the approved drug to be covered by that approval, and allowed those IRS drugs to be marketed without independent approval. Many manufacturers also introduced drugs onto the market between 1938 and 1962 based on their own conclusion that the products were generally recognized as safe (GRAS) or based on an opinion from FDA that the products were not new drugs. Between 1938 and 1962, the Agency issued many such opinions, although all were formally revoked in 1968 (see 21 CFR 310.100).

B. DESI

In 1962, Congress amended the Act to require that a new drug also be proven effective, as well as safe, to obtain FDA approval. This amendment also required FDA to conduct a retrospective evaluation of the effectiveness of the drug products that FDA had approved as safe between 1938 and 1962 through the new drug approval process.

FDA contracted with the National Academy of Science/National Research Council (NAS/NRC) to make an initial evaluation of the effectiveness of over 3,400 products that were approved only for safety between 1938 and 1962. The NAS/NRC created 30 panels of 6 professionals each to conduct the review, which was broken down into specific drug categories. The NAS/NRC reports for these drug products were submitted to FDA in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Agency reviewed and re-evaluated the findings of each panel and published its findings in Federal Register notices. FDA’s administrative implementation of the NAS/NRC reports was called the Drug Efficacy Study Implementation (DESI). DESI covered the 3,400 products specifically reviewed by the NAS/NRCs as well as the even larger number of IRS products that entered the market without FDA approval.

14 This brief history document should be viewed as a secondary source. To determine the regulatory status of a particular drug or category of drugs, the original source documents cited should be consulted.
Because DESI products were covered by approved (pre-1962) applications, the Agency concluded that, prior to removing products not found effective from the market, it would follow procedures in the FD&C Act and regulations that apply when an approved new drug application is withdrawn:

- All initial DESI determinations are published in the Federal Register and, if the drug is found to be less than fully effective, there is an opportunity for a hearing.

- The Agency considers the basis of any hearing request and either grants the hearing or denies the hearing on summary judgment and publishes its final determination in the Federal Register.

- If FDA's final determination classifies the drug as effective for its labeled indications, as required by the FD&C Act, FDA still requires approved applications for continued marketing of the drug and all drugs IRS to it – NDA supplements for those drugs with NDAs approved for safety, or new ANDAs or NDAs, as appropriate, for IRS drugs. DESI-effective drugs that do not obtain approval of the required supplement, ANDA, or NDA are subject to enforcement action.

- If FDA's final determination classifies the drug as ineffective, the drug and those IRS to it can no longer be marketed and are subject to enforcement action.

1. Products Subject to Ongoing DESI Proceedings

Some unapproved marketed products are undergoing DESI reviews in which a final determination regarding efficacy has not yet been made. In addition to the products specifically reviewed by the NAS/NRC (i.e., those products approved for safety only between 1938 and 1962), this group includes unapproved products identical, related, or similar to those products specifically reviewed (see 21 CFR 310.6). In virtually all these proceedings, FDA has made an initial determination that the products lack substantial evidence of effectiveness, and the manufacturers have requested a hearing on that finding. It is the Agency's longstanding policy that products subject to an ongoing DESI proceeding may remain on the market during the pendency of the proceeding. See, e.g., *Upjohn Co. v. Finch*, 303 F. Supp. 241, 256-61 (W.D. Mich. 1969).

2. Products Subject to Completed DESI Proceedings

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15 Products first marketed after a hearing notice is issued with a different formulation than those covered by the notice are not considered subject to the DESI proceeding. Rather, they need approval prior to marketing. Under longstanding Agency policies, a firm holding an NDA on a product for which a DESI hearing is pending must submit a supplement prior to reformulating that product. The changed formulation may not be marketed as a related product under the pending DESI proceeding; it is a new drug, and it must be approved for safety and efficacy before it can be legally marketed. See, e.g., “Prescription Drugs Offered for Relief of Symptoms of Cough, Cold, or Allergy” (DESI 6514), 49 FR 153 (January 3, 1984) (Dimetane and Actifed); “Certain Drugs Containing Antibiotic, Corticosteroid, and Antifungal Components” (DESI 10826), 50 FR 15227 (April 17, 1985) (Mycolog). See also 21 U.S.C. 356a(c)(2)(A). Similarly, firms without NDAs cannot market new formulations of a drug without first getting approval of an NDA.
Some unapproved marketed products are subject to already-completed DESI proceedings and lack required approved applications. This includes a number of products IRS to DESI products for which approval was withdrawn due to a lack of substantial evidence of effectiveness. This group also includes a number of products IRS to those DESI products for which FDA made a final determination that the product is effective, but applications for the IRS products have not been both submitted and approved as required under the statute and longstanding enforcement policy (see 21 CFR 310.6). FDA considers all products described in this paragraph to be marketed illegally.

C. Prescription Drug Wrap-Up

As mentioned above, many drugs came onto the market before 1962 without FDA approvals. Of these, many claimed to have been marketed prior to 1938 or to be IRS to such a drug. Drugs that did not have pre-1962 approvals and were not IRS to drugs with pre-1962 approvals were not subject to DESI. For a period of time, FDA did not take action against these drugs and did not take action against new unapproved drugs that were IRS to these pre-1962 drugs that entered the market without approval.

Beginning in 1983, it was discovered that one drug that was IRS to a pre-1962 drug, a high potency Vitamin E intravenous injection named E-Ferol, was associated with adverse reactions in about 100 premature infants, 40 of whom died. In November of 1984, in response to this, a congressional oversight committee issued a report to FDA expressing the committee's concern regarding the thousands of unapproved drug products in the marketplace.

In response to the E-Ferol tragedy, CDER assessed the number of pre-1962 non-DESI marketed drug products. To address those drug products, the Agency significantly revised and expanded CPG section 440.100 to cover all marketed unapproved prescription drugs, not just DESI products. The program for addressing these marketed unapproved drugs and certain others like them became known as the Prescription Drug Wrap-Up. Most of the Prescription Drug Wrap-Up drugs first entered the market before 1938, at least in some form. For the most part, the Agency had evaluated neither the safety nor the effectiveness of the drugs in the Prescription Drug Wrap-Up.

A drug that was subject to the Prescription Drug Wrap-Up is marketed illegally, unless the manufacturer of such a drug can establish that its drug is grandfathered or otherwise not a new drug.

Under the 1938 grandfather clause (see 21 U.S.C. 321(p)(1)), a drug product that was on the market prior to passage of the 1938 Act and which contained in its labeling the same representations concerning the conditions of use as it did prior to passage of that act was not considered a new drug and therefore was exempt from the requirement of having an approved new drug application.

Under the 1962 grandfather clause, the FD&C Act exempts a drug from the effectiveness requirements if its composition and labeling has not changed since 1962 and if, on the day before the 1962 Amendments became effective, it was (a) used or sold commercially in the United
Contains Nonbinding Recommendations

States, (b) not a new drug as defined by the FD&C Act at that time, and (c) not covered by an effective application. See Public Law 87-781, section 107 (reprinted following 21 U.S.C.A. 321); see also USV Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 655, 662-66 (1973).

The two grandfather clauses in the FD&C Act have been construed very narrowly by the courts. FDA believes that there are very few drugs on the market that are actually entitled to grandfather status because the drugs currently on the market likely differ from the previous versions in some respect, such as formulation, dosage or strength, dosage form, route of administration, indications, or intended patient population. If a firm claims that its product is grandfathered, it is that firm's burden to prove that assertion. See 21 CFR 314.200(e)(5); see also United States v. An Article of Drug (Bentex Ulcerine), 469 F.2d 875, 878 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Articles of Drug Consisting of the Following: 5,906 Boxes, 745 F.2d 105, 113 (1st Cir 1984).

Finally, a product would not be considered a new drug if it is generally recognized as safe and effective (GRAS/GRAE) and has been used to a material extent and for a material time. See 21 U.S.C. 321(p)(1) and (2). As with the grandfather clauses, this has been construed very narrowly by the courts. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973); United States v. 50 Boxes More or Less Etc., 909 F.2d 24, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. 225 Cartons . . . Fiorinal, 871 F.2d 409 (3rd Cir. 1989). See also Letter from Dennis E. Baker, Associate Commissioner for Regulatory Affairs, FDA, to Gary D. Dolch, Melvin Spigelman, and Jeffrey A. Staffa, Knoll Pharmaceutical Co. (April 26, 2001) (on file in FDA Docket No. 97N-0314/CP2) (finding that Synthroid, a levothyroxine sodium product, was not GRAS/GRAE).

As mentioned above, the Agency believes it is not likely that any currently marketed prescription drug product is grandfathered or is otherwise not a new drug. However, the Agency recognizes that it is at least theoretically possible. No part of this guidance, including the Appendix, is a finding as to the legal status of any particular drug product. In light of the strict standards governing exceptions to the approval process, it would be prudent for firms marketing unapproved products to carefully assess whether their products meet these standards.

D. New Unapproved Drugs

Some unapproved drugs were first marketed (or changed) after 1962. These drugs are on the market illegally. Some also may have already been the subject of a formal Agency finding that they are new drugs. See, e.g., 21 CFR 310.502 (discussing, among other things, controlled/timed release dosage forms).

E. Over-the-Counter (OTC) Drug Review

Although OTC drugs were originally included in DESI, FDA eventually concluded that this was not an efficient use of resources. The Agency also was faced with resource challenges because it was receiving many applications for different OTC drugs for the same indications. Therefore, in 1972, the Agency implemented a process of reviewing OTC drugs through rulemaking by therapeutic classes (e.g., antacids, antiperspirants, cold remedies). This process involves convening an advisory panel for each therapeutic class to review data relating to claims and active ingredients. These panel reports are then published in the Federal Register, and after
FDA review, tentative final monographs for the classes of drugs are published. The final step is the publication of a final monograph for each class, which sets forth the allowable claims, labeling, and active ingredients for OTC drugs in each class (see, e.g., 21 CFR part 333). Drugs marketed in accordance with a final monograph are considered to be generally recognized as safe and effective (GRAS/GRAE) and do not require FDA approval of a marketing application.

Final monographs have been published for the majority of OTC drugs. Tentative final monographs are in place for virtually all categories of OTC drugs. FDA has also finalized a number of negative monographs that list therapeutic categories (e.g., OTC daytime sedatives, 21 CFR 310.519) in which no OTC drugs can be marketed without approval. Finally, the Agency has promulgated a list of active ingredients that cannot be used in OTC drugs without approved applications because there are inadequate data to establish that they are GRAS/GRAE (e.g., phenolphthalein in stimulant laxative products, 21 CFR 310.545(a)(12)(iv)(B)).

OTC drugs covered by ongoing OTC drug monograph proceedings may remain on the market as provided in current enforcement policies (see, e.g., CPG sections 450.200 and 450.300, and 21 CFR part 330). This document does not affect the current enforcement policies for such drugs.

OTC drugs that need approval, either because their ingredients or claims are not within the scope of the OTC drug review or because they are not allowed under a final monograph or another final rule, are illegally marketed. For example, this group would include a product containing an ingredient determined to be ineffective for a particular indication or one that exceeds the dosage limit established in the monograph. Such products are new drugs that must be approved by FDA to be legally marketed.
The Case for Clarifying FDA Authority: Large-Scale Drug Compounding and the Ongoing Risk to Public Health

Committee Staff Report

May 22, 2013
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Executive Summary

- This is the second HELP Committee staff report of the Committee’s investigation into the nationwide outbreak of fungal meningitis traced to injections of contaminated drugs prepared by the Massachusetts-based New England Compounding Center. The report is based on a review of more than 30,000 pages of internal Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) documents over a six month period, as well as publicly available documents.

- Drug compounding is a traditional and longstanding activity of pharmacies, and serves an important role in our health care system. However, over the last 10 to 15 years, a number of large-scale drug compounding companies have started to produce large batches of high-risk drugs for national sale.

- Despite a scope of operations that makes these companies much more similar to drug manufacturers than pharmacies, they primarily face oversight similar to a state-licensed community pharmacy, rather than the more rigorous quality standards governing traditional drug manufacturers.

- The New England Compounding Center (“NECC”) and the co-owned compounding company, Ameridose, both have lengthy track records of producing drugs of questionable sterility and potency, and both have been the subject of repeated adverse event reports and consumer complaints.
  
  o The Committee review of FDA documents indicates that, between 2002 and 2012, NECC was the subject of at least 52 adverse event reports that demonstrate the dangers created by its hazardous compounding practices. Documented issues include: the failure to ensure the sterility of equipment and products; the distribution of drugs containing particulate matter; the manufacture of super-potent and sub-potent drugs; the mislabeling of drugs; inaccurate beyond use dating; and the illegal distribution of drugs in the absence of patient-specific prescriptions.

  o Similarly, internal FDA documents dated between 2007 and 2012 indicate that Ameridose was the subject of at least 18 adverse event reports, with inspections documenting that Ameridose-compounded drugs displayed issues relating to sterility, potency, mislabeling, and adulteration.

- In tests of compounded drugs conducted by the FDA in 2001 and 2006, 34 and 33 percent of the drugs sampled failed one or more standard quality tests.

- FDA documents indicate that, between 2001 and 2011, at least 25 deaths and 36 serious injuries, including hospitalizations, were linked to large-scale drug compounding companies, including 13 deaths in 2011 alone. These numbers likely understate the actual number of adverse events, as current law does not require reporting of these events.

- Large-scale drug compounders continue to pose a serious risk to public health. In the eight months since the NECC-caused meningitis infections, at least 48 compounding companies have been found to be producing and selling drugs that were contaminated or created in unsafe conditions. Ten drug compounders have issued national recalls because of concerns about contamination, and 11 drug compounders have been ordered by state licensing agencies to stop producing some or all drugs.
To reduce the risk to the public health from compounded drug products, it is essential that a clear statutory framework be enacted – one that requires compounding manufacturers to engage in good manufacturing practices, to better ensure the drugs produced are sterile and contain the correct amount of the active pharmaceutical ingredient.
Introduction

Beginning in the summer of 2012, 379 people in 19 states were infected with a rare form of fungal meningitis.¹ Fifty-five of those people died.² Rapid epidemiological investigative work by the Tennessee Department of Health and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDCP”) likely averted additional fatalities.³ However, many of those infected continue to suffer debilitating side effects from the infection and the powerful drugs required to save their lives.⁴ Those effects include loss of feeling in limbs, nightmare-like hallucinations, intense chronic pain, and the risk of organ failures.⁵ One woman who received an injection in Michigan stated that she had been hospitalized seven separate times for a total of 75 days as a result of the infection she contracted.⁶ A Florida woman remained hospitalized four months after developing meningitis.⁷ Three hundred sixty-two additional cases of spinal and joint infections have also been documented.⁸ The CDCP has linked those infections to injections of a fungus-contaminated drug prepared by the New England Compounding Center (“NECC”), a pharmacy based in Massachusetts.⁹

The contaminated drug linked to this outbreak was manufactured in large batch doses and distributed nationally. Neither the FDA nor the state of Massachusetts acted to enjoin the actions of the company. Because the FDA lacked clear authority over this type of pharmacy, the agency did not act to require the company to meet the good manufacturing practices or the quality standards that would have better ensured that the drugs produced were safe. Even in the wake of the NECC outbreak, and despite increased awareness of the risks posed by pharmacies operating like manufacturers, large-scale drug compounders continue to pose a serious risk to public health. Since the NECC outbreak, at least 10 separate companies have recalled compounded drugs, and at least 11 companies were ordered to stop producing some or all drugs.¹⁰ Besides NECC and Ameridose, at least 48 other pharmacies have been found by the FDA or state regulators to be producing and selling drugs that are contaminated, were created in unsafe conditions, or otherwise violate state licensing requirements.¹¹

What is Drug Compounding and How is it Regulated?

Compounding medicines is a traditional activity of pharmacies and serves an important role in our health care system. When compounding, the pharmacist alters medicines to adjust the dosing or modify the form to meet a patient-specific need. For instance, if an infant needs an antibiotic that is normally produced as a pill, a pharmacist could convert it to a liquid to be taken orally. That traditional compounding practice, by which a drug is produced in response to an individual prescription, or at most in small batches based on reasonably anticipated need, is regulated by the states. Drugs that are manufactured, in contrast, are regulated by the FDA.¹² Those drugs must be manufactured following rigorous quality controls to ensure that the drugs are not contaminated and that the dosage of the active ingredient is correct.

Over the last 10 to 15 years, a number of pharmacies have expanded operations far beyond the traditional compounding role, at least in part in response to hospital and consumer demand for otherwise unavailable drugs. Dozens, and possibly hundreds, of these large-scale drug compounding companies produce large batches of high-risk drugs, including preservative-free steroid injections and triple...
anesthetic creams, for national sale. Some have specialized to become suppliers of commonly used hospital intravenous (IV) drugs like heparin, oxytocin, hydromorphone, and sodium chloride. Despite a scope of operations that makes these companies much more similar to drug manufacturers than pharmacies, they primarily face oversight similar to a state-licensed community pharmacy rather than the rigorous quality controls Americans would expect. Meanwhile, the FDA has been faced with a lack of clarity over the scope of its authority and an industry willing to challenge that authority on a regular basis. There also existed within FDA a bureaucracy hesitant to act on instances of apparent misconduct.

Congress and federal regulators have made previous efforts to establish an enforceable policy that clearly differentiates between traditional pharmacy compounding and compound drug manufacturing, but those efforts have proved to be complicated. Although Congress passed legislation designed to delineate these practices in 1997, the Supreme Court found certain provisions of this law unenforceable in 2002, and federal circuit courts split over whether the rest of the law was enforceable. Also in 2002, the FDA issued a Compliance Policy Guidance setting forth when it would consider bringing an enforcement action against a compounding pharmacy. However, trade associations and individual drug compounding companies continued to initiate challenges when the FDA sought to bring an enforcement action against large-scale drug compounders. These cases further complicated the enforceability of the 1997 law in different parts of the country.

Although the FDA was faced with a lack of clarity in the law, and with an industry willing to challenge its authority on a regular basis, the agency responded poorly to those challenges. Officials responsible for enforcing the drug compounding guidance appear to have lacked defined inspection criteria and tracking procedures for building a strong evidentiary record for these cases. These uncertainties contributed to long delays when cases were brought to the agency Chief Counsel’s office for approval, a required step before a Warning Letter or an injunction could be issued for a compounding pharmacy. At least in actions relating to NECC and its co-owned compounding pharmacy, Ameridose, the Chief Counsel’s office delayed decisions until the matter was so stale that it was no longer pursued. Even when the agency did issue Warning Letters, as it ultimately did in the case of NECC, the agency’s promised follow-through to injunction often did not materialize.

By 2008, the jurisdictional issues had become so unclear that the agency appeared to be unable to balance the risk of litigation against the public health risk posed by the large-scale compounders, even though the agency continued to receive regular reports of serious adverse events, complaints from state boards of pharmacy, and consumer complaints. The result was an agency that lacked effective internal guidelines, procedures, and the leadership consensus required to regulate high-risk compounders like NECC and Ameridose.

In 2009, FDA leadership set out to develop a clear and enforceable policy that reflected the limitations of the multiple court decisions and the resulting differences in authority in various parts of the country. In the fall of 2012, almost three years later, and despite additional complaints, the agency was finally...
close to issuing that policy through revised Compounding Pharmacy Guidance, when the NECC-linked fungal meningitis outbreak occurred.\textsuperscript{20}

However, had the FDA successfully implemented the revised guidance, it still would have faced serious challenges to ensuring that large-scale compounders were producing safe and effective drugs. Even under the proposed guidance, high-risk compounders would not have been required to register with the FDA, they would not have been subject to regular inspections (only to inspections following an adverse event or complaint), and additional rulemakings would have been necessary to define significant terms in the 1997 law, including what constituted compounding “regularly or in inordinate amounts (as defined by the Secretary) any drug products that are essentially copies of a commercially available product.”\textsuperscript{21} It also likely would have had to litigate further to determine which circuit court’s interpretation of the 1997 law would prevail.

Moreover, although the FDA’s ability to inspect and bring enforcement actions against individual high-risk compounding operations would have been clarified, it is not clear that the guidance would have led many of the large-scale drug compounders that were engaged in the equivalent of manufacturing to improve quality standards. As demonstrated by the continuing safety violations documented over the past seven months, Congress needs to take action to ensure clear lines of responsibility for oversight of these companies. Drug compounding companies that are manufacturing batches of drugs in the absence of a prescription, and shipping those products to states across the country, need to adhere to an appropriate level of good manufacturing practices as determined by the FDA. These requirements are the linchpin that ensures that drugs are not contaminated and that the dosage of the active ingredient is correct.

**The Public Health Risk Posed by NECC and Ameridose**

As large-scale compounding manufacturers have grown over the last decades, so have concerns about the quality of the drugs produced by some of those companies. Documents produced to the Committee indicate that both NECC and co-owned Ameridose have lengthy track records of producing drugs of questionable sterility and potency, and both were the subject of repeated adverse event reports and consumer complaints.

**NECC**

Between 2002 and 2012, NECC was the subject of at least 52 adverse event reports exemplifying the dangers created by its hazardous compounding practices.\textsuperscript{22} Also during this time, NECC’s threat to public health was conclusively established by investigations undertaken by the FDA and state regulators, both as routine measures and in response to reports of NECC’s unsafe compounding practices.\textsuperscript{23} NECC’s unsafe operations were repeatedly highlighted in the complaints of doctors, state boards of pharmacy, competitors, and consumers, some of whom suffered meningitis-like symptoms after receiving steroid injections made by NECC.\textsuperscript{24}

As evidenced by these persistent complaints, NECC’s compounding practices posed a public safety risk that was both broad in scope and egregious in nature. Among the many issues documented were
NECC’s failure to ensure the sterility of equipment and products, including the distribution of drugs containing particulate matter; the manufacture of drugs that were overly strong or not strong enough (“super-potent” and “sub-potent”); the mislabeling of drugs; the inaccurate use of expiration dates (or “beyond use dates”); and the illegal distribution of drugs in the absence of patient-specific prescriptions.25

These deficient and unsafe practices compromised the integrity of a broad range of NECC-compounded drugs, including steroids administered for pain relief such as betamethasone epidural injections and methylprednisolone acetate injections; repackaged Avastin, a drug used to treat age-related macular degeneration; Trypan Blue, a drug used for capsular staining during cataract surgery; methotrexate; and topical anesthetic creams. Ultimately, these dangerous practices appear to have caused more than 50 patients to suffer serious illnesses, often requiring hospitalization, years in advance of the 2012 meningitis outbreak.26 As previously documented by the Committee, both the FDA and the Massachusetts Board of Registration in Pharmacy took action against NECC, respectively issuing a Warning Letter and a Consent Decree, but neither agency moved effectively to enjoin the company from practices that placed the public health at risk.27

When the FDA and Massachusetts Board inspectors returned to NECC in the wake of the 2012 meningitis outbreak, their findings only amplified NECC’s long history of unsound practices. The inspection demonstrated that NECC failed to comply with sterility procedures outlined in USP <797>, a widely accepted quality standard for smaller-scale compounders, and documented visible black particulate matter in vials of recalled methylprednisolone acetate.28 Further, the FDA determined that NECC’s environmental monitoring system documented 61 instances between January and August 2012 in which bacteria or mold existed in concentrations surpassing action-level thresholds.29 Additional findings included “greenish yellow discoloration” lining one of two autoclaves used to sterilize various components and equipment; “yellow residue lining the rear return of Weigh Station 2 Hood and greenish residue lining the rear return of Weigh Station 3 Hood” which were used to “weigh active ingredients and other raw materials”; residual powder in the powder hood; tacky mats, which were used to prevent potential contaminants from entering the clean room, that were “visibly soiled with assorted debris”; and a leaking boiler that “created an environment susceptible to contaminant growth” adjacent to the clean room.30

\textbf{Ameridose}

Although regulators had already documented extensive problems concerning NECC’s compounding practices, the Massachusetts Board of Registration in Pharmacy approved a license for the owners of NECC, the Conigliaro family, to open a second compounding company called Ameridose in 2006.31 While NECC primarily manufactured drugs for purchase by pain clinics and physicians, Ameridose focused on compounding IV mixtures for use by hospitals across the country.
Between 2006 and 2012, Ameridose grew rapidly and, by the time of the NECC-caused meningitis crisis, Ameridose-compounded drugs were available to the 3,000 hospital members of Novation, the largest group purchasing organization in the country, in addition to 22,000 other providers and facilities.  

Ameridose engaged in many of the same unsafe compounding practices as did NECC. Between 2007 and 2012, Ameridose was the subject of at least 18 adverse event reports, in addition to a report from an employee-informant, and investigations by both federal and state authorities. Findings established that Ameridose products posed considerable risks arising from issues of sterility, potency, mislabeling, adulteration, and illegal manufacturing. For example, in August 2008, FDA investigators found that Ameridose products were shipped immediately without waiting for the results of sterility testing; testing for potency and dose uniformity was not routinely performed; and Ameridose failed to comply with the requirements of USP <797> in violation of Massachusetts law.

A subsequent follow-up inspection resulted in sampling of Fentanyl, a drug opioid analgesic that FDA inspectors noted was already “very potent” at “80x” the potency of morphine in its standard form. Testing demonstrated that Ameridose-compounded Fentanyl was concentrated at 118.4 percent the standard level, leading to a recall of that particular batch of that particular drug. Following the 2008 inspections, a Warning Letter was drafted for Ameridose that enumerated many instances of illegal manufacturing of unapproved, misbranded, and adulterated drug products. While the Warning Letter was tentatively cleared by the FDA’s Office of the Chief Counsel in early March 2009, concerns over a single sentence delayed final approval for months. In September 2009, the Warning Letter was deemed stale because it had been over a year since the initial inspections, and the letter was never sent.

In 2010, an employee-informant of Ameridose described concerns such as the elimination of several product safety checks and the presence of particulate matter in a batch of Succinylcholine that was deemed acceptable for distribution. The informant also related that untrained sales force personnel had assisted in labeling operations in a clean room, one of the three clean rooms was used despite a positive test result for mold growth, and employees sanitized areas before taking environmental samples.

Following the 2012 meningitis outbreak, FDA investigators documented concerns at the larger-scale Ameridose that were virtually identical to those they found at the co-owned NECC facility. Among the issues discovered were failures to guarantee the sterility of drugs and the uniformity of doses, including findings that batches of drugs were not subjected to sterility testing, and that procedures to prevent microbiological contamination of sterile drugs were inadequate. Further, FDA investigators found that Ameridose failed to clean or maintain equipment and utensils sufficiently to prevent contamination, lacked equipment for adequate control over air pressure, and was infested with vermin.

The Scope of the Public Health Risk: Beyond NECC and Ameridose

NECC and Ameridose were hardly the only companies engaged in practices that were of serious concern to the FDA. Between 2004 and 2010, the agency issued at least 46 Warning Letters to compounders documenting concerns ranging from failure to test drugs for contaminants and potency, to the use of unjustifiable beyond use dates. Additionally, between 2001 and 2011, an FDA document compiling
some of the most serious adverse events related to drug compounding details at least 25 deaths and 36 serious injuries, including hospitalizations, that were linked to large-scale drug compounding companies, including 13 deaths in 2011 alone.\textsuperscript{46}

In addition, since the NECC outbreak, state boards of pharmacy, the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy, and the FDA have taken steps to understand and inspect companies engaged in large-scale drug compounding more effectively. As a result of those efforts, at least 10 companies have issued recalls for sterile drug products, many in response to documented contamination; at least 11 companies have been the subject of cease-and-desist orders by state authorities; and Iowa has initiated license revocations against at least five companies.\textsuperscript{47}

**FDA Sampling Documented Risks of Compounding**

In an effort to understand better the risks posed by increasingly large drug compounding companies, the FDA undertook surveys of compounded drugs in 2001 and 2006. In 2001, the FDA purchased products from 12 companies offering products for sale online, and, in 2006, it collected samples in unannounced visits to 36 compounding pharmacies.\textsuperscript{48} The FDA also tested the active ingredients used to compound the drugs and determined that no underlying active ingredient failed quality testing.\textsuperscript{49}

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<tr>
<th>Results of FDA Sampling of Compounder- and Manufacturer-Produced Drugs, 1996-2006</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Compounded Samples 2001</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Compounded Samples 2006</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Manufacturer Produced Samples 1996-2001</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>34%</td>
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Results based on following: 2001 - 29 samples; 2006 - 36 samples; manufacturer produced - more than 3,000 samples.

The 2001 survey was based on standard quality testing conducted on compounded drugs, including sterile injectables, pellet implants, and ophthalmic products.\textsuperscript{50} Ultimately, the agency was able to
complete testing on a total of 29 samples. Of those, 10 of the samples, or 34 percent, failed one or more standard quality tests. By contrast, in routine FDA samples of drug products from commercial manufacturers, the analytical testing failure for those drugs has been less than 2 percent. When compared to this failure rate, the failure rate of 34 percent for compounded drugs indicates the need for better quality controls in most compounding companies. Specifically, the survey found that most of the samples that failed quality testing contained improper amounts of the active ingredient, and thus were either super-potent or sub-potent. In addition, one sterile injectable was found to have an unacceptably high level of bacterial endotoxins. The failed products included sterile injectable betamethasone, a drug which has resulted in meningitis infections on several occasions, and commonly used fertility drugs, including estradiol.

Similarly, the 2006 survey collected samples from unannounced visits to compounding pharmacies from around the United States. Quality testing was completed on 36 samples, all of which were sterile injectable drugs. Of the 36 samples tested, 12, or 33 percent, failed one or more standard quality tests. As in 2001, the survey found that the samples that failed quality testing were either super-potent or sub-potent. Moreover, the test results were not off by small margins; in fact, the samples ranged from having 67.5 percent to 268.4 percent of the drug potency declared on the product labeling. All tested drug products with the active ingredient of lidocaine and estradiol failed the analysis. Since none of the active pharmaceutical ingredients that went into the final product failed testing, the FDA concluded that “the analytical failures of the finished drug products were likely related to the compounding processes at the pharmacies.” As the FDA concluded, “the fact that nearly one-third failed analytical testing raises public health concerns.”

**Adverse Events**

The gravity of the public health threat posed by large-scale drug compounders can be better understood by examining some of the documented adverse events. Between 2001 and 2011, an FDA document compiling some of the most serious adverse events related to drug compounding details at least 25 deaths and 36 serious injuries, including hospitalizations, that were linked to large-scale drug compounding companies, including 13 deaths in 2011 alone. As the FDA stated in the memo, “Based on the information presented…, we feel that there are significant public health concerns with the compounding of sterile drug products.”

A separate accounting of adverse events and complaints linked to drug compounding companies between 1988 and 2005 documents at least 38 deaths and 210 injuries from drugs that were contaminated, mislabeled, or caused lethal overdoses because they contained more of the active pharmaceutical ingredient than indicated. These 248 tragedies included the deaths of six infants and children, and at least 18 other children paralyzed, burned, hospitalized, and suffering from other severe reactions. The FDA said that these reports represented only a small percentage of total adverse events.
from compounded drugs. There is currently no system in place that requires adverse event reporting or accurately tracks adverse events to compounded products.

The adverse events detailed by the FDA include three 2007 deaths that were associated with compounded Colchicine from a pharmacy in Texas. Colchicine, which can be very toxic when given in high doses, is used to prevent gout attacks (sudden, severe pain in one or more joints) in adults, and to relieve the pain accompanying gout attacks when they occur. Three patients died after being administered the drug by injection for back pain. Within hours of receiving the injections, the patients became seriously ill and were taken to local hospitals. When the FDA investigated and tested samples of the compounded product, sample potency varied from 640 percent to 62 percent of the level of Colchicine declared.

Last month, on April 15, 2013, the same pharmacy announced a total recall of all lots of all sterile compounded products. The company continues to operate under current law as a pharmacy not subject to good manufacturing practices, and currently manufactures numerous drug products, including hormones, thyroid and adrenal drugs, and eye drops.

Numerous other examples exist of compounding pharmacies repeatedly failing to meet high-quality safe and sterile manufacturing practices, including a California pharmacy selling contaminated compounded cardioplegia solution (used in open-heart surgery) that resulted in severe infections, sepsis, and three deaths in 2005. The same compounding pharmacy produced super-potent hydromorphone in 2009, causing patients to overdose. The company continues to operate under current law as a pharmacy not subject to good manufacturing practices, and it currently operates 25 locations nationwide. During recent inspections of six of these 25 locations, the FDA found such disturbing problems as potential potency issues, microorganism contamination, and pests.
Similarly in 2002, several people developed fungal infections and two died after being injected with methylprednisolone made by a South Carolina pharmacy. The South Carolina Board of Pharmacy found the pharmacy unsanitary and its sterilization practices inadequate. It suspended the pharmacist’s license for four years and fined him $10,000. Ultimately, the pharmacy closed.

Findings of Recent Investigations and Inspections

In the eight months since the NECC-caused meningitis crisis, it has become clear that public health risks from large-scale drug compounding persist. As a result of increased oversight from state and federal regulators, at least 48 compounding companies have been found to be producing and selling drugs that are contaminated, were created in unsafe conditions, or otherwise violate state licensing requirements. Ten companies have issued nationwide recalls of drugs compounded at their facilities. In at least four cases, the recall was issued in response to documentation of actual contamination. Further, 11 compounding pharmacies have been ordered to cease and desist operations, including two of those that had issued nationwide recalls.

In Massachusetts, one compounding pharmacy recalled all of its sterile products after unidentified particulates were observed in five vials of drugs. After producing a super-potent painkiller that caused two people to be hospitalized last year, the company was already under investigation by state authorities. In November 2012, the state ordered the company to stop making a generic form of Viagra because it was found to be using “improper components.”

A second Massachusetts specialty pharmacy recalled allegedly sterile fertility drugs after a patient discovered an unknown substance floating in a vial of medication that had been shipped to 2,100 patients in 39 states. In February 2013, state health officials issued a cease-and-desist order prohibiting the company from producing sterile compounded drugs.

Similarly, in March 2013, a hospital nurse spotted debris floating in a vial of intravenous drugs. Tests confirmed that the debris was a fungus and, consequently, prompted a massive recall by the New Jersey compounding pharmacy that produced the drugs. Although the New Jersey Board of Pharmacy has restricted the company from compounding intravenous drugs, and the state Attorney General is seeking the revocation of the pharmacy’s license, the company previously manufactured a wide variety of other sterile drugs, including antibiotics, anesthetics, and pain management medications.

More recently, in April 2013, a Florida pharmacy recalled all lots of its sterile drug products after an FDA inspection revealed “black particles of unknown origin” in seven vials of an injectable steroid. FDA investigators also found “a cloth-like filament of unknown origin” in one vial of chromium-chloride injections, an additive used for intravenous nutritional supplements. Tests confirmed the presence of bacteria.

Six additional companies also have recalled potentially contaminated drugs over the past few months, spurred by FDA inspections that identified serious quality control deficiencies resulting in the high
potential for contaminated products.\textsuperscript{96} In addition, the FDA issued “inspecational observations” to 20 other compounding pharmacies that contained findings including inappropriate and/or inadequate clothing for sterile processing, lack of appropriate air filtration systems, insufficient microbiological testing, failure to conduct potency testing, and problems related to expiration and beyond use dates.\textsuperscript{97}

Finally, the Iowa Board of Pharmacy has filed charges against at least five companies for violations including incorrect labeling, noncompliant sterile areas, and improper distribution of drugs.\textsuperscript{98} These actions are the result of an ongoing series of inspections of all out-of-state pharmacies licensed in Iowa, conducted in partnership with the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy.\textsuperscript{99} Tennessee and Florida are both surveying state compounding pharmacies in an effort to regulate these companies more effectively.\textsuperscript{100} Other states have also been re-examining their oversight of these entities.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The NECC-linked meningitis crisis occurred against a backdrop of a significant increase in the number of companies that manufacture large batches of high-risk compounded drugs and market and ship them nationally. Investigations and sampling studies conducted by the FDA plainly demonstrate that many of these companies were and are not following good manufacturing standards or meeting other practice standards. At the same time, the FDA struggled to develop a clear and enforceable policy for these types of large-scale drug compounders. The agency faced numerous challenges in developing this policy, including repeated legal challenges to the agency’s attempted enforcement actions against high-risk compounders, but the agency ultimately never released a workable policy.

Today, eight months after quick work by the Tennessee Department of Health and the CDCP isolated NECC-produced steroids as the source of the infections, the public health risk from compounded drugs persists. Some states have engaged in an effort to understand and inspect large-scale compounders operating in or licensed within their borders more effectively, and the FDA has similarly inspected a number of large compounders closely. That scrutiny has demonstrated the scope of the public health risk posed by large-scale compounding manufacturers and the need for well-defined lines that differentiate these companies from traditional pharmacy compounders, providing medicine for individual patients. To reduce the risk to the public health from compounded drug products, it is essential that a clear statutory framework be enacted that requires compounding manufacturers to follow the appropriate good manufacturing practices that will better ensure that the drugs produced are sterile and contain the correct amount of the active pharmaceutical ingredient.
Endnotes


2 Id.

3 CDC Testimony before the Senate HELP Committee, Re: The CDC and Public Health Response to the 2012 Fungal Meningitis and Other Infections Outbreak, November 15, 2012 (“Their [local infectious disease officials, including state epidemiologists, healthcare associated infection (HAI) prevention coordinators, and others whose positions are directly supported through CDC’s Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity (ELC) cooperative agreement and CDC’s Emerging Infections Program (EIP)] efforts at the state and local level have been extraordinary and in many cases undoubtedly contributed directly to saving the lives of exposed patients.”).


9 CDC Testimony before the Senate HELP Committee, Re: The CDC and Public Health Response to the 2012 Fungal Meningitis and Other Infections Outbreak, November 15, 2012 (“My remarks today will focus specifically on the identification of, and subsequent public health response to, the outbreak associated with injections of contaminated preservative-free methylprednisolone acetate (MPA), an injectable steroid produced by the New England Compounding Center (NECC).”).


11 Recent Regulatory Actions, supra 10.
12 Among other requirements, drug manufacturers are subject to a preapproval process that generally requires clinical testing. Manufacturers must also register with the agency and identify their drug products.
13 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA); Western States Medical Center v. Shalala, 238 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2001); Medical Center Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2008).
16 FDA Internal Document, Re: Procedures for Clearing FDA Warning Letters and Untitled Letters, July 2012, available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresManual/UCM176965.pdf (accessed May 16, 2013). In 2001, a policy was implemented that required all Warning Letters and untitled letters to be reviewed by the FDA Chief Counsel’s Office. The policy was revised in 2009, but it continues to require review for a wide range of letters, including any letter implicating compounding or other controversial legal issues.
17 E.g., FDA Internal Email, Re: CMS Quality Control Check, September 1, 2009 (“Ameridose’s Warning Letter (Case ID 40318) was put on hold due to conflicting court rulings related to Pharmacy Compounding. We are currently not proceeding
with issuance of this warning letter because it has now been 1 [sic] year since the district’s inspection of the firm. We may in the future conduct an inspection of this firm, but for now this case is closed.”).  

22 Untitled Letters from Food and Drug Administration to Chairman Harkin and Ranking Member Enzi, December 6, 2012.  
23 E.g., Colorado State Board of Pharmacy, Special Report, Re: New England Compounding Pharmacy, Inc. (WHO 7832), July 20, 2012; FDA Warning Letter to NECC, December 4, 2006; Massachusetts Board of Registration in Pharmacy, Consent Agreement re: Docket No. DS-03-055, PH-03-066.  
24 Id.  
25 Id.  
26 Untitled Letters from Food and Drug Administration to Chairman Harkin and Ranking Member Enzi, December 6, 2012.  
27 FDA Warning Letter to NECC, December 4, 2006; Massachusetts Board of Registration in Pharmacy, Consent Agreement re: Docket No. DS-03-055, PH-03-066; Massachusetts Board of Registration in Pharmacy, Consent Agreement re: Docket No. DS-03-055, PH-03-066.  
29 FDA Inspectional Observations, Form FDA483, issued to Barry Cadden, Owner, New England Compounding Pharmacy, Inc., d/b/a New England Compounding Center, October 26, 2012.  
30 Id.  
31 Ameridose, LLC, Application for a New Store – 50 Fountain Street, 2006.  
32 See Todd Wallack, Ameridose faced previous safety questions, BOSTON GLOBE, October 10, 2012, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/2012/10/11/ameridose-faced-previous-safety-questions/9kI8lp8FOEuOKG5X9mZoM/story.html (accessed May 17, 2013).  In June 2012, prior to the NECC outbreak, Novation announced that it would sever its agreement with Ameridose after the company failed an audit. During that audit, Novation found that Ameridose neglected to separate sterile products from non-sterile objects and lacked sufficient quality controls, though the agreement was not officially severed at the time of the NECC-triggered outbreak.  
33 Untitled Letters from Food and Drug Administration to Chairman Harkin and Ranking Member Enzi, December 6, 2012; FDA Consumer Complaint/Injury Report, Re: Complaint #115569, July 13, 2010.  
34 FDA Inspectional Observations, Form FDA483, issued to Gary Conigliaro, General Manager, Ameridose, LLC, August 6, 2008.  
35 FDA Internal Memorandum, Re: Warning Letter Recommendation, October 6, 2008; FDA Establishment Inspection Report, Ameridose, LLC, August 22, 2008; FDA Inspectional Observations, Form FDA483, issued to Gary Conigliaro, General Manager, Ameridose, LLC, August 6, 2008.  
36 FDA Internal Email, Re: Ameridose spl 366491, September 10, 2008.  
37 Id.  
38 FDA Internal Memorandum, Re: Warning Letter Recommendation, October 6, 2008.  
39 FDA Internal Email, Re: Ameridose LLC, Framingham, MA (FEI 2005881167), December 8, 2009 (“What has happened is CDER approved the WL. Its [sic] been in OCC for over a year. Its [sic] stuck there.”).  
40 FDA Internal Email, Re: CMS Quality Control Check, September 1, 2009 (“Ameridose’s Warning Letter (Case ID 40318) was put on hold due to conflicting court rulings related to Pharmacy Compounding. We are currently not proceeding with issuance of this warning letter because it has now been 1 [sic] year since the district’s inspection of the firm. We may in the future conduct an inspection of this firm, but for now this case is closed.”). See also FDA Internal Email, Re: Compounding Pharmacy, September 2, 2009 (“...NWE-DO spent a lot of time developing this case last year and having it ‘closed’ for nebulous reasons is troubling. If you look this up in CMS CDER actually concurred with our rec [sic] back in Feb. [sic]. So, I’m not sure what happened. This is quite frustrating since I thought we had a good WL. I’ve told our IB [sic] not to bother inspecting compounding pharmacies if we aren’t going to act on the violations.”).
42 FDA Internal Memorandum, Re: Memorandum of Telecon, Between [Redacted] at Ameridose and Karen Archdeacon, CO, NWE-DO, re: GMP Allegations at Ameridose, Westboro, MA, July 16, 2010 (“He indicated that personnel from their sales force were assisting in labeling operations in a clean room. He indicated that they had not been trained to perform such an operation. … He indicated that their firm was behind in orders and that this is why they needed additional personnel to assist in the manufacturing.”; “On 8/5/10, he was aware that one of the 3 clean rooms had a positive result for mold growth. … He indicated that the room was used that day and that the managers performed a cleaning of the room in the event. He indicated that this cleaning was not documented.”; “He also indicated that when they take environmental samples, they clean the area first before taking the sample.”).
43 FDA Inspectional Observations, Form FDA483, issued to Gary Conigliaro, Vice President and General Manager, Ameridose, LLC, November 9, 2012.
44 Id.
46 FDA Internal Memorandum, Re: Rationale for 503A Policy and Regulatory Strategy, October 4, 2011.
47 Recent Regulatory Actions, supra 10.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 FDA Internal Memorandum, Re: Rationale for 503A Policy and Regulatory Strategy, October 4, 2011.
66 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
75 FDA Internal Document, Appendix I: Compounding Adverse Events from 2001 to 2011.
76 Id.
77 Recent Regulatory Actions, supra 10.
80 Id.
81 Recent Regulatory Actions, supra 10.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
89 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
94 Id.
96 Recent Regulatory Actions, supra 10.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 See generally Bruce and Joan Buckley, Is Compounding Denial Coma Over, PHARMACY PRACTICE NEWS, February 2013, available at

Compounding pharmacy that recalled drugs had customers in states where it’s not licensed - Health & wel...

The Boston Globe  Health & wellness

Compounder sold drugs illegally in seven states

By Chelsea Conahoy  |  GLOBE STAFF  |  MARCH 30, 2013

A Woburn compounding pharmacy that recalled two dozen drugs this week has said it distributed directly to patients and doctors in up to 21 states, but a Globe review found the company lacked the required license to operate as a pharmacy in at least a third of those states.

The California pharmacy board on Wednesday ordered Pallimed Solutions Inc. to stop shipping prescription drugs into that state because it had no license. Texas will consider taking similar action, the pharmacy board director said. State officials in Illinois, Maine, Wisconsin, Vermont, and Virginia — all listed on the distribution list in Pallimed’s recall notice — said the company was not properly licensed to operate within their borders.

The possibility that the pharmacy was operating in states where it is not licensed points to continued gaps in the oversight of compounding pharmacies exposed last year when tainted steroids produced at New England Compounding Center caused a national crisis.

The Framingham pharmacy’s drugs sickened hundreds of people and have been linked to 51 deaths. Regulators have said New England Compounding was acting more like a drug manufacturer, shipping products in bulk to providers nationwide though it didn’t have a federal license.

While manufacturers are overseen by the Food and Drug Administration, it is the responsibility of compounding pharmacies to secure proper licenses for the states in which they do business.

“It’s easy to see how, given the regulatory structure, these companies can go undetected,” particularly if they are shipping drugs directly to patients’ homes, said Dr. Michael Carome, deputy director of the Health Research Group at Public Citizen, a consumer advocacy group.
Compounding pharmacy that recalled drugs had customers in states where it’s not licensed - Health & wel...

Compounders are supposed to custom make drugs for individual patients who need doses of preparations that aren’t available off the shelf. Some compounders, including Pallimed and New England Compounding, specialized in mixing sterile products, which can include injections, intravenous solutions, and eye drops.

Pallimed announced on Tuesday that it is working with the FDA to recall all sterile compounded products it has dispensed since Jan. 1, after inspectors found still-unidentified contaminants in five vials of drugs at the company’s Woburn pharmacy.

Many of the recalled products are injections used to treat erectile dysfunction or other conditions. No patient injuries or illnesses have been reported as a result of the recall. Pallimed has said it will continue to make products that don’t require a sterile compounding process.

The company would not comment this week on how many patients might have received recalled items, where exactly it shipped its drugs, or where the pharmacy is licensed.

When asked about licensing status, Pallimed spokesman Scott Farmelant said by e-mail that “patients with out-of-state billing addresses often fill their prescriptions at Pallimed’s Massachusetts facility.” He declined to explain, citing the ongoing investigation. For the same reason, state and federal regulators would not comment specifically on the issue.

It is unclear at what scale Pallimed, which has a small staff and is located in the back of an office building in West Cummings Park, was operating. The state has said it is looking into whether the company has stayed within the scope of its Massachusetts license.

Carmen Catizone, executive director of the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy, said the system of making pharmacies responsible for securing their state licenses seemed to work until the fungal meningitis outbreak linked to New England Compounding.

“It wasn’t troubling before, but it is troubling now,” he said. “The whole game has changed.”

His organization is working to build a database of pharmacy profiles, including disciplinary records, as a free resource for regulators researching a company’s history in other states. The group has offered to contract with states to inspect out-of-state pharmacies that sell drugs within their borders.

According to a Globe review of records and interviews with state regulators, Pallimed has active licenses in eight states, including Massachusetts. In two states on Pallimed’s distribution list, Georgia and Pennsylvania, representatives said licenses are not required for out-of-state pharmacies. Pallimed did not show up in licensing databases for several other states listed in the company recall, but state officials could not be reached for confirmation.

http://bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/health-wellness/2013/03/29/compounding-pharmacy-that-recalled-drugs-ha...
Compounding pharmacy that recalled drugs had customers in states where it’s not licensed - Health & wel...

New York regulators did not renew Pallimed’s pharmacy license in December, after the Massachusetts pharmacy board ordered Pallimed to stop making a generic form of Viagra because it was using veterinary components to fill human prescriptions. The company also was cited last year for making a too-potent batch of a painkiller that caused two people to be hospitalized.

Some officials said the licensing board in a compounding pharmacy’s home state should compare the facility’s product logs with its licenses to be sure it is complying with basic regulatory standards.

“Any legitimate pharmacy is going to make sure they have all the proper licenses and registrations that they need,” said Ronald Klein, a pharmacist and former inspector who is executive officer of Vermont’s pharmacy board.

Massachusetts wasn’t making routine pharmacy inspections prior to the New England Compounding case. Governor Deval Patrick’s administration has recently expanded oversight efforts, ordering surprise inspections of sterile compounding pharmacies and planning to hire more staff.

Proposals before state and federal lawmakers could further tighten regulation of the pharmacies. A federal proposal would require compounders that are acting as manufacturers to register with the FDA.

Massachusetts is one of just three states that do not require pharmacies located out of state to be licensed in Massachusetts in order to serve patients here. That means if Pallimed were based in another state, for example, it could distribute drugs here without a Massachusetts license. A bill scheduled for a legislative hearing Tuesday would change that.

Kay Lazar of the Globe staff contributed to this report. Chelsea Conaboy can be reached at econaboy@boston.com. Follow her on Twitter @econaboy.
Report: Compounding Pharmacies Go Untracked (Washn)

April 14, 2013, 8:21 p.m. PDT
The Washington Post News Service

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WASHINGTON — State authorities who are supposed to oversee the type of specialized pharmacy at the heart of last fall’s deadly meningitis outbreak lack the most basic information about the companies they are supposed to regulate, according to a congressional report to be released Monday.

State boards of pharmacy generally don’t know which pharmacies in their state engage in compounding, the custom mixing of medications for individual patients. Nor do they know how much medication they make, how much of it is sterile and whether any products are sold across state lines. Only two states, Mississippi and Missouri, routinely track the number of compounding pharmacies in their states.

The report, by Rep. Edward Markey, D-Mass., follows up on a state-by-state examination last fall into safety issues raised when thousands of vials of steroid shots were sent to doctors’ offices and clinics in 23 states by the New England Compounding Center (NECC), based in Framingham, Mass. Some of the vials were contaminated, and the outbreak killed 53 people and sickened 680 others.

The report’s findings include state-by-state information on inspections, record-keeping and other aspects of compounding oversight. The information further demonstrates that states do not have the ability to effectively inspect, track or police activities within states or across state lines, Markey said.

"In states from coast to coast, compounding pharmacies are going untracked, unregulated and under-inspected, exposing patients everywhere to tainted drugs, disease and death," he said in a statement.

Markey and many other Democrats in Congress support legislation to give the Food and Drug Administration more authority over compounding. That topic is likely to be a focus Tuesday during a scheduled hearing of a House Energy and Commerce subcommittee.

Republicans are expected to question FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg about why the agency didn’t take more forceful action against the NECC before the outbreak. Democrats on the panel want executives of the International Academy of Compounding Pharmacists, a major industry group, to testify about their two decades of lobbying Congress to limit FDA authority over compounders.

Last week, FDA officials released initial results of a targeted inspection of 30 compounding pharmacies that mix sterile drugs, considered the most high risk because any breakdown in the process can result in contamination. Federal inspectors found dozens of potentially dangerous safety problems, including unidentified black particles in vials of sterile solution, rust and mold in "clean rooms," and workers wearing torn gloves.

Hospitals, clinics and doctors’ offices rely on a wide array of medications made by compounding pharmacies, including antibiotics, painkillers, and labor and delivery drugs, as well as medication for pets.

Sometimes compounders start with raw materials. Sometimes they repackage finished drugs into different forms and concentrations.
But unlike drugs made by pharmaceutical companies, compounded drugs are not FDA-approved. Compounders do not have to meet the same standards as drug companies, even though some have grown so large that they resemble manufacturing-style operations, producing tens of thousands of doses and shipping them across state lines, often without individual prescriptions.

The FDA rarely inspects the facilities, unless the agency is responding to a complaint or a request from state authorities. State pharmacy boards are the primary regulators, but their oversight and expertise is uneven.

About a dozen states were considering legislation that would require stricter licensing requirements for compounders. Maryland and Virginia have passed bills requiring greater scrutiny of compounders who make sterile drugs.

The Markey report is based on information collected from states last month.

Among the other findings:

The majority of states allow any pharmacy to compound without a specific compounding license or permit. Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia were unable to provide an exact number of pharmacies that are authorized to compound. Only Missouri and Mississippi require a license for basic drug compounding.

Three other states — Arkansas, Maine and Oregon — ask that pharmacies indicate on their initial license application whether they plan to engage in compounding activities.

None of the states said they track the volume of medications made by compounders or whether pharmacies sell compounded drugs across state lines.

Thirty-seven state boards of pharmacy do not systematically track which pharmacies make sterile products. Among the 13 states that do track are California, Massachusetts and New Jersey.

When issues arise with pharmacies located in other states, state boards do not consistently inform each other or the FDA.

As a result, a state may discover a serious problem with the drugs produced by a pharmacy located in another state, take action to stop that pharmacy from shipping drugs into its state, but never notify the home state or any other state about the safety problem.

To address this lack of information, the Iowa pharmacy board is inspecting more than 600 out-of-state pharmacies that ship medications into Iowa, including compounders. The inspections have led to charges against five compounding pharmacies. The board is accusing the companies of failing to comply with regulations that require compounders to have prescriptions for specific patients, among other violations.

Carmen Catizone, executive director of the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy (NABP), which represents the state regulators and is helping Iowa with its inspections, said the report will help efforts underway to strengthen state oversight.

"Most of what they found we're already pushing the states to do," he said. "But we welcome any time we can get some help from Congress to identify these issues."

The NABP is putting together an electronic database accessible to all state pharmacy boards that would share detailed information about every pharmacy, including the states where it is licensed, its products, and any disciplinary action by any state, he said. He hopes to have it ready for the states by the end of the month and accessible to the public by the end of the summer.

Aaron Davis and Magda Jean-Louis contributed to this report.

bc-pharmacies

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FDA inspectors find unsanitary conditions at 30 compounding pharmacies across the US

WASHINGTON — The Food and Drug Administration says it has uncovered potential safety problems at 30 specialty pharmacies that were inspected in the wake of a recent outbreak of meningitis caused by contaminated drugs.

The agency said its inspectors targeted 31 compounding pharmacies that produce sterile drugs, which must be prepared under highly sanitary conditions. The FDA said Thursday it issued inspection reports to all but one of the pharmacies citing unsanitary conditions and quality control problems, including: rust and mold in supposedly sterile rooms, inadequate ventilation, and employees wearing non-sterile lab coats.

The agency generally issues such reports before taking formal action against companies. Inspectors visited pharmacies in 18 states, including Florida, Arizona, Colorado, Tennessee and New Jersey.
The wave of inspections comes in response to a deadly fungal meningitis outbreak linked to contaminated steroids from the New England Compounding Center, a Massachusetts pharmacy. The company's injections, mainly used to treat back pain, have been linked to 53 deaths and 733 illnesses since last summer.

Compounding pharmacies are supposed to mix customized prescriptions based on individual doctors' instructions. However, some pharmacies like the New England Compounding Center have grown into larger businesses, supplying bulk quantities of injectable drugs to hospitals across the country.

The FDA has stepped up its oversight of the pharmacies since the outbreak was identified in September, but agency officials say they have been slowed by the complex overlap of various state and federal laws that govern the industry. Pharmacies are licensed and overseen by state pharmacy boards, though the FDA sometimes intervenes when major safety issues arise.

In a blog post to the FDA's website Thursday, FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg noted that four pharmacies initially refused to admit the agency's inspectors. In two cases the agency had to return with search warrants and U.S. marshals to complete the inspections.

"These challenges and others highlight the need for clearer authorities for FDA to efficiently protect public health," Hamburg stated.

Hamburg has asked Congress to pass new laws giving the FDA explicit oversight over large compounding pharmacies. Under the proposal, large compounders would have to register with the FDA and undergo regular inspections, similar to pharmaceutical manufacturers.

But the FDA proposal has faced pushback from some members of Congress, particularly House Republicans, who have been investigating whether the FDA could have prevented the meningitis outbreak using its existing powers.

The House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee for Oversight and Investigations will hold its second hearing on the issue next Tuesday. Hamburg is scheduled to testify, according to committee staffers.
FDA inspectors find unsanitary conditions at 30 compounding pharmacies across the US -...
House Republicans fault FDA on meningitis outbreak

By Kimberly Kindy,

After reviewing 27,000 pages of documents from the Food and Drug Administration, Republicans and Democrats came to different conclusions about the agency's ability to prevent one of the worst public health crises in American history.

Republican members of the House Energy and Commerce Committee said Tuesday that its six-month investigation into the FDA's role in last fall's meningitis outbreak shows the agency knew for a decade about serious safety lapses at the specialized pharmacy that made the tainted drugs but failed to act.

Democrats said they believe the documents paint a different picture, one of an agency that made some efforts to rein in the Massachusetts-based New England Compounding Center (NECC), which made the contaminated steroids tied to the outbreak that has so far killed 53 people. However, they were thwarted by the Bush administration and by ambiguous federal laws and conflicting court rulings that do not give the FDA clear authority over compounders.

The documents show that, dating back at least 2002, the FDA had received and largely ignored complaints from doctors, nurses and whistleblowers about safety problems at the NECC, according to the majority report from the Republicans. The complaints prompted two inspections, but, even as new complaints rolled in and after the agency issued a warning letter in 2006, the FDA did not return to the facility until after the outbreak.

"We know now that 53 Americans did not need to die," said the committee chairman, Rep. Fred Upton (R-Mich.). "It sickens me that this could have been avoided."

FDA commissioner Margaret A. Hamburg, the only person scheduled to testify at the hearing, was sharply criticized about the agency's efforts with the NECC.

Members repeatedly asked why the agency has been able to conduct stepped-up inspections in recent months if they lack authority to do so. Earlier this month, the FDA released initial results of a targeted inspection of 30 compounding pharmacies, showing many of the firms had potentially dangerous safety violations.

"I wish we had been more aggressive," Hamburg told the committee.

"I bet the families who have lost loved ones wish you had acted as well," said Rep. Renee L. Ellmers (R-N.C.).

Hamburg told members that although the FDA is being more aggressive now, compounders are challenging their authority. In two recent instances, compounding pharmacies refused to give FDA inspectors access to the facility or records, so the agency had to secure warrants.

Hamburg asked for legislation that would require large, manufacturing-style compounding pharmacies to register with the agency and provide detailed information about the products they make. She said federal law must also make it clear that they have the right to conduct inspections, view pharmacy documents and order changes when they identify safety lapses.

The documents show that much of the delay was the result of internal agency debate about whether and how to proceed, in anticipation of having to defend an enforcement action.

"We are picking at gnats and straining at flies. We should be trying to figure out what are the problems," said Rep. John D. Dingell (D-Mich.). "We are dealing here with an agency that doesn't have the authority to do the things they need to do."

The committee's majority report from Republicans also criticized the agency for failing to take action against the NECC's sister company, Ameridose, which was inspected by the agency in 2007 and 2008 and had to recall a painkiller in 2008 because it was too strong.

The majority report also faulted the FDA for failing to share information it had on the NECC and Ameridose with state regulators.

Democrats released their own report that cited internal e-mails and other documents to back their claims that the Bush administration stymied the FDA's efforts to send warning letters to the NECC and that this was partially to blame for the agency's inaction.

One August 2006 e-mail, written by a director in the FDA's complaint division to appointees in the agency's legal office, said: "I'm very frustrated that we still don't have a decision from your office about these warning letters.... For these letters to still be pending at this late date, especially given these extraordinary and unusual measures, is troubling."

Lena H. Sun contributed to this report.

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House Republicans fault FDA on meningitis outbreak - The Washington Post
June 4, 2013

To: Members, Enforcement and Compounding Subcommittee

Subject: Agenda Item II (c) – Proposed Federal Legislation on Compounding – U.S. Senate S. 959

On May 22, 2013, the United States Senate Committee on Health Education Labor & Pensions passed S. 959, the *Pharmaceutical Compounding Quality and Accountability Act*. Text from the committee’s press release is below. A copy of S. 959 is attached.

**Harkin Statement on HELP Committee Passage of the Pharmaceutical Compounding Quality and Accountability Act and the Drug Supply Chain Security Act**

*Wednesday, May 22, 2013*

WASHINGTON—Today, Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA), Chairman of the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) Committee, issued the following statement on the Committee’s passage of S. 959, the *Pharmaceutical Compounding Quality and Accountability Act*, and S. 957, the *Drug Supply Chain Security Act*.

“I am pleased that the HELP Committee has come together in a bipartisan effort to protect the public health from tainted and adulterated prescription drugs. These bills will enable Americans to be confident that the bottles in their medicine cabinet contain exactly what the doctor ordered.

“The *Pharmaceutical Compounding Quality and Accountability Act* will clarify oversight of pharmaceutical compounding, leaving traditional pharmacies under the supervision of states, while enabling the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to regulate compounding manufacturers, companies that make compounded sterile drugs without prescriptions, and ship them across state lines. This change will grant FDA the authority it needs to help protect Americans against future tragedies, like the meningitis outbreak—caused by tainted compound steroid injections—that claimed more than fifty lives in 2012.

“The *Drug Supply Chain Security Act* will strengthen the FDA’s ability to track prescription drugs after they leave manufacturers, ensuring that they are accounted for at every step. That way, doctors, patients, and regulators can be sure that their medicines are safe.”

“I plan to work with Senate leadership to bring this bipartisan legislation to the floor for a vote in a timely manner.”

# # #
AMENDMENT NO. _______ Calendar No. _______

Purpose: In the nature of a substitute.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—113th Cong., 1st Sess.

S. 959

A bill to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act with respect to compounding drugs.

Referred to the Committee on _______________ and ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE intended to be proposed by ____________

Viz:

1 Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; REFERENCES IN ACT.

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the “Pharmaceutical Compounding Quality and Accountability Act”.

7 (b) REFERENCES IN ACT.—Except as otherwise specified, amendments made by this Act to a section or other provision of law are amendments to such section or other provision of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act

11 (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.).
SEC. 2. REGULATION OF HUMAN DRUG COMPOUNDING.

(a) CLARIFICATION OF NEW DRUG STATUS.—For purposes of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.), the term "new drug" (as defined in section 201(p) of such Act) shall include a compounded human drug.

(b) REGULATION OF HUMAN DRUG COMPOUNDING.—Section 503A (21 U.S.C. 353a) is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 503A. HUMAN DRUG COMPOUNDING.

(a) SCOPE.—

"(1) COMPOUNDING.—In this section, the terms 'compounding' and 'compound'—

"(A) include—

"(i) the combining, admixing, mixing, diluting, reconstituting, or otherwise altering of a marketed drug;

"(ii) compounding a drug from a bulk drug substance; and

"(iii) repackaging; and

"(B) exclude mixing, reconstituting, or other such acts with respect to a marketed drug that are limited to and performed in accordance with specific directions for such acts contained in approved labeling provided by a drug's manufacturer, when performed based upon a pre-
scription order for an identified individual patient.

"(2) Administration not a sale.—In this section, the terms 'sell' or 'resale' do not include circumstances in which a licensed practitioner administers a drug to a patient or provides a drug to a patient who has been instructed to self-administer the drug, including any fee associated with such administration or provision of the drug.

"(3) Inapplicability to certain drugs.—

"(A) In general.—For purposes of this section, the activities described in paragraph (1) shall not be considered 'compounding' if such activities are conducted in whole or in part with respect to a drug described in subparagraph (B).

"(B) Excluded drugs.—The drugs described in this subparagraph are the following:

"(i) Blood and blood components for transfusion.

"(ii) Medical gases, as defined in section 575(2).

"(4) Animal drugs for human use.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit the
use of animal drugs in compounding a drug for
human use.

“(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

“(1) COMPOUNDING MANUFACTURER.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—The term
‘compounding manufacturer’ means a facility at
one geographic location or address—

“(i) that compounds any sterile drug
without receiving a prescription order for
an identified individual patient for such
sterile drug prior to beginning
compounding, and distributes or offers to
sell such compounded sterile drug in inter-
state commerce; or

“(ii) that repackages any preservative-
free sterile drug or pools any sterile drugs,
except as provided in paragraph (9)(B).

“(B) EXCLUDED ACTIVITIES.—Notwith-
standing subparagraph (A)(ii), a facility shall
not be considered a compounding manufacturer
if such facility—

“(i) repackages drugs in accordance
with section 506F or the final guidance de-
scribed in section 506F(d) once the final
guidance is published; and
“(ii) does not otherwise meet the definition of compounding manufacturer under subparagraph (A).

“(2) COMPOUNGING NUCLEAR PHARMACY.—
The term ‘compounding nuclear pharmacy’ means an entity that—

“(A) is a State-licensed pharmacy or a Federal facility;

“(B) holds a license currently in effect from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or from a State pursuant to an agreement with such commission under section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; and

“(C) does not compound other drugs that would cause the entity to be a compounding manufacturer described in paragraph (1)(A).

“(3) COPY.—The term ‘copy’ means an identical or nearly identical version of a drug.

“(4) POOLING; POOLS.—The terms ‘pooling’ and ‘pool’—

“(A) mean taking a single drug approved under section 505 (other than a biological product) from the container in which it is distributed by the original manufacturer and combining it with the same drug from one or more
other containers without or before further manipulating the product (such as by diluting it or mixing it with another, different drug or drugs);

"(B) do not include combining the drug from two or more separate containers of the same drug when a single container of the drug is not sufficient to prepare a dose for administration to an individual patient; and

"(C) do not include combining a single drug from two or more separate containers of component products of a parenteral nutrition product, if such pooling, and labeling and use of the finished parenteral nutrition product, comply with State pharmacy law.

"(5) PRACTITIONER.—The term ‘practitioner’ includes a physician or any other person that is authorized to prescribe medication under State law.

"(6) RADIOACTIVE DRUG.—The term ‘radioactive drug’—

"(A) means any substance defined as a drug in section 201(g)(1) that exhibits spontaneous disintegration of unstable nuclei with the emission of nuclear particles or photons and includes any nonradioactive reagent kit or nuclide
regenerator which is intended to be used in the
preparation of any such substance but does not
include drugs such as carbon-containing com-
pounds or potassium-containing salts which
contain trace quantities of naturally occurring
radionuclides; and

"(B) includes a 'radioactive biological
product,' which means a biological product
which is labeled with a radionuclide or intended
solely to be labeled with a radionuclide.

"(7) REPACKAGING.—The term
'repackage' or 'repackaging'—

"(A) means taking a drug approved under
section 505 or licensed under section 351 of the
Public Health Service Act from the container in
which it is distributed by the original manufac-
turer and placing it in a different container of
the same or smaller size without further manip-
ulating the drug (such as by diluting it or mix-
ing it with another, different drug or drugs);
and

"(B) does not include removing the drug
from its original container for immediate ad-
ministration to a patient, such as withdrawing
a drug into a syringe for immediate injection or
filling a cassette for immediate use within a
drug delivery device.

"(8) STERILE DRUG.—The term ‘sterile drug’
means a drug that is—

"(A) intended for parenteral administra-
tion;

"(B) an ophthalmic or inhalation drug; or

"(C) required to be sterile under Federal
or State law.

"(9) TRADITIONAL COMPOUNDER.—

"(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘traditional
compounder’ means a facility operating pursu-
ant to State law—

"(i) wherein a drug is compounded
by—

"(I) a licensed pharmacist, in a
State-licensed pharmacy or a licensed
Federal facility; or

"(II) a licensed physician;

"(ii) that—

"(I) compounds a drug upon re-
cipient of a prescription order for an
identified individual patient; or

"(II) compounds a drug in lim-
ited quantities before receipt of a pre-
scription order for an identified individual patient, if such compounding is based on a history of the licensed pharmacist or licensed physician receiving prescription orders for the compounding of the drug, which orders have been generated solely within an established relationship between the licensed pharmacist or licensed physician and—

"(aa) such individual patient for whom the prescription order will be provided; or

"(bb) the licensed physician or other licensed practitioner who will write such prescription order; and

"(iii) that does not meet the definition of a compounding manufacturer under paragraph (1).

"(B) EXCEPTIONS.—

"(i) HOSPITALS AND HEALTH SYSTEMS.—A pharmacy within a hospital or health system shall be considered a traditional compounder if such pharmacy other-
wise meets the definition under subpara-
graph (A) and if, with respect to a drug
compounded by such pharmacy, the only
activity conducted by the pharmacy is to
dispense or administer such drug (which
may include interstate shipment) solely to
a patient of such hospital or health system.

“(ii) HEALTH SYSTEM DEFINED.—
For purposes of this subparagraph, the
term ‘health system’ means one or more
hospitals that are owned and operated by
the same entity and that share access to
databases with drug order information for
patients. A health system includes the in-
patient, outpatient, and ambulatory facili-
ties wholly owned by the health system.

“(c) EXEMPTIONS FROM CERTAIN REQUIRE-
MENTS.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as otherwise pro-
vided in paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), a compounded
drug shall be subject to all the requirements of this
Act applicable to new drugs.

“(2) DRUGS COMPOUNDED BY TRADITIONAL
COMPOUNDERS.—Sections 501(a)(2)(B), 502(f)(1),
and 505 of this Act and section 351 of the Public
Health Service Act shall not apply to a compounded drug if such drug—

“(A) is compounded by a traditional compounder that is in compliance with this section; and

“(B) meets the requirements of this section applicable to drugs compounded by traditional compounders.

“(3) DRUGS COMPOUNDED BY COMPOUNDING MANUFACTURERS.—Sections 502(f)(1) and 505 of this Act and section 351 of the Public Health Service Act shall not apply to a compounded prescription drug, if such prescription drug—

“(A) is compounded by a compounding manufacturer—

“(i) that is not licensed as a pharmacy in any State; and

“(ii) that is in compliance with this section; and

“(B) meets the requirements of this section applicable to drugs compounded by compounding manufacturers.

“(4) DRUGS COMPOUNDED BY COMPOUNDING NUCLEAR PHARMACIES.—Sections 501(a)(2)(B), 502(f)(1), and 505 of this Act and section 351 of
the Public Health Service Act shall not apply to a compounded radioactive drug if such drug is com- pounded—

"(A) by a licensed pharmacist in a compounding nuclear pharmacy;

"(B) solely using a radioactive drug approved under section 505 or licensed under section 351 of the Public Health Service Act, and one or more ingredients in compliance with subsection (e)(1)(B); and

"(C) in compliance with the United States Pharmacopoeia chapters on pharmacy compounding.

"(d) DRUGS THAT MAY NOT BE COMPOUNDED.—

"(1) IN GENERAL.—The following drugs may not be compounded:

"(A) DRUGS THAT ARE DEMONSTRABLY DIFFICULT TO COMPOUND.—A drug or category of drugs that presents demonstrable difficulties for compounding, which may include a complex dosage form or biological product, as designated by the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (2).

"(B) MARKETED DRUGS.—A drug (other than a biological product) that is a copy of a marketed drug approved under 505 or a vari-
(C) BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS.—A drug that is a biological product, except as provided in paragraph (4).

(D) DRUGS SUBJECT TO RISK EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGY.—A copy or variation of a drug approved under section 505 or licensed under section 351 of the Public Health Service Act that is the subject of a risk evaluation and mitigation strategy approved with elements to assure safe use pursuant to section 505-1, except provided in paragraph (5).

(E) DRUGS REMOVED FOR SAFETY AND EFFICACY.—A drug that appears on a list published by the Secretary in the Federal Register of drugs that have been withdrawn or removed from the market because such drug or components of such drug have been found to be unsafe or not effective.

(2) DRUGS THAT ARE DEMONSTRABLY DIFFICULT TO COMPOUND.—
"(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary may promulgate a regulation that designates drugs or categories of drugs that are demonstrably difficult to compound that may not be compounded, or that may be compounded only under conditions specified by the Secretary. Such regulation may include the designation of drugs or categories of drugs that are complex dosage forms or biological products, such as extended release products, metered dose inhalers, transdermal patches, and sterile liposomal products.

"(B) INTERIM LIST.—

"(i) IN GENERAL.—Before the effective date of the regulation promulgated under subparagraph (A), the Secretary may designate drugs or categories of drugs that present demonstrable difficulties for compounding, which may include complex dosage forms or biological products that cannot be compounded, except under conditions specified by the Secretary, by—

"(I) publishing a notice of such drugs or categories of drugs proposed for designation, including the ration-
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ale for such designation, in the Federal Register;

“(II) providing a period of not less than 60 days for comment on the notice; and

“(III) publishing a notice in the Federal Register designating such drugs or categories of drugs that cannot be compounded, including the rationale for such designation.

“(ii) SUNSET.—Any notice provided under clause (i) shall cease to have force or effect on the date that is 5 years after the date of enactment of the Pharmaceutical Compounding Quality and Accountability Act or on the effective date of the final regulation under subparagraph (A), whichever is earlier:

“(C) CONSULTATION WITH STAKEHOLDERS.—Prior to establishing the lists described in this paragraph, the Secretary shall consult with relevant stakeholders including pharmacists, professional associations, patient advocacy groups, manufacturers and physicians
about the need for the compounded drugs to be included or excluded from the lists.

"(D) UPDATES TO DIFFICULT TO COMPOUND LIST.—Five years after the effective date of the regulation described in subparagraph (A), and every 5 years thereafter, the Secretary shall publish a Federal Register notice seeking public input about the need for the compounded drugs to be included or excluded from the list described in subparagraph (A). Nothing in the previous sentence prohibits notifications or submissions before or during any 5-year period described under such sentence regarding the need for the compounded drugs to be included or excluded from the list.

"(3) EXCEPTIONS REGARDING MARKETED DRUGS.—

"(A) IN GENERAL.—A drug (other than a biological product) that is a copy of a marketed drug approved under 505, including variations of such drug compounded from bulk drug substances, may be compounded only if—

"(i) the compounded variation produces for the patient a clinical difference between the compounded drug and such
marketed drug, as determined by the pre-
scribing practitioner, and, prior to begin-
ning compounding such variation, the tra-
ditional compounder compounding the vari-
ation receives a prescription order for an
identified individual patient specifying that
the variation may be compounded; or

“(ii)(I) such marketed drug, at the
time of compounding a copy of such drug
and at the time of distribution of the com-
pounded drug, is on the drug shortage list
under section 506E, or in the Secretary’s
sole discretion, has otherwise been identi-
ified by the Secretary as in shortage such
as in a specific region or on a drug short-
age list maintained by a private party;

“(II) the facility compounding the
drug notifies the Secretary not later than
3 calendar days after beginning the
compounding; and

“(III) in the case of a compounding
manufacturer, the compounding manufac-
turer has registered under subsection
(g)(2) as an entity that intends to com-
pound pursuant to this paragraph and no-
tifies the Secretary at least 14 days prior
to beginning the compounding.

"(B) NOTICE WAIVER.—The Secretary
may waive a notice required under subpara-
graph (A)(ii)(II).

"(C) EXCLUSION.—For purposes of this
paragraph, repackaging a marketed drug ap-
proved under section 505 does not make the re-
packaged drug a copy of such marketed drug,
unless the repackaged drug is also a marketed
drug approved under section 505.

"(4) EXCEPTIONS REGARDING BIOLOGICAL
PRODUCTS.—

"(A) IN GENERAL.—A drug that is a vari-
ation of a licensed biological product may be
compounded only if—

"(i)(I) such compounded variation is
compounded solely using a licensed biologi-
cal product, or solely using a licensed bio-
logical product and one or more ingredi-
ents in compliance with subsection
(e)(1)(B); or

"(II) in the case of a licensed aller-
genic product, such variation is com-
pounded solely using one or more licensed
allergenic products, or solely using one or
more licensed allergenic products and one
or more ingredients in compliance with
subsection (e)(1)(B);

"(ii) such compounded variation pro-
duces for the patient a clinical difference
between such compounded variation and
the licensed biological product, as deter-
mined by—

"(I) the prescribing practitioner
(in the case of a variation com-
pounded by a traditional
compounder); or

"(II) a licensed practitioner re-
sponsible for the patient’s care in a
health care entity that provides med-
ical services through licensed practi-
tioners directly to patients (in the
case of a variation compounded by a
compounding manufacturer);

"(iii) prior to beginning
compounding—

"(I) except as provided in sub-
paragraph (B), the traditional
compounder receives a prescription
order for an identified individual patient specifying that the biological product may be compounded for an identified individual patient; or

"(II) the compounding manufacturer receives a duly authorized medical order from a health care entity that provides medical services through licensed practitioners directly to patients, specifying that the biological product may be compounded for an identified patient or patients; and

"(iv) in the case of a radioactive biological product, the compounded variation is compounded by a compounding nuclear pharmacy in accordance with subsection (b)(2).

"(B) SPECIAL RULE FOR PEDIATRIC USES.—A traditional compounder that is a hospital or health system may begin compounding a drug that is a variation of a licensed biological product prior to receiving a prescription order as required under subparagraph (A)(iii) if—
“(i) such compounded variation is a
diluted or repackaged variation of the li-
censed biological product for emergent use
in pediatric patients; and

“(ii) such compounded variation pro-
duces for the patient a clinical difference
between such compounded variation and
the licensed biological product, as deter-
mined by a licensed practitioner respon-
sible for the patient’s care in the hospital
or health system.

“(C) INAPPLICABILITY.—Clauses (ii) and
(iii) of subparagraph (A) shall not apply to a
compounded allergenic product.

“(5) REQUIREMENT FOR DRUGS THAT HAVE
RISK EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES.—

“(A) IN GENERAL.—A copy or variation of
a drug approved under section 505 or biological
product licensed under section 351 of the Pub-
lic Health Service Act that is the subject of a
risk evaluation and mitigation strategy ap-
proved with elements to assure safe use pursu-
ant to section 505–1, may be compounded only
if—
“(i) the entity compounding the copy or variation receives a prescription order for an identified individual patient specifying that the drug or biological product may be compounded; and

“(ii) the entity compounding the copy or variation demonstrates to the Secretary, prior to beginning compounding, that the entity will utilize controls that are comparable to the controls applicable under the relevant risk evaluation and mitigation strategy for the approved drug or licensed biological product.

“(B) EFFECT.—Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to permit compounding a copy or variation of a drug other than as permitted in paragraphs (3) and (4).

“(e) QUALITY OF DRUG INGREDIENTS.—

“(1) HUMAN DRUGS.—A traditional compounder or a compounding manufacturer shall—

“(A) if compounding a drug from bulk drug substances (as defined in regulations of the Secretary published at section 207.3(a)(4) of title 21, Code of Federal Regulations (or any
successor regulations)), use only bulk sub-
stances—

"(i) that—

"(I) comply with the standards of
an applicable United States Pharma-
copoeia or National Formulary mono-
graph, if a monograph exists and has
not been identified under paragraph
(2);

"(II) if such a monograph does
not exist, are drug substances that
are components of drugs approved by
the Secretary; or

"(III) if such a monograph does
not exist and the drug substance is
not a component of a drug approved
by the Secretary, that appear on a list
developed by the Secretary through
regulations issued by the Secretary;

"(ii) that are manufactured by an es-
establishment that is registered under sec-
tion 510 (including a foreign establishment
that is registered under section 510(i));

and
(iii) that are accompanied by valid certificates of analysis for each specific lot of bulk drug substance;

(B) use ingredients (other than bulk drug substances) that comply with the standards of an applicable United States Pharmacopeia or National Formulary monograph, if a monograph exists and has not been identified under paragraph (2); and

(C) in the case of a traditional compounder, comply with the standards of the United States Pharmacopoeia chapters on pharmacy compounding.

(2) IDENTIFICATION BY SECRETARY.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding the existence of an applicable monograph under subparagraph (A)(i)(I) or (B) of paragraph (1), the Secretary may identify bulk substances that the Secretary determines, based on public health concerns, may not be used in compounding a drug.

(B) PROCEDURE.—In identifying the bulk substances that may not be used in compounding, the Secretary shall—
“(i) publish a notice of such bulk substances proposed for identification in the Federal Register;
“(ii) provide a period of not less than 60 days for comment on the notice; and
“(iii) publish a notice in the Federal Register identifying the bulk substances that may not be used in compounding a drug.

“(f) REQUIREMENTS REGARDING WHOLESALING AND LABELING APPLICABLE TO TRADITIONAL COMPOUNDERS AND COMPOUNDING MANUFACTURERS.—

A compounded drug—

“(1) may not be sold by an entity other than the compounding manufacturer or traditional compounder that compounded the drug;

“(2) compounded by a compounding manufacturer may not be sold to an entity other than a health care entity that provides medical services through licensed practitioners directly to patients, or a network of such providers, except that a compounding manufacturer may transfer without profit a compounded sterile drug to a licensed pharmacy if—
“(A) the licensed pharmacy falls under the same corporate ownership as the compounding manufacturer;

“(B) the transfer of such compounded sterile drug is solely for the purpose of dispensing the compounded sterile drug to the end user, who has been instructed by the prescribing physician to self-administer such compounded sterile drug;

“(C) as of the date of enactment of the Pharmaceutical Compounding Quality and Accountability Act, the compounding manufacturer is an entity that provides pharmacy benefits management services on behalf of a health benefits plan;

“(D) the compounding manufacturer identifies itself to the Secretary upon registering under subsection (g)(2): as an entity that qualifies for the exception under this paragraph, and provides documentation of the compounding of such drugs as of the date of enactment of the Pharmaceutical Compounding Quality and Accountability Act, in a manner described by the Secretary; and
"(E) the compounding manufacturer receives confirmation from the Secretary that the compounding manufacturer qualifies for the exception under this paragraph and the sterile drug or drugs for which the exemption applies; and

"(3) in the case of a compounded drug offered for sale, shall be labeled 'not for resale'.

"(g) OTHER REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO COMPOUNDING MANUFACTURERS.—

"(1) LICENSED PHARMACIST OVERSIGHT.—A compounding manufacturer shall ensure that a pharmacist licensed in the State where the compounding manufacturer is located exercises direct supervision over the operations of the compounding manufacturer.

"(2) REGISTRATION OF COMPOUNDING MANUFACTURERS AND REPORTING OF DRUGS.—

"(A) REGISTRATION OF COMPOUNDING MANUFACTURERS.—

"(i) ANNUAL REGISTRATION.—During the period beginning on October 1 and ending on December 31 each year, each compounding manufacturer shall register with the Secretary its name, place of busi-
ness, and unique facility identifier (which shall conform to the requirements for the unique facility identifier established under section 510), and a point of contact e-mail address, and shall indicate whether the compounding manufacturer intends to compound drug in shortage pursuant to subsection (d)(3)(A)(ii).

“(ii) NEW COMPOUNDING MANUFACTURERS.—Each compounding manufacturer, upon first engaging in the operations described in subsection (b)(1), shall immediately register with the Secretary and provide the information described under clause (i). The Secretary shall establish a timeline for registration for the first year following the effective date of the Pharmaceutical Compounding: Quality and Accountability Act. In no case may registration be required until at least 60 days following publication of the timeline in the Federal Register.

“(iii) AVAILABILITY OF REGISTRATION FOR INSPECTION.—The Secretary shall make available for inspection, to any per-
son so requesting, any registration filed pursuant to this subparagraph.

"(B) DRUG REPORTING BY COMPOUNDING MANUFACTURERS.—

"(i) IN GENERAL.—Each compounding manufacturer who registers with the Secretary under subparagraph (A) shall submit to the Secretary, once during the month of June of each year and once during the month of December of each year, a report—

"(I) identifying the drugs compounded by such compounding manufacturer during the previous 6-month period; and

"(II) with respect to each drug identified under subclause (I), providing the active ingredient; the source of such active ingredient, the National Drug Code, if available, number of the source drug or bulk active ingredient, the strength of the active ingredient per unit, the dosage form and route of administration, the package description, the number of in-
dividual units produced, the National
Drug Code number of the final prod-
uct, if assigned, and which conforms
to other applicable requirements iden-
tified by the Secretary in accordance
with clause (ii).

"(ii) FORM.—Each report under
clause (i) shall be prepared in such form
and manner as the Secretary may pre-
scribe by regulation or guidance.

"(iii) CONFIDENTIALITY.—Reports
submitted pursuant to this subparagraph
shall be exempt from inspection under sub-
paragraph (A)(iii), unless the Secretary
finds that such an exemption would be in-
consistent with the protection of the public
health.

"(C) ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION AND RE-
PORTING.—Registrations and drug reporting
under this paragraph (including the submission
of updated information) shall be submitted to
the Secretary by electronic means unless the
Secretary grants a request for waiver of such
requirement because use of electronic means is
not reasonable for the person requesting waiver.
"(D) RISK-BASED INSPECTION FREQUENCY.—

"(i) IN GENERAL.—Compounding manufacturers shall be subject to inspection pursuant to section 704.

"(ii) RISK-BASED SCHEDULE.—The Secretary, acting through one or more officers or employees duly designated by the Secretary, shall inspect compounding manufacturers described in clause (i) in accordance with a risk-based schedule established by the Secretary.

"(iii) RISK FACTORS.—In establishing the risk-based schedule under clause (ii), the Secretary shall inspect compounding manufacturers according to the known safety risks of such compounding manufacturers, which shall be based on the following factors:

"(I) The compliance history of the compounding manufacturer.

"(II) The record, history, and nature of recalls linked to the compounding manufacturer.
“(III) The inherent risk of the drug compounded at the compounding manufacturer.

“(IV) The inspection frequency and history of the compounding manufacturer, including whether the compounding manufacturer has been inspected pursuant to section 704 within the last 4 years.

“(V) Whether the compounding manufacturer has registered under subsection (g)(2) as an entity that intends to compound pursuant to subsection (d)(3)(A)(ii).

“(VI) Any other criteria deemed necessary and appropriate by the Secretary for purposes of allocating inspection resources.

“(3) ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING.—

“(A) DEFINITIONS.—In this paragraph:

“(i) ADVERSE EVENT.—The term ‘adverse event’ means any health-related event associated with the use of a compounded drug that is adverse, including—
"(I) an event occurring in the course of the use of the drug in professional practice;

"(II) an event occurring from an overdose of the drug, whether accidental or intentional;

"(III) an event occurring from abuse of the drug;

"(IV) an event occurring from withdrawal of the drug; and

"(V) any failure of expected pharmacological action of the drug.

"(ii) SERIOUS ADVERSE EVENT.—The term ‘serious adverse event’ means an adverse event that—

"(I) results in—

"(aa) death;

"(bb) an adverse drug event that places the patient at immediate risk of death from the adverse drug event as it occurred (not including an adverse drug event that might have caused death had it occurred in a more severe form);
“(cc) inpatient hospitalization or prolongation of existing hospitalization;

“(dd) a persistent or significant incapacity or substantial disruption of the ability to conduct normal life functions; or

“(ee) a congenital anomaly or birth defect; or

“(II) based on appropriate medical judgment, may jeopardize the patient and may require a medical or surgical intervention to prevent an outcome described in subclause (I).

“(B) REPORTS.—

“(i) ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—

“(I) 15-DAY REPORT.—If a compounding manufacturer becomes aware of any serious adverse event, such manufacturer shall submit reports of each instance to the Secretary as soon as practicable, but in no case later than 15 calendar days after the initial receipt of the applica-
ble information. Such manufacturer shall investigate and submit to the Secretary followup reports for each such instance not later than 15 calendar days after receipt of new information or as requested by the Secretary. Unless and until the Secretary establishes the content and format of adverse event reports by guidance or regulation, reports shall be submitted in accordance with the content and format requirements under section 310.305 of title 21, Code of Federal Regulations (or any successor regulations) or section 600.80 of title 21, Code of Federal Regulations (or any successor regulations).

"(II) ANNUAL REPORT.—Compounding manufacturers that report serious adverse events shall submit in December of each year a narrative summary of any analysis of each report submitted under subclause (I), including a history of actions taken during the year because of each
report, using the content, format, and manner established by the Secretary by guidance or regulation. Until such time as the Secretary publishes such guidance or regulation, each compounding manufacturer shall retain such summaries as part of the records to be maintained in accordance with subparagraph (C).

"(ii) PRODUCT QUALITY REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 3 calendar days after the compounding manufacturer becomes aware of information pertaining to sterility, stability, or other product quality concerns that could result in serious adverse events, the compounding manufacturer shall submit to the Secretary a product quality report, in a form and manner established by the Secretary by guidance or regulation.

"(C) MAINTENANCE OF RECORDS.—A compounding manufacturer shall maintain for a period of 10 years records of all serious adverse drug events known to the compound manufacturer in accordance with section 314.80(i) of
title 21, Code of Federal Regulations (or any successor regulation), or as otherwise directed by the Secretary in regulations.

"(4) LABELING OF DRUGS.—

"(A) LABEL.—The label of a drug compounded by a compounding manufacturer shall include—

"(i) the statement ‘This is a compounded drug’ or a reasonable comparable alternative statement (as specified by the Secretary) that prominently identifies the drug as a compounded drug;

"(ii) the name, address, and phone number of the applicable compounding manufacturer; and

"(iii) with respect to the compounded drug—

"(I) the lot or batch number;

"(II) the established name of the medication;

"(III) the dosage form and strength;

"(IV) the statement of quantity or volume, as appropriate;
“(V) the date that the drug was compounded;

“(VI) the expiration date;

“(VII) storage and handling instructions;

“(VIII) the National Drug Code number, if available;

“(IX) the ‘not for resale’ statement as required by subsection (f)(3);

and

“(X) subject to subparagraph (B)(i), a list of active and inactive ingredients, identified by established name and the quantity or proportion of each ingredient.

“(B) Container.—The container from which the individual units of a drug compounded by a compounding manufacturer are removed for dispensing or for administration (such as a plastic bag containing individual product syringes) shall include—

“(i) the information described under subparagraph (A)(iii)(X), if there is not space on the label for such information;
“(ii) the following information to facilitate adverse event reporting:
www.fda.gov/medwatch and 1-800-FDA-1088; and
“(iii) the directions for use, including,
as appropriate, dosage and administration.
“(C) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.—The
label and labeling of a drug compounded by a
compounding manufacturer shall include any
other information as determined necessary and
specified in regulations promulgated by the Sec-
retary.
“(h) COMPOUNDING MANUFACTURER ESTABLISH-
MENT AND REINSPECTION FEES.—
“(1) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection—
“(A) the term ‘affiliate’ has the meaning
given such term in section 735(11);
“(B) the term ‘gross annual sales’ means
the total worldwide gross annual sales, in
United States dollars, for a compounding man-
ufacturer, including the sales of all the affiliates
of the compounding manufacturer; and
“(C) the term ‘reinspection’ means, with
respect to a compounding manufacturer, 1 or
more inspections conducted under section 704
subsequent to an inspection conducted under such provision which identified noncompliance materially related to an applicable requirement of this Act, specifically to determine whether compliance has been achieved to the Secretary’s satisfaction.

“(2) Establishment and reinspection fees.—

“(A) In general.—For fiscal year 2015 and each subsequent fiscal year, the Secretary shall, in accordance with this subsection, assess and collect—

“(i) an annual establishment fee from each compounding manufacturer; and

“(ii) a reinspection fee from each compounding manufacturer subject to a reinspection in such fiscal year.

“(B) Multiple reinspections.—A compounding manufacturer subject to multiple reinspections in a fiscal year shall be subject to a reinspection fee for each reinspection.

“(3) Establishment and reinspection fee setting.—The Secretary shall establish the establishment and reinspection fee to be collected under this subsection for each fiscal year, based on the
methodology described in paragraph (4) and shall publish such fee in a Federal Register notice not later than 60 days before the start of each such year.

"(4) AMOUNT OF ESTABLISHMENT FEE AND REINSPECTION FEE.—

"(A) IN GENERAL.—For each compounding manufacturer in a fiscal year—

"(i) except as provided in subparagraph (D), the amount of the annual establishment fee under paragraph (2) shall be equal to the sum of—

"(I) $15,000, multiplied by the inflation adjustment factor described in subparagraph (B); plus

"(II) the small business adjustment factor described in subparagraph (C); and

"(ii) the amount of any reinspection fee (if applicable) under paragraph (2) shall be equal to $15,000, multiplied by the inflation adjustment factor described in subparagraph (B).

"(B) INFLATION ADJUSTMENT FACTOR.—
"(i) IN GENERAL.—For fiscal year 2015 and subsequent fiscal years, the fee amounts established in subparagraph (A) shall be adjusted by the Secretary by notice, published in the Federal Register, for a fiscal year by the amount equal to the sum of—

"(I) one;

"(II) the average annual percent change in the cost, per full-time equivalent position of the Food and Drug Administration, of all personnel compensation and benefits paid with respect to such positions for the first 3 years of the preceding 4 fiscal years, multiplied by the proportion of personnel compensation and benefits costs to total costs of an average full-time equivalent position of the Food and Drug Administration for the first 3 years of the preceding 4 fiscal years; and

"(III) the average annual percent change that occurred in the Consumer Price Index for urban consumers
(U.S. City Average; Not Seasonally Adjusted; All items; Annual Index) for the first 3 years of the preceding 4 years of available data multiplied by the proportion of all costs other than personnel compensation and benefits costs to total costs of an average full-time equivalent position of the Food and Drug Administration for the first 3 years of the preceding 4 fiscal years.

"(ii) COMPOUNDED BASIS.—The adjustment made each fiscal year under clause (i) shall be added on a compounded basis to the sum of all adjustments made each fiscal year after fiscal year 2014 under clause (i).

“(C) SMALL BUSINESS ADJUSTMENT FACTOR.—The small business adjustment factor referred to subparagraph (A)(i)(II) shall be an amount established by the Secretary for each fiscal year based on the Secretary’s estimate of—"
“(i) the number of small businesses that will pay a reduced establishment fee for such fiscal year; and
“(ii) the adjustment to the establishment fee necessary to achieve total fees equaling the total fees that the Secretary would have collected if no entity qualified for the small business exception in subparagraph (D).
“(D) EXCEPTION FOR SMALL BUSINESSES.—

“(i) IN GENERAL.—In the case of a compounding manufacturer with gross annual sales of $1,000,000 or less in the 12 months ending April 1 of the fiscal year immediately preceding the fiscal year in which the fees under this subsection are assessed, the amount of the establishment fee under paragraph (2) for a fiscal year shall be equal to \( \frac{1}{3} \) of the amount calculated under subparagraph (A)(i)(I) in such fiscal year.

“(ii) APPLICATION.—To qualify for the exception under this subparagraph, a small business shall submit to the Sec-
retary a written request for such exception, in a format specified by the Secretary in guidance, certifying its gross annual sales for the 12 months ending April 1 of the fiscal year immediately preceding the fiscal year in which fees under this subsection are assessed. Any such application must be submitted to the Secretary not later than April 30 for the following fiscal year. Any statement or representation made to the Secretary shall be subject to section 1001 of title 18, United States Code.

"(E) CREDITING OF FEES.—In establishing the small business adjustment factor under subparagraph (C) for a fiscal year, the Secretary shall provide for the crediting of fees from the previous year to the next year if the Secretary overestimated the amount of the small business adjustment factor for such previous fiscal year, and consider the need to account for any adjustment of fees and such other factors as the Secretary determines appropriate.

“(5) USE OF FEES.—The Secretary shall make all of the fees collected pursuant to clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph (2)(A) available solely to pay for
the costs of oversight of compounding manufacturers.

"(6) SUPPLEMENT NOT SUPPLANT.—Funds received by the Secretary pursuant to this subsection shall be used to supplement and not supplant any other Federal funds available to carry out the activities described in this section.

"(7) CREDITING AND AVAILABILITY OF FEES.—Fees authorized under this subsection shall be collected and available for obligation only to the extent and in the amount provided in advance in appropriations Acts. Such fees are authorized to remain available until expended. Such sums as may be necessary may be transferred from the Food and Drug Administration salaries and expenses appropriation account without fiscal year limitation to such appropriation account for salaries and expenses with such fiscal year limitation. The sums transferred shall be available solely for the purpose of paying the costs of oversight of compounding manufacturers.

"(8) COLLECTION OF FEES.—

"(A) ESTABLISHMENT FEE.—A compounding manufacturer shall remit the establishment fee due under this subsection in a
fiscal year when submitting a registration pursuant to subsection (g) for such fiscal year.

"(B) REINSPECTION FEE.—The Secretary shall specify in the Federal Register notice described in paragraph (3) the manner in which reinspection fees assessed under this subsection shall be collected and the timeline for payment of such fees. Such a fee shall be collected after the Secretary has conducted a reinspection of the compounding manufacturer involved.

"(C) EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PAY FEES.—

“(i) REGISTRATION.—A compounding manufacturer shall not be considered registered under subsection (g) in a fiscal year until the date that the compounding manufacturer remits the establishment fee under this subsection for such fiscal year.

“(ii) MISBRANDING.—All drugs manufactured, prepared, propagated, compounded, or processed by a compounding manufacturer for which any establishment fee or reinspection fee has not been paid as required by this subsection shall be deemed misbranded under section 502(cc) until the
fees owed for such compounding manufacturer under this subsection have been paid.

"(D) COLLECTION OF UNPAID FEES.—In any case where the Secretary does not receive payment of a fee assessed under this subsection within 30 days after it is due, such fee shall be treated as a claim of the United States Government subject to provisions of subchapter II of chapter 37 of title 31, United States Code.

"(9) ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 120 days after each fiscal year in which fees are assessed and collected under this subsection, the Secretary shall submit a report to the Committee on Health Education Labor and Pensions of the Senate and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives, to include a description of fees assessed and collected for each year, a summary description of entities paying the fees, and the number of inspections and reinspections of such entities performed each year.

"(10) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—For fiscal year 2015 and each subsequent fiscal year, there is authorized to be appropriated for fees under this subsection an amount equivalent to the
total amount of fees assessed for such fiscal year under this subsection.

"(i) Action by Secretary Regarding Complaints From State Boards of Pharmacy.—

"(1) Identification of Compounding Manufacturers.—The Secretary shall encourage States to identify to the Secretary facilities that are licensed by a State as a pharmacy that appear to be entities that are required to be registered with the Secretary as a compounding manufacturer.

"(2) Designation.—The Secretary shall designate a point of contact and establish a format and procedure for a State Board of Pharmacy to notify the Secretary if it appears to a State Board of Pharmacy that an entity licensed by a State as a pharmacy is required to be registered with the Secretary as a compounding manufacturer.

"(3) Determination.—If the Secretary determines that such an entity described in paragraph (2) is required to be registered with the Secretary as a compounding manufacturer, the Secretary shall transmit such determination to the State Board of Pharmacy in the State in which the entity is located, and to the State Board of Pharmacy in the notifying State, if different, within 15 days of such determina-
tion and shall make such determination publicly available on the Internet Web site of the Food and Drug Administration.

“(4) EFFECT.—The Secretary shall encourage direct communications between States regarding traditional compounders. Nothing in this subsection shall expand the Secretary’s authority over or responsibility for traditional compounders.”.

(c) PROHIBITED ACT.—Section 301 (21 U.S.C. 331) is amended—

(1) in subsection (e), by striking “417, 416, 504” and inserting “417, 416, 503A(g), 504”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(ccc)(1) The resale of a compounded drug that is labeled ‘not for resale’ as required by section 503A.

“(2) The failure to register in accordance with subsection (g) of section 503A or the failure to submit a report as required by subsection (g)(2)(B) or (g)(3) of such section.”.

(d) REPORT BY GAO.—Not later than November 1, 2016, the Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct a study and submit to Congress a report on the safety of animal drug compounding and the availability of safe and effective drugs for animals.
SEC. 3. OTHER REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO

COMPOUNDING MANUFACTURERS.

(a) LABELING.—Section 502 (21 U.S.C. 352) is amended by adding at the end the following:

"(bb) If it is a compounded drug and (1) the labeling does not include the information as required by subsections (f)(3) and (g)(4) of section 503A, as applicable, or (2) the labeling or advertising or promotion of such drug is false or misleading in any particular.

(cc) If it is a drug, and it was manufactured, prepared, propagated, compounded, or processed by a compounding manufacturer for which fees have not been paid as required by section 503A(g)."

(b) APPLICATION OF INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS TO

COMPOUNDING MANUFACTURERS.—Section 704(a)(2) (21 U.S.C. 374(a)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the following flush text:

"The exemption in subparagraph (A) does not apply with respect to compounding manufacturers (as such term is defined in section 503A)."

SEC. 4. IMPLEMENTATION.

(a) CONSULTATION WITH STAKEHOLDERS.—In implementing this section, the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall consult with relevant stakeholders including pharmacists, professional associations, patient advocacy groups, manufacturers and physicians.
1 (b) REGULATIONS.—In promulgating any regulations
2 to implement this Act (and the amendments made by this
3 Act), the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall—
4 (1) issue a notice of proposed rulemaking that
5 includes the proposed regulation;
6 (2) provide a period of not less than 60 days
7 for comments on the proposed regulation; and
8 (3) publish the final regulation not more than
9 18 months following publication of the proposed rule
10 and not less than 30 days before the effective date
11 of such final regulation.

12 SEC. 5. EFFECTIVE DATE.
13 This Act (and the amendments made by this Act)
14 shall take effect on the date that is 1 year after the date
15 of enactment of this Act.
June 4, 2013

To: Members, Enforcement and Compounding Committee

Subject: Agenda Item II (d) – Discussion Regarding USP 797 and the California’s Requirements for Compounding

For a number of years, California has had its own statutory and regulation requirements for those pharmacies that compound medication or perform parenteral compounding. Since 2001, again through legislation as well as through regulations, the board has several times developed additional requirements to respond to emergent public health or regulatory concerns.

Today, many states rely upon USP 797 components to regulate compounding activities. California instead relies on its own standards for compounders and sterile compounding.

During this segment of the meeting, the committee will review the components in a crosswalk comparing the two sets of requirements. This crosswalk has been prepared by the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services, and is attached.
### Sterile Compounding Crosswalk: USP 797 vs. California State Law

**USP 797 Information** extracted from both USP Chapter 797 and Appendix I: Principal Competencies, Conditions, Practices, and Quality Assurances that are Required († “shall”) and Recommended (‡ “should”) in USP Chapter 797.

**California State Law** extracted from 2013 California Law Book for Pharmacy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compounding Personnel Responsibilities, Training, and Competencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Responsibility of Compounding Personnel</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>† Practices and quality assurances required to prepare, store, and transport CSPs that are sterile, and acceptably accurate, pure, and stable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compounding personnel are responsible for ensuring that CSPs are accurately identified, measured, diluted, and mixed and are correctly purified, sterilized, packaged, sealed, labeled, stored, dispensed, and distributed. These performance responsibilities include maintaining appropriate cleanliness, conditions and providing labeling and supplementary instructions for the proper clinical administration of CSPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All personnel who prepare CSPs shall be responsible for understanding these fundamental practices and precautions, for developing and implementing appropriate procedures, and for continually evaluating these procedures and the quality of final CSPs to prevent harm.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Personnel Training and Evaluation in Aseptic Manipulations Skills |
| — Pass didactic, practical skill assessment and media-fill testing initially, followed by an annual assessment for low- and medium-risk level compounding and semi-annual assessment for high-risk level compounding. |

| 1751. Sterile Injectable Compounding; Compounding Area; Self-Assessment |
| (a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall conform to the parameters and requirements stated by Article 4.5 (Section 1735 et seq.), applicable to all compounding, and shall also conform to the parameters and requirements stated by this Article 7 (Section 1751 et seq.), applicable solely to sterile injectable compounding. |
| (c) Any pharmacy compounding a sterile injectable product from one or more non-sterile ingredients shall comply with Business and Professions Code Section 1277. |

| Risk Levels Are Not Specifically Defined in California State Law |
| 1735.7. Training of Compounding Staff |
| (a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding shall maintain written documentation sufficient to demonstrate that pharmacy personnel have the skills and training required to properly and accurately perform their assigned responsibilities relating to compounding. |
| (b) The pharmacy shall develop and maintain an ongoing competency evaluation process for pharmacy personnel involved in compounding, and shall maintain documentation for any and all training related to compounding undertaken by pharmacy personnel. |
| (c) Pharmacy personnel assigned to compounding duties shall demonstrate knowledge and skills about processes and procedures used in compounding any drug product. |

| (a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall... |
maintain a written policy and procedure manual for compounding that includes, in addition to the elements required by Section 1735.5, written policies and procedures regarding the following:

(4) Training of staff in the preparation of sterile injectable products.

(d) Pharmacies compounding sterile injectable products from one or more nonsterile ingredients must have written policies and procedures that comply with the following:

(2) All personnel involved must read the policies and procedures before compounding sterile injectable products, and any additions, revisions, and deletions to the written policies and procedures must be communicated to all personnel involved in sterile compounding.

1751.6 Training of Sterile Injectable Compounding Staff, Patient, and Caregiver

(a) Consultation shall be available to the patient and/or primary caregiver concerning proper use of sterile injectable products and related supplies furnished by the pharmacy.

(b) The pharmacist-in-charge shall be responsible to ensure all pharmacy personnel engaging in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall have training and demonstrated competence in the safe handling and compounding of sterile injectable products, including cytotoxic agents of the pharmacy compounds.

(c) The pharmacist-in-charge shall be responsible to ensure the continuing competence of pharmacy personnel engaged in compounding sterile injectable products.

(e) Pharmacies that compound sterile products from one or more nonsterile ingredients must comply with the following training requirements:

(1) The pharmacy must establish and follow a written program of training and performance evaluation designed to ensure that each person working in the designated area has the knowledge and skills necessary to perform their assigned tasks properly. This program of training and performance evaluation must address at least the following:

(A) Aseptic technique.
(B) Pharmaceutical calculations and terminology.
(C) Sterile product compounding and documentation.
(D) Quality assurance procedures.
(E) Aseptic preparation procedures.
(F) Proper gowning and gloving technique.
(G) General conduct in the controlled area.
(H) Cleaning, sanitizing, and maintaining equipment used in the controlled area.
(I) Sterilization techniques.
(J) Container, equipment, and closure system selection.

(2) Each person assigned to the controlled area must successfully complete practical skills training in aseptic technique and aseptic area practices. Evaluation must include written testing and a written protocol of periodic routine performance checks involving adherence to aseptic area policies and procedures. Each person's
### 1751.7 Sterile Injectable Compounding Quality Assurance and Process Validation

| (b) | Each individual involved in the preparation of sterile injectable products must first successfully complete a validation process on technique before being allowed to prepare sterile injectable products. The validation process shall be carried out in the same manner as normal production, except that an appropriate microbiological growth medium is used in place of the actual product used during sterile preparation. The validation process shall be representative of all types of manipulations, products, and batch sizes the individual is expected to prepare. The same personnel, procedures, equipment, and materials must be involved. Completed medium samples must be incubated. If microbial growth is detected, then the sterile preparation process must be evaluated, corrective action taken, and the validation process repeated. Personnel competency must be revalidated at least every twelve months. Whenever the quality assurance program yields an unacceptable result, whenever the compounding process changes, whenever the equipment used in the compounding of sterile injectable drug products is repaired or replaced, the facility is modified in a manner that affects airflow or traffic patterns, or whenever improper aseptic techniques are observed, revalidation must be documented. |

| † | Compounding personnel who fail written tests, or whose media fill test vials result in gross microbial colonization, shall be immediately re instructed and re evaluated by expert compounding personnel to ensure correction of all aseptic practice deficiencies. |

### 1735.8

| (d) | The quality assurance plan shall include a written procedure for scheduled action in the event any compounded drug product is discovered to be below minimum standards for integrity, potency, stability, labeled strength, or labeled expiration. |

### 1751.6 Training of Sterile Injectable Compounding Staff, Patient, and Caregiver

| (a) | Consultation shall be available to the patient and/or primary caregiver concerning the proper use of sterile injectable products and related supplies furnished by the pharmacy. |

<p>| PATIENT OR CAREGIVER TRAINING | †Multiple component formal training program to ensure patients and caregivers understand the proper storage, handling, use, and disposal of CSPs. | State Law only addresses proper use. Storage, handling, and disposal are not addressed in California State Law. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel Cleansing And Garbing</th>
<th>1751.6 Training of Sterile Injectable Compounding Staff, Patient, and Caregiver</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>†Personnel shall also be thoroughly competent and highly motivated to perform flawless aseptic manipulations with ingredients, devices, and components of CSPs.</td>
<td>(b) The pharmacist-in-charge shall be responsible to ensure all pharmacy personnel engaging in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall have training and demonstrated competence in the safe handling and compounding of sterile injectable products, including cytotoxic agents. The pharmacy shall ensure that all personnel engaged in compounding sterile injectable products are highly motivated and thoroughly competent on the aseptic manipulations with ingredients, devices, and components of CSPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>†Personnel shall also be thoroughly motivated to perform flawless aseptic manipulations with ingredients, devices, and components of CSPs.</td>
<td>(d) The pharmacist-in-charge shall be responsible to ensure the continuing competence of pharmacy personnel engaged in compounding sterile injectable products.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>†Personnel with rashes, sunburn, weeping sores, conjunctivitis, active respiratory infection, and cosmetics are prohibited from preparing CSPs.</td>
<td>(e) Pharmacies that compound sterile products from one or more nonsterile ingredients must comply with the following training requirements:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>†Compounding personnel shall remove personal outer garments, cosmetics, artificial nails, hand, wrist, and body jewelry that can interfere with the fit of gowns and gloves, and visible body piercing above the neck.</td>
<td>(1) The pharmacy must establish and follow a written program of training and performance evaluation designed to ensure that each person working in the designated area has the knowledge and skills necessary to perform their assigned tasks properly. This program of training and performance evaluation must address at least the following:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| †Personnel shall also be thoroughly motivated to perform flawless aseptic manipulations with ingredients, devices, and components of CSPs. |
| 1751.7 Sterile Injectable Compounding Quality Assurance and Process Validation. |
| (b) Each individual involved in the preparation of sterile injectable products must first successfully complete a validation process on technique before being allowed to prepare sterile injectable products. |

Not Specifically Addressed

State Law only addresses garbing requirements for sterile preparations made from one or more nonsterile ingredients and cytotoxic agents.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Personnel Training And Competency Evaluation Of Garbing, Aseptic Work Practices And Cleaning/Disinfection Procedures</strong></th>
<th><strong>1751.5. Sterile Injectable Compounding Attire.</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‡Order of compounding garb and cleansing in ante-area: shoes or shoe covers, head and facial hair covers, face mask, fingernail cleansing, hand and forearm washing and drying, non-shedding gown.</td>
<td>(a) When preparing cytotoxic agents, gowns and gloves shall be worn. (b) When compounding sterile products from one or more non-sterile ingredients, the following standards must be met. 1. Cleanroom garb consisting of a low-shedding coverall, head cover, face mask, and shoe covers must be worn inside the designated area at all times. 2. Cleanroom garb must be donned and removed outside the designated area. 3. Hand, finger, and wrist jewelry must be eliminated. If jewelry cannot be removed, then it must be thoroughly cleaned and covered with a sterile glove. 4. Head and facial hair must be kept out of the critical area or be covered. 5. Gloves made of low-shedding materials are required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‡Order of cleansing and gloving in buffer room or area: hand cleansing with a persistently active alcohol-based product with persistent activity, allow hands to dry, don sterile gloves.</td>
<td>(c) The requirements of subdivision (b) do not apply if a barrier isolator is used to compound sterile injectable products from one or more non-sterile ingredients.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‡Routinely disinfect gloves with sterile 70% IPA after contacting non-sterile objects.</td>
<td>† Not Specifically Addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‡Inspect gloves for holes and replace when breaches are detected.</td>
<td>† Not Specifically Addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‡Personnel repeat proper procedures after they are exposed to direct contact contamination or worse than ISO Class 8 air.</td>
<td>† Not Specifically Addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‡These requirements are exempted only for immediate-use CSPs and CAIs for which manufacturers provide written documentation based on validated testing that such personnel practices are not required to maintain sterility in CSPs.</td>
<td>† Not Specifically Addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‡Personnel who prepare CSPs shall be trained conscientiously and skillfully by expert personnel, multiple-media instructional sources, and professional publications on the theoretical principles and practical skills of garbing procedures, aseptic work practices, achieving and maintaining ISO Class 5 environmental conditions, and cleaning and disinfection procedures.</td>
<td><strong>1735.7. Training of Compounding Staff</strong> (b) The pharmacy shall develop and maintain an on-going competency evaluation process for pharmacy personnel involved in compounding, and shall maintain documentation of any and all training related to compounding undertaken by pharmacy personnel. (c) Pharmacy personnel assigned to compounding duties shall demonstrate knowledge about processes and procedures associated with compounding any drug product.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‡Personnel who prepare CSPs shall be trained conscientiously and skillfully by expert personnel, multiple-media instructional sources, and professional publications on the theoretical principles and practical skills of garbing procedures, aseptic work practices, achieving and maintaining ISO Class 5 environmental conditions, and cleaning and disinfection procedures.</td>
<td><strong>1751.3. Sterile Injectable Policies and Procedures.</strong> (a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
maintain a written policy and procedure manual for compounding that includes, in addition to the elements required by Section 1735.5, written policies and procedures regarding the following:

- Training of staff in the preparation of sterile injectable products.
- Pharmacies compounding sterile injectable products from one or more non-sterile ingredients must have written policies and procedures that comply with the following:
  - All personnel involved must read the policies and procedures before compounding sterile injectable products, and any additions, revisions, and deletions to the written policies and procedures must be communicated to all personnel involved in sterile compounding.

1751.6 Training of Sterile Injectable Compounding Staff, Patient, and Caregiver

- The pharmacist-in-charge shall be responsible to ensure all pharmacy personnel engaging in compounding sterile injectable drug products have training and demonstrated competence in the safe handling and compounding of sterile injectable products, including cytotoxic agents in the pharmacy compounding products with cytotoxic agents.
- The pharmacist-in-charge shall be responsible to ensure the continuing competence of pharmacy personnel engaged in compounding sterile injectable products.

- Pharmacies that compound sterile products from one or more non-sterile ingredients must comply with the following training requirements:
  - Training and performance evaluation designed to ensure that each person working in the designated area has the knowledge and skills necessary to perform their assigned tasks properly. Each program of training and performance evaluation must address at least the following:
    - Aseptic technique.
    - Pharmaceutical calculations and terminology.
    - Sterile product compounding documentation.
    - Quality assurance procedures.
    - Aseptic preparation procedures.
    - Proper gowning and gloving technique.
    - General conduct in the controlled area.
    - Cleaning, sanitizing, and maintaining equipment used in the controlled area.
    - Sterilization techniques.
    - Container, equipment, and closure system selection.
  - Each person assigned to the controlled area must successfully complete practical skills training in aseptic technique and aseptic area procedures. Evaluation must include written testing and written protocols of periodic routine performance checks involving adherence to aseptic area policies and procedures. Each person's proficiency and continuing training needs must be reassessed every 12 months. Results of these assessments must be documented and retained in the pharmacy for three years.
**1735.7. Training of Compounding Staff**
(a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding shall maintain written documentation sufficient to demonstrate that pharmacy personnel have the skills and training required to properly and accurately perform their assigned responsibilities relating to compounding.

**1751.6 Training of Sterile Injectable Compounding Staff, Patient, and Caregiver**
(b) The pharmacist-in-charge shall be responsible to ensure all pharmacy personnel engaging in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall have training and demonstrated competence in the safe handling and compounding of sterile injectable products, including cytotoxic agents. The pharmacy shall provide training for each individual and shall be retained for three years beyond the period of employment.

(c) Records of training and demonstrated competence shall be available for each individual and shall be retained for three years beyond the period of employment.

(e) Pharmacies that compound sterile products from one or more non-sterile ingredients must comply with the following training requirements:
(2) Each person assigned to the controlled area must successfully complete practical skills training in aseptic technique and aseptic area practices. Evaluation must include written testing and a written protocol of periodic routine performance checks involving adherence to aseptic area policies and procedures. Each person's proficiency and continuing training needs must be reassessed every 12 months. Results of the assessments must be documented and retained in the pharmacy for three years.

**1751.7. Sterile Injectable Compounding Quality Assurance and Process Validation.**
(b) Each individual involved in the preparation of sterile injectable products must first successfully complete the validation process on technique before being allowed to prepare sterile injectable products. The validation process shall be carried out in the same manner as normal production, except that an appropriate microbiological growth medium is used in place of the actual product used during sterile preparation. The validation process shall be representative of all types of manipulations, products, and batch sizes the individual is expected to prepare. The same personnel, procedures, equipment, and materials must be involved.

Completed medium samples must be incubated. If microbial growth is detected, then the sterile preparation process must be reevaluated, corrective action taken, and the validation process repeated. Personnel competency must be revalidated at least every twelve months. Whenever the quality assurance program yields an unacceptable result, when the compounding process changes, equipment is replaced, the facility is modified in a manner that affects airflow or traffic patterns, or whenever improper aseptic techniques are observed, revalidation must be documented.
1751.7. Sterile Injectable Compounding Quality Assurance and Process Validation.

(b) Each individual involved in the preparation of sterile injectable products must first successfully complete a validation process on technique before being allowed to prepare sterile injectable products. The validation process shall be carried out in the same manner as normal production, except that an appropriate microbiological growth medium is used in place of the actual product used during sterile preparation. The validation process shall be representative of all types of manipulations, products, and batch sizes the individual is expected to prepare. The same personnel, procedures, equipment, and materials must be involved. Completed medium samples must be incubated. If microbial growth is detected, then the sterile preparation process must be evaluated, corrective action taken, and the validation process repeated. Personnel competency must be revalidated at least every twelve months, whenever the quality assurance program yields an unacceptable result, when the compounding process changes, equipment used in the compounding of sterile injectable drug products is repaired or replaced, the facility is modified in a manner that affects airflow or traffic patterns, or whenever improper aseptic techniques are observed. Revalidation must be documented.

† Media-fill testing of aseptic work skills shall be performed initially before beginning to prepare CSPs and at least annually thereafter for low- and medium-risk level compounding; and semiannually for high-risk level compounding.

1751.6. Training of Sterile Injectable Compounding Staff, Patient, and Caregiver

(e) Pharmacies that compound sterile products from one or more non-sterile ingredients must comply with the following training requirements:

(2) Each person assigned to the controlled area must successfully complete practical skills training in aseptic technique and aseptic area practices. Evaluation must include written testing and a written protocol of periodic routine performance checks involving adherence to aseptic area policies and procedures. Each person’s proficiency and continuing training needs must be reassessed every 12 months. Results of these assessments must be documented and retained in the pharmacy for three years.

1751.7. Sterile Injectable Compounding Quality Assurance and Process Validation.

(b) Each individual involved in the preparation of sterile injectable products must first successfully complete a validation process on technique before being allowed to prepare sterile injectable products. The validation process shall be carried out in the same manner as normal production, except that an appropriate microbiological growth medium is used in place of the actual product used during sterile preparation. The validation process shall be representative of all types of manipulations, products, and batch sizes the individual is expected to prepare. The same personnel, procedures, equipment, and materials must be involved. Completed medium samples must be incubated. If microbial growth is detected, then the sterile preparation process must be evaluated, corrective action taken, and the validation process repeated. Personnel competency must be revalidated at least every twelve months, whenever the quality assurance program yields an unacceptable result, when the compounding process changes, equipment used in the compounding of sterile injectable drug products is repaired or replaced, the facility is modified in a manner that affects airflow or traffic patterns, or whenever improper aseptic techniques are observed. Revalidation must be documented.
then the sterile preparation process must be evaluated, corrective action taken, and the validation process repeated. Personnel competency must be revalidated at least every twelve months, whenever the quality assurance program yields an unacceptable result, when the compounding process changes, equipment used in the compounding of sterile injectable drug products is repaired or replaced, the facility is modified in a manner that affects airflow or traffic patterns, or whenever improper aseptic techniques are observed. Revalidation must be documented.

† Compounding personnel who fail written tests, observational audits, or whose media-fill test vials have one or more units showing visible microbial contamination, shall be re instructed and re evaluated by expert compounding personnel to ensure correction of all aseptic work practice deficiencies.

1751.7. Sterile Injectable Compounding Quality Assurance and Process Validation. (b) If microbial growth is detected, then the sterile preparation process must be evaluated, corrective action taken, and the validation process repeated.

† Compounding personnel must demonstrate proficiency of proper hand hygiene, garbing, and consistent cleaning procedures in addition to didactic evaluation and aseptic media fill.

1751.6 Training of Sterile Injectable Compounding Staff, Patient, and Caregiver (b) The pharmacist-in-charge shall be responsible to ensure all pharmacy personnel engaging in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall have training and demonstrated competence in the safe handling and compounding of sterile injectable products, including cytotoxic agents and the pharmacy compounds products with cytotoxic agents.

1751.7. Sterile Injectable Compounding Quality Assurance and Process Validation. (b) If microbial growth is detected, then the sterile preparation process must be evaluated, corrective action taken, and the validation process repeated.

† Compounding personnel must demonstrate proficiency of proper hand hygiene, garbing, and consistent cleaning procedures in addition to didactic evaluation and aseptic media fill.

1751.6.6 Training of Sterile Injectable Compounding Staff, Patient, and Caregiver (e) Pharmacies that compound sterile products from one or more non sterile ingredients must comply with the following training requirements:

(1) The pharmacy must establish and follow a written program of training and performance evaluation designed to ensure that each person working in the designated area has the knowledge and skills necessary to perform their assigned tasks properly. This program of training and performance evaluation must address the following:

(D) Quality assurance procedures.
(F) Proper gowns and gloves technique.
(G) General conduct in the controlled area.
(H) Cleaning, sanitizing, and maintaining equipment used in the controlled area.
(I) Sterilization techniques.

(2) Each person assigned to the controlled area must successfully complete practical skills training in aseptic technique and aseptic area practices. Evaluation must include written testing and a written protocol of periodic routine performance checks involving adherence to aseptic area policies and procedures. Each person’s proficiency and continuing training needs must be reassessed every 12 months. Results of these assessments must be documented and retained in the pharmacy for three years.
Cleaning and disinfecting procedures performed by support personnel shall be thoroughly trained in proper hand hygiene, garbing, cleaning, and disinfection procedures by a qualified aseptic compounding expert.

In the event that cleaning and disinfecting procedures are also performed by other support personnel, thorough training of proper hand hygiene, garbing, cleaning, and disinfection procedures shall be done by a qualified aseptic compounding expert. After completion of training, support personnel shall routinely undergo performance evaluation of proper hand hygiene, garbing, and all applicable cleaning and disinfecting procedures conducted by a qualified aseptic compounding expert.

Support personnel shall routinely undergo performance evaluation of proper hand hygiene, garbing, and all applicable cleaning and disinfecting procedures conducted by a qualified aseptic compounding expert.

Compounding personnel shall be evaluated initially prior to beginning compounding CSPs and whenever an aseptic compounding activity is performed using a sample form for assessing hand hygiene and garbing-related practices by compounding personnel.

Aseptic work practice assessment and evaluation via personnel glove fingertip sampling

Monitoring of compounding personnel glove fingertips shall be performed for all CSPs at all risk levels and whenever aseptic compounding activity is performed using a sample form for assessing hand hygiene and garbing-related practices by compounding personnel.

Glove fingertip sampling shall be used to evaluate the competency of personnel in performing hand hygiene and garbing procedures in addition to educating compounding personnel in proper work practices.

All personnel shall demonstrate competency in proper hand hygiene and garbing procedures in addition to aseptic work practices.

Sterile contact agar plates shall be used to sample the gloved fingertips of compounding personnel after garbing to assess garbing competency and after completing the media-fill preparation.

Gloves shall not be disinfected with sterile 70% IPA immediately prior to sampling.

Garbing and gloving competency evaluation

Compounding personnel shall be visually observed during the process of performing hand hygiene and garbing procedures.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Not Specifically Addressed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gloved Fingertip Sampling</td>
<td>Immediately after the compounder completes the hand hygiene and garbing procedure, the evaluator shall collect a gloved fingertip and thumb sample from both hands of the compounder onto appropriate agar plates by lightly pressing each fingertip into the agar.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The plates shall be incubated for the appropriate incubation period and at the appropriate temperature.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All employees shall successfully complete an initial competency evaluation and gloved fingertip/thumb sampling procedure (0 cfu) no less than three times before initially being allowed to compound CSPs for human use.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>After completing the initial gowning and gloving competency evaluation, re-evaluation of all compounding personnel shall occur at least annually for low- and medium-risk level CSPs and semiannually for high-risk level CSPs before being allowed to continue compounding CSPs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gloves shall not be disinfected with sterile 70% IPA prior to testing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The sampled gloves shall be immediately discarded and proper hand hygiene performed after sampling. The nutrient agar plates shall be incubated as stated below.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Results should be reported separately as number of cfu per employee per hand (left hand, right hand).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incubation Period (For Gloved Fingertip Sampling)</td>
<td>At the end of the designated sampling period, the agar plates are recovered, covers secured, inverted, and incubated at temperature and for a time period conducive to multiplication of microorganisms. Trypticase soy agar (TSA) with lecithin and polysorbate 80 shall be incubated at 35°C +/- 2°C for 2–3 days.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aseptic Manipulation Competency Evaluation</td>
<td>All compounding personnel shall have their aseptic technique and related practice competency evaluated initially during the media fill test procedure and subsequent annual and semiannual media fill test procedures on the Sample Form for Assessing Aseptic Technique and Related Practices of Compounding Personnel.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1751.6 Training of Sterile Injectable Compounding Staff, Patient, and Caregiver (2) Each person assigned to the controlled area must successfully complete practical skills training in aseptic technique and aseptic area practices. Evaluation must include written testing and a written protocol with periodic routine performance checks involving adherence to aseptic area policies and procedures. Each person’s proficiency and continuing training needs must be reassessed every 2.5 months. Results of these assessments must be documented and retained in the pharmacy for three years.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media-Fill Test Procedure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Each individual involved in the preparation of sterile injectable products must first successfully complete a validation process on technique before being allowed to prepare sterile injectable products. The validation process shall be carried out in the same manner as normal production, except that an appropriate microbiological growth medium is used in place of the actual product used during sterile preparation. The validation process shall be representative of all types of manipulations, products and batch sizes the individual is expected to prepare. The same personnel, procedures, equipment, and materials must be involved. Completed medium samples must be incubated. If microbial growth is detected, then the sterile preparation process must be evaluated, corrective action taken, and the validation process repeated. Personnel competency must be revalidated at least every twelve months, whenever the quality assurance program yields an unacceptable result, when the compounding process changes, equipment used in the compounding of sterile injectable drug products is repaired or replaced, the facility is modified in a manner that affects airflow or traffic patterns, or whenever improper aseptic techniques are observed. Validation must be documented.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surface Cleaning and Disinfecting Competency Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immediate after sampling, surface with non-shedding wipe soaked in sterile 70% IPA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surface Cleaning and Disinfecting Sampling and Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Results should be reported in Sample Form for Assessing cleaning and disinfection procedures. Changes in cleaning and disinfection procedures may be reflected in the sample form.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surface Collection Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immediately after sampling, surface with non-shedding wipe soaked in sterile 70% IPA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surface Cleaning and Disinfecting Competency Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immediately after sampling, surface with non-shedding wipe soaked in sterile 70% IPA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Action Levels, Documentation, and Data Evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environment Sampling Data shall be collected and reviewed on a routine basis as a means of evaluating the overall control of the compounding environment.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An activity consistently shows elevated levels of microbial growth, competent microbiology personnel shall be consulted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An investigation into the source of the contamination shall be conducted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When gloved fingertip sample results exceed action levels after proper incubation, review of hygiene and garbing procedures as well as glove and surface disinfection procedures and work practices shall be performed and documented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any CFU count that exceeds its respective action level should prompt a re-evaluation of the adequacy of personnel work practices, cleaning procedures, operational procedures, and air filtration efficiency within the aseptic compounding location.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Compounded Sterile Preparations

**CSP Microbial Contamination Risk Levels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low-Risk Level CSPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aseptic manipulations within an ISO Class 5 environment using three or fewer sterile products and entries into any container.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Absence of passing sterility test, store not more than 48 hours at controlled room temperature, 14 days at cold temperature, and 45 days in a solid frozen state at 
-25°C to -10°C. |
| Media fill test at least annually by compounding personnel. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medium-Risk Level CSPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aseptic manipulations within an ISO Class 5 environment using prolonged and complex mixing and transfer, more than three sterile products and entries into any container, and pooling ingredients from multiple sterile products to prepare multiple CSPs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**State law only addresses compounds made from one or more nonsterile ingredients and sterile compounds that do not meet these criteria.**

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1735. Compounding in Licensed Pharmacies

- The parameters and requirements stated by this Article 4.5 (Section 1735 et seq.) apply to all compounding practices. Additional parameters and requirements applicable solely to sterile injectable compounding are stated by Article 7 (Section 1735 et seq.).

1735.2. Compounding Limitations and Requirements; Self-Assessment

- Every compounded drug product shall be given an expiration date representing the date beyond which, in the professional judgment of the pharmacist or the professional supervision of the pharmacist, it should not be used. This beyond-use date shall not exceed 180 days from preparation or the shortest expiration date of any component in the compounded drug product, unless a longer date is supported by stability studies of finished drugs or compounded drug products using the same components and packaging. Shorter dating than set forth in this subsection may be used if it is deemed appropriate in the professional judgment of the responsible pharmacist.

1751. Sterile Injectable Compounding; Compounding Area; Self-Assessment
† In absence of passing sterility test, store not more than 30 hours at controlled room temperature, 5 days at cold temperature, and 5 days in solid frozen state at -25° to -10° or colder.

Media-fill test at least annually by compounding personnel.

High-Risk Level CSPs
† Confirmed presence of nonsterile ingredients and devices, or confirmed or suspected exposure of sterile ingredients for more than one hour to air quality inferior to ISO Class 5 before final sterilization.
† Sterilization method verified to achieve sterility for the quantity and type of containers.
† Meet allowable limits for bacterial endotoxins.
† Maintain acceptable strength, purity of ingredients and integrity of containers after sterilization.
† In absence of passing sterility test, store not more than 24 hours at controlled room temperature, 3 days at cold temperature, and 45 days in solid frozen state at -25° to -10° or colder.

Media-fill test at least semiannually by compounding personnel.

1751.6 Training of Sterile Injectable Compounding Staff, Patient, and Caregiver
(e) Pharmacies that compound sterile products from one or more nonsterile ingredients must comply with the following training requirements:
(1) The pharmacy must establish and follow a written program of training and performance evaluation designed to ensure that each person working in the designated area has the knowledge and skills necessary to perform their assigned tasks properly. This program of training and performance evaluation must address at least the following:
(A) Aseptic technique.
(B) Pharmaceutical calculations and terminology.
(C) Sterile product compounding documentation.
(D) Quality assurance procedures.
(E) Aseptic preparation procedures.
(F) Proper gowning and gloving technique.
(G) General conduct in the controlled area.
(H) Cleaning, sanitizing, and maintaining equipment used in the controlled area.
(I) Sterilization techniques.
(J) Container, equipment, and closure system selection.
(2) Each person assigned to the controlled area must successfully complete a practical skills training in aseptic technique and aseptic area practices. Evaluation must include written testing and a written protocol of periodic, routine, performance checks involving adherence to aseptic area policies and procedures. Each person's proficiency and continuing training needs must be reassessed every 12 months. Results of these assessments must be documented and retained in the pharmacy for three years.

1751.7 Sterile Injectable Compounding Quality Assurance and Process Validation.
(a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall maintain, as part of its written policies and procedures, a written quality assurance plan including, in addition to the elements required by Section 1735.8, a documented, ongoing quality assurance program that monitors personnel performance, equipment, and facilities. This program shall be examined in a periodic, sampling basis as determined by the pharmacist in charge to assure that it meets required specifications. The Quality Assurance Program shall include at least the following:
(1) Written justification of the chosen expiration dates for compounded sterile injectable products.
**Determining Beyond-Use Dates**

† Use the general criteria in USP <795> in the absence of direct stability-indicating assays or authoritative literature that supports longer durations.

**1735.2. Compounding Limitations and Requirements; Self-Assessment**

(d) A drug product shall not be compounded until the pharmacy has first prepared a written master formula record that includes at least the following elements:

(6) Expiration dating requirements.

(h) Every compounded drug product shall be given an expiration date representing the date beyond which, in the professional judgment of the pharmacist performing or supervising the compounding, it should not be used. This “beyond use date” of the compounded drug product shall not exceed 180 days from preparation in the shortest expiration date of any component in the compounded drug product, unless a longer date is supported by stability studies of finished drugs or compounded drug products using the same components and packaging. Shorter dating than set forth in this subsection may be used if deemed appropriate in the professional judgment of the responsible pharmacist.

**1751.7. Sterile Injectable Compounding Quality Assurance and Process Validation.**

(4) Written justification of the chosen expiration dates for compounded sterile injectable products.

**1751.3. Sterile Injectable Policies and Procedures.**

(a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall maintain written policies and procedures that include, in addition to the elements required by section 1735.3, written policies and procedures regarding the following:

(1) Compounding, filling, and labeling of sterile injectable compounds.

(6) Quality assurance program.

(d) Pharmacies compounding sterile injectable products from one or more non-sterile ingredients must have written policies and procedures that comply with the following:

(3) Policies and procedures must address at least the following:

(B) Storage and handling of products and supplies.

(C) Storage and delivery of final products.

(D) Process validation.

(I) For sterile batch compounding, written policies and procedures must be established for the use of master formulas and worksheets and for appropriate documentation.

(J) Sterilization.

(K) End-product evaluation and testing.

**1751.7. Sterile Injectable Compounding Quality Assurance and Process Validation.**

(a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall maintain, as part of its written policies and procedures, a written quality assurance plan including, in addition to the elements required by section 1735.3, the documented, ongoing quality assurance program that monitors personnel performance, equipment, and facilities. The end product shall be examined on a periodic sampling basis as determined by the pharmacist in charge to assure that it meets required specifications. The Quality Assurance Program shall include at least the following:

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Original Document Date: March 2013
The storage of compounded sterile injectable products in the pharmacy and periodic documentation of refrigerator temperature.

Redispensed CSPs
- When sterility, and acceptable purity, strength, and quality can be ensured.
- Assignment and storage times and stability beyond use dates that occur later than those of originally dispensed CSPs must be based on results of sterility testing and quantitative assay of ingredients.

Not Specifically Addressed

Packaging and Transporting CSPs
- Packaging maintains physical integrity, sterility, stability, and purity.
- Modes of transport that maintain appropriate temperatures and prevent damage to CSPs.

Not Specifically Addressed

Immediate Use CSPs
- Fully comply with all six specified criteria.
- The immediate use provision is intended only for those situations where there is a need for emergency administration of CSPs. Such situations may include cardiopulmonary resuscitation, emergency room treatment, preparation of diagnostic agents, or critical therapy where the preparation of the CSP under conditions described for Low-Risk Level CSPs subjects the patient to additional risk due to delays in therapy. Immediate-use CSPs are not intended for storage for anticipated needs of batch compounding. Preparations that are medium-risk level and high-risk level shall not be prepared as immediate-use CSPs. Immediate-use CSPs are exempt from the requirements described for Low-Risk Level CSPs only when all of the following criteria are met:

1. The compounding process involves simple transfer of not more than three commercially manufactured packages of sterile, nonhazardous products or diagnostic radiopharmaceutical products from the manufacturer's original containers and not more than two entries into any one container or package (e.g., bag, vial, bottle, or sterile infusion solution or administration container/device). For example, anti-neoplastics shall not be prepared as immediate-use CSPs because they are hazardous drugs.

2. Unless required for the preparation, the compounding procedure is a continuous process not to exceed 1 hour.

3. During preparation, aseptic technique is followed and the finished CSP is immediately administered, the finished CSP is under continuous supervision to minimize the potential for contamination with non-sterile surfaces, introduction of particulate matter, biological fluids, mix-ups with other CSPs, and direct contact of the drug.

1735.2. Compounding Limitations and Requirements; Self-Assessment
(d) A drug product shall not be compounded until the pharmacy has first prepared and written a master formula record that includes at least the following elements:
(3) Process and/or procedure used to prepare the drug.
(6) Expiration dating requirements.

1751.6 Training of Sterile Injectable Compounding Staff, Patient, and Caregiver
(1) The pharmacy must establish and follow a written program of training and performance evaluation designed to ensure that each person working in the designated area has the knowledge and skills necessary to perform their assigned tasks properly. This program of training and performance evaluation must address...
outside surfaces.

at least the following:

(A) Aseptic technique.
(B) Pharmaceutical calculations and terminology.
(C) Sterile product compounding documentation.
(D) Quality assurance procedures.
(E) Aseptic preparation procedures.
(F) Proper gowning and gloving technique.

1751.7. Sterile Injectable Compounding Quality Assurance and Process Validation.

(b) Each individual involved in the preparation of sterile injectable products must first successfully complete a validation process in technique before being allowed to prepare sterile injectable products. The validation process shall be carried out in the same manner as normal production, except that an appropriate microbiological growth medium is used in place of the actual product used during sterile preparation. The validation process shall be representative of all types of manipulations, products and batch sizes the individual is expected to prepare. The same personnel, procedures, equipment, and materials must be involved. Completed medium samples must be incubated. If microbial growth is detected, then the sterile preparation process must be evaluated, corrective action taken, and the validation process repeated. Personnel competency must be validated at least every twelve months. Whenever the quality assurance program yields an unacceptable result, when the compounding process changes, equipment is repaired or replaced, the facility is modified in a manner that affects airflow or traffic patterns, or whenever improper aseptic techniques are observed, revalidation must be documented.

Not Specifically Addressed

4. Administration begins not later than 1 hour following the start of the preparation of the CSP.

5. Unless immediately and completely administered by the person who prepared it or immediately and completely witnessed by the preparer, the CSP shall bear a label listing patient identification information, the names and amounts of all ingredients, the name or initials of the person who prepared the CSP, and the exact 1-hour BUD and time.

Not Specifically Addressed
6. If administration has not begun within 1 hour following the start of preparing the CSP, the CSP shall be promptly, properly, and safely discarded.

**Time Constraints are Not Specifically Addressed**

1735.2. Compounding Limitations and Requirements; Self-Assessment

(d) A drug product shall not be compounded until the pharmacy has first prepared a written master formula record that includes at least the following elements:

(1) Essence or form of the intended drug product.

(2) All ingredients.

(3) Dosage form.

(4) Strength.

(5) Post-compounding process or procedures required, if any.

(6) Expiration dating requirements.

(h) Every compounded drug product shall be given an expiration date representing the date beyond which, in the professional judgment of the pharmacist performing or supervising the compounding, it should not be used. This beyond use date “bfu” of the compounded drug product shall not exceed 180 days from preparation in the shortest expiration date of any component in the compounded drug product, unless a longer date “bfu” is supported by stability studies of finished drug products or compounded drug products using the same components and packaging. Shorter dating than set forth in this subsection may be used if it is deemed appropriate in the professional judgment of the responsible pharmacist.

1751.7. Sterile Injectable Compounding Quality Assurance and Process Validation.

The Quality Assurance Program shall include at least the following:

(1) Written justification of the chosen expiration dates for compounded sterile injectable products.

(2) Beyond-use date of 28 days, unless specified otherwise by the manufacturer.

(3) Beyond-use time of 6 hours, unless specified otherwise by the manufacturer.

(4) Beyond-use time of 1 hour, for closure sealed single-dose/containers, after being opened or entered in worse than ISO Class 5 air.

(5) Storage of opened single-dose ampuls is not permitted.

Single-Dose and Multiple-Dose Containers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beyond-use date</td>
<td>28 days, unless specified otherwise by the manufacturer, for closure sealed multiple-dose containers after initial opening or entry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beyond-use time</td>
<td>6 hours, unless specified otherwise by the manufacturer, for closure sealed single-dose containers in ISO Class 5 or cleaner air after initial opening or entry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beyond-use time</td>
<td>1 hour, for closure sealed single-dose containers, after being opened or entered in worse than ISO Class 5 air.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storage</td>
<td>Of open single-dose ampuls is not permitted.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hazardous Drugs as CSPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appropriate personnel protective equipment (PPE)</td>
<td>Shall be worn when compounding in an BSC or CACI and when using CSTD devices. PPE should include gowns, face masks, eye protection, hair covers, shoe covers, dedicated shoes, double gloving with sterile chemo-type gloves, and compliance with manufacturers’ recommendations when using a CACI.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**State Law only addresses with respect to High Risk CSPs**

1751.5. Sterile Injectable Compounding Attire.

(a) When preparing cytotoxic agents, gowns and gloves shall be worn.

(b) When compounding sterile products from one or more non-sterile ingredients, the following standards must be met:

(1) Cleanroom garb consisting of a low-shedding coverall, head cover, face mask, and shoe covers must be worn inside the designated area at all times.

(2) Cleanroom garb must be donned and removed outside the designated area.

(3) Hand, finger, and wrist jewelry must be eliminated. If jewelry cannot be removed, then it must be thoroughly cleaned and covered with a sterile glove.

(4) Head and facial hair must be kept out of the critical area or be covered.
### Compounding Sterile Injectables from Nonsterile Ingredients

- **Section 4127.7. Compounding Sterile Injectables from Nonsterile Ingredients; Requirements**
  - On or after July 1, 2005, a pharmacy shall compound sterile injectable products from one or more nonsterile ingredients in one of the following environments:
    - An ISO class 5 laminar airflow hood within an ISO class cleanroom. The cleanroom must have a positive air pressure differential relative to adjacent areas.
    - An ISO class 5 cleanroom.
    - A barrier isolator that provides an ISO class 5 environment for compounding.

### Sterile Injectable Policies and Procedures

- **Section 1751.3. Sterile Injectable Policies and Procedures**
  - (3) Policies and procedures must address at least the following:
    - Use and maintenance of environmental control devices used to create the critical area for manipulation of sterile products (e.g., laminar airflow workstations, biological safety cabinets, class 100 clean rooms, and barrier isolator workstations).

### Facility and Equipment Standards for Sterile Injectable Compounding

- **Section 1751.4. Facility and Equipment Standards for Sterile Injectable Compounding**
  - (e) Pharmacies preparing parenteral cytotoxic agents shall do so in accordance with Section 1106(b) of the California Administrative Code, requiring a laminar airflow hood. The hood must be certified annually by a qualified technician who is familiar with the methods and procedures for certifying laminar airflow hoods and cleanroom requirements, in accordance with National Sanitation Foundation Standard 49 for Class II (Laminar Flow) Biohazard Cabintetry, as revised May, 1983. Certification records must be retained for at least three years.

### Pharmacies: Laminar Flow Biological Safety Cabinet

- **Section 505.5.1 Pharmacies: Laminar Flow Biological Safety Cabinet**
  - In all pharmacies preparing parenteral cytotoxic agents, all compounding shall be conducted within a certified Class II Type A or Class II Type B vertical laminar airflow hood with bag-in-bag out design. The pharmacy must ensure that contaminated air plenums, that are under positive air pressure, are leak tight.

### Hazardous Drugs

- **Section 1751.3. Sterile Injectable Policies and Procedures**
  - (a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall maintain a written policy and procedure manual for compounding that includes, in addition to the elements required by Section 1735.5, written policies and procedures regarding the following:
    - Procedures for handling cytotoxic agents.

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Not Specifically Addressed

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### Hazardous Drugs

Hazardous drugs shall be handled with caution at all times using appropriate chemotherapy gloves during receiving, distribution, stocking, inventorying, preparing for administration, and disposal.

### Sterile Injectable Labeling Requirements

- **(d)** Cytotoxic agents shall bear a special label which states “Chemotherapy. Dispose of properly.”

### Sterile Injectable Policies and Procedures

- **(a)** Any pharmacy engaged in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall maintain a written policy and procedure manual for compounding that includes, in addition to the elements required by Section 1735.5, written policies and procedures regarding the following:
  - Procedures for handling cytotoxic agents.
  - Pharmacies compounding sterile injectable products shall have written policies and procedures for the disposal of infectious materials and/or materials containing cytotoxic residues. The written policies and procedures shall describe the pharmacy protocols for cleanups and spills in conformity with local health jurisdiction standards.

### Compounding Sterile Injectables from Nonsterile Ingredients

- **On and after July 1, 2005,** any pharmacy shall compound sterile injectable drug products from one or more nonsterile ingredients in one of the following environments:
  - An ISO class 5 laminar airflow hood within an ISO class 7 cleanroom. The cleanroom must have a positive air pressure differential relative to adjacent areas.
  - An ISO class 5 cleanroom.
  - A barrier isolator that provides an ISO class 5 environment for compounding.

### Facility and Equipment Standards for Sterile Injectable Compounding

- Pharmacies preparing parenteral cytotoxic agents shall do so in accordance with Section 41106(b) of Title 24 of the California Administrative Code, requiring a laminar airflow hood. The hood must be certified annually by a qualified technician who is familiar with the methods and procedures for certifying laminar airflow hoods and cleanroom requirements, in accordance with National Sanitation Foundation Standard 49 for Class II (Laminar Flow) Biohazard Cabinetry, as revised May, 1983. Certification records must be retained for at least three years.

### Compounding Area for Parenteral Solutions

- The pharmacy shall have a designated area for the preparation of sterile products for dispensing which shall:
  - **(5.1)** An ISO class 5 laminar airflow hood within an ISO class 7 cleanroom. The hood must be certified annually by a qualified technician who is familiar with the methods and procedures for certifying laminar airflow hoods and cleanroom requirements, in accordance with National Sanitation Foundation Standard 49 for Class II (Laminar Flow) Biohazard Cabinetry, as revised May, 1983. Certification records must be retained for at least three years.
### Cleanroom Requirements

- A cleanroom must have a positive air pressure differential relative to adjacent areas.
- 5.2 An ISO class 5 cleanroom.
- 5.3 A barrier isolator that provides an ISO class 5 environment for compounding.

**Note:** For additional pharmacy mechanical standard requirements, see Chapter 5, California Mechanical Code.

### Pharmacies: Laminar Flow Biological Safety Cabinet

- In pharmacies preparing parenteral cytotoxic agents, all compounding shall be conducted within a certified Class II Type A or Class II Type B biological safety cabinet. The pharmacy must ensure that contaminated air plenums that are under positive air pressure are leak-tight.
- Access to drug preparation areas shall be limited to authorized personnel.
- A pressure indicator shall be installed that can readily monitor room pressurization, which is documented daily.
- Annual documentation of full training of personnel regarding storage, handling, and disposal of hazardous drugs.
- Personnel access and movement of materials into and near the controlled area.
- A CSTD shall be used in an ISO Class 5 primary engineering control device.
- At least 0.01 inch water column negative pressure is required for compounding of hazardous drugs.
- When used, a CSTD shall be used in an ISO Class 5 primary engineering control device.
- Compounding personnel of reproductive capability shall confirm in writing that they understand the risks of handling hazardous drugs.
- Disposal of all hazardous drug wastes shall comply with all applicable federal and state regulations.

### Pharmacy Mechanical Standard Requirements

- For additional pharmacy mechanical standard requirements, see Chapter 5, California Mechanical Code.

### Sterile Injectable Policies and Procedures

- Pharmacies compounding sterile injectable products from one or more non-sterile ingredients must have written policies and procedures that comply with the following:
  - Policies and procedures must address at least the following:
  - Personnel access and movement of materials into and near the controlled area.
  - Records of training and demonstrated competence shall be available for each individual and shall be retained for three years beyond the period of employment.
  - When used, a CSTD shall be used in an ISO Class 5 primary engineering control device.

### Storage and Disposal of Sterile Injectable Compounding Staff, Patient, and Caregiver

- The pharmacist-in-charge shall be responsible to ensure all pharmacy personnel engaging in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall have training and demonstrated competence in the safe handling and compounding of sterile injectable products, including cytotoxic agents.
- Records of training and demonstrated competence shall be available for each individual and shall be retained for three years beyond the period of employment.

### Sterile Injectable Policies and Procedures

- All cytotoxic agents shall bear a special label which states “Chemotherapy – Dispose of Properly.”

### Disposal of Sterile Injectable Policies and Procedures

- Records of training and demonstrated competence shall be available for each individual and shall be retained for three years beyond the period of employment.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radiopharmaceuticals as CSPs</th>
<th>Not Specifically Addressed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>† Radiopharmaceuticals are not specifically addressed in Sterile Compounding State Regulations.</td>
<td>Radiopharmaceuticals as CSPs are Not Specifically Addressed in Sterile Compounding State Regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>† Appropriate primary engineering controls and radioactivity containment and shielding.</td>
<td>Allergen Extracts as CSPs are not subject to the personnel, environmental, and storage requirements for all CSPs. Microbial Contamination Risk Levels when certain criteria are met.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>† Radiopharmaceuticals compounded from sterile components, in closed sterile containers, with volume of 100 ml or less, for a single dose injection or not more than 30 ml taken from a multiple-dose container shall be designated, and conform to, the standards for low-risk level CSPs.</td>
<td>Allergen Extracts as CSPs are not subject to the personnel, environmental, and storage requirements for all CSPs. Microbial Contamination Risk Levels when certain criteria are met.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>† Radiopharmaceutical vials designed for multi-use, compounded with technetium-99m, exposed to ISO Class 5 environment and punctured by needles with no direct contact contamination may be used, but time indicated by manufacturer recommendations.</td>
<td>Patient Monitoring and Adverse Events Reporting are not specifically addressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>† Location of primary engineering controls permitted in ISO Class 8 controlled environment.</td>
<td>Patient Monitoring and Adverse Events Reporting are not specifically addressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>† Technetium-99m/Molybdenum-99m generators used according to manufacturer, state, and federal requirements.</td>
<td>Patient Monitoring and Adverse Events Reporting are not specifically addressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>† Radiopharmaceuticals prepared as low-risk level CSPs with 12-hour BUD shall be prepared in the segregated compounding area.</td>
<td>Patient Monitoring and Adverse Events Reporting are not specifically addressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>† Materials and garb exposed in patient-care and treatment area shall not cross the line of demarcation into the segregated compounding area.</td>
<td>Patient Monitoring and Adverse Events Reporting are not specifically addressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>† Technetium-99m/Molybdenum-99m generators must be placed in ISO Class 8 conditions.</td>
<td>Patient Monitoring and Adverse Events Reporting are not specifically addressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>† Segregated compounding area will be designated with a line of demarcation.</td>
<td>Patient Monitoring and Adverse Events Reporting are not specifically addressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>† Storage and transport of properly shielded vials of radiopharmaceutical CSPs may occur in a limited access ambient environment without a specific ISO Class designation.</td>
<td>Patient Monitoring and Adverse Events Reporting are not specifically addressed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Quality Assurance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verification of Compounding Accuracy and Sterility</th>
<th>Not Specifically Addressed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Review labels and document correct measurements, aseptic manipulations, and sterilization procedures to confirm correct identity, purity, and strength of ingredients in and sterile drug products.</td>
<td>1735.5. Compounding Policies and Procedures (c) The policy and procedure manual shall include the following: (2) Documentation of a plan for recall of a dispensed compounded drug product where subsequent verification demonstrates the potential for adverse effects with continued use of the compounded drug product.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Assay finished CSPs to confirm correct identity and strength of ingredients.</td>
<td>1751.7. Sterile Injectable Compounding Quality Assurance and Process Validation. (a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall maintain, as part of its policies and procedures, a written quality assurance plan including, in addition to the elements required by Section 1735.8, a documented, ongoing quality assurance program that monitors personnel performance, equipment, and facilities. The end product shall be examined in a periodic sampling basis as determined by the pharmacist in charge to assure that it meets required specifications. The Quality Assurance Program shall include at least the following: (3) Actions to be taken in the event of a drug recall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sterility test finished CSPs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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documented, ongoing quality assurance program that monitors personnel performance, equipment, and facilities. The end product shall be examined on a periodic sampling basis as determined by the pharmacist-in-charge to assure that it meets required specifications.

(c) Batch-produced sterile injectable drug products compounded from one or more non-sterile ingredients shall be subject to documented end product testing for sterility and pyrogens and shall be quarantined until the end product testing confirms sterility and acceptable levels of pyrogens.

(d) Batch-produced sterile to sterile transfers shall be subject to periodic testing through process validation for sterility as determined by the pharmacist-in-charge and described in the written policies and procedures.


(a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall maintain a written policy and procedure manual for compounding that includes, in addition to the elements required by section 1735.5, written policies and procedures regarding the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sterilization Methods</th>
<th>Sterilization of High-Risk Level CSPs by Filtration</th>
<th>Sterilization of High-Risk Level CSPs by Steam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‡ Verify that methods achieve sterility while maintaining appropriate strength, purity, quality, and packaging integrity.</td>
<td>‡ Nominal 0.2-μm pore size sterile membranes that are chemically and physically compatible with the CSP.</td>
<td>‡ Test to verify the mass of containers to be sterilized will be sterile after the selected exposure duration in the particular autoclave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‡ Prove effectiveness by USP chapter 71, equivalent, or superior to sterility testing.</td>
<td>‡ Complete rapidly without filter replacement.</td>
<td>‡ Ensure live steam contacts all ingredients and surfaces to be sterilized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‡ Subject filter to manufacturers recommended integrity test (e.g., bubble point test) after filtering CSPs.</td>
<td>‡ Test to verify the mass of containers to be sterilized will be sterile after the selected exposure duration in the particular autoclave.</td>
<td>‡ Pass solutions through a 1.2-μm or smaller nominal pore size filter into final containers to remove particulates before sterilization.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Original Document Date: March 2013
† Sufficient space shall be left between materials to allow for good
circulation of the hot air.

‡ The description of dry heat sterilization conditions and duration for
specific CSPs shall be included in written documentation in the
compounding facility. The effectiveness of dry heat sterilization shall be
verified using appropriate biological indicators and other confirmation.

‡ The oven should be equipped with a system for controlling
temperature and exposure period.

† Dry heat depyrogenation shall be used to render glassware or
containers, such as vials free from pyrogens as well as viable microbes.

† The description of the dry heat depyrogenation cycle and duration for
specific load items shall be included in written documentation
in the compounding facility.

† The effectiveness of the dry heat depyrogenation cycle shall be verified
using endotoxin challenge vials (ECVs).

‡ The bacterial endotoxin test should be performed on the ECVs to verify
the cycle is capable of achieving a 3 log reduction in endotoxin.

† Review procedures and documents to ensure sterility, purity, correct
identities, and amounts of ingredients and stability.

(d) A drug product shall not be compounded until the pharmacy has first
prepared a written master formula record that includes at least the following
elements:

(1) Active ingredients to be used.

(2) Inactive ingredients to be used.

(3) Process and/or procedure used to prepare the drug.

(4) Quality reviews required at each step in preparation of the drug.

(5) Post-compounding process or procedures required, if any.

(6) Expiration dating requirements.

(f) The pharmacist performing or supervising compounding is responsible
for the integrity, potency, quality, and labeled strength of a compounded drug
product until it is dispensed.

(g) All chemicals, bulk drug substances, drug products, and other
components used for drug compounding shall be stored and used according to
compendial and other applicable requirements to maintain their integrity, potency,
quality, and labeled strength.

(i) The pharmacist performing or supervising compounding is responsible
for the proper preparation, labeling, storage, and delivery of the compounded drug
product.
verification, monitoring, and review of the adequacy of the compounding processes and shall also include written documentation of review of those processes by qualified pharmacy personnel.

(c) The quality assurance plan shall include written standards for qualitative and quantitative integrity, potency, quality, and labeled strength analysis of compounded drug products. All qualitative and quantitative analysis reports for compounded drug products shall be retained by the pharmacy and collated with the compounding record and master formula.

(d) The quality assurance plan shall include written procedures for scheduled action in the event any compounded drug product is ever discovered to be below minimum standards for integrity, potency, quality, or labeled strength.

1751.1. Sterile Injectable Recordkeeping Requirements.

(b) In addition to the records required by section 1735.3 and subdivision (a), for sterile products compounded from one or more non-sterile ingredients, the following records must be made and kept by the pharmacy:

(1) Preparation records including the master work sheet, the preparation work sheet, and records of end product evaluation results.
(2) Preparation records including the master work sheet, the preparation work sheet, and records of end product evaluation results.
(3)Pharmacies shall maintain and retain all records required by this article in the pharmacy in a readily retrievable form for at least three years from the date the record was created.

1751.7. Sterile Injectable Compounding Quality Assurance and Process Validation.

(a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall maintain as part of its written policies and procedures, a written quality assurance plan including, in addition to the elements required by section 1735.8, a documented, ongoing quality assurance program that monitors personnel performance, equipment, and facilities. The end product shall be examined in a periodic sampling basis as determined by the pharmacist in charge to assure that it meets required specifications.

† Visually inspect for abnormal particulate matter and color, and intact containers and seals.

1735.8. Compounding Quality Assurance

(c) The quality assurance plan shall include written standards for qualitative and quantitative integrity, potency, quality, and labeled strength analysis of compounded drug products. All qualitative and quantitative analysis reports for compounded drug products shall be retained by the pharmacy and collated with the compounding record and master formula.

Sterility Testing

† High-risk level CSPs prepared in batches of more than 25 identical containers, or exposed longer than 12 hours at 2°C to 8°C and 6 hours at warmer than 8°C before being sterilized.

Not Specifically Addressed

Bacterial Endotoxin (Pyrogen) Testing

† High-risk level CSPs, excluding those for inhalation and ophthalmic administration, prepared in batches of more than 25 identical containers, or exposed longer than 12 hours at 2°C to 8°C and 6 hours at warmer than 8°C before being sterilized.

Not Specifically Addressed

Identity and Strength

† Written procedures to verify correct identity, quality, amounts, and...
### Verification of Ingredients

- Any pharmacy engaged in compounding shall maintain, as part of its written policies and procedures, a written quality assurance plan designed to monitor and ensure the integrity, potency, quality, and labeled strength of compounded drug products.

- The quality assurance plan shall include written procedures for verification, monitoring, and review of the adequacy of the compounding processes and shall also include written documentation of review of those processes by qualified pharmacy personnel.

- The quality assurance plan shall include written standards for qualitative and quantitative integrity, potency, quality, and labeled strength analysis of compounded drug products. All qualitative and quantitative analysis reports for compounded drug products shall be retained by the pharmacy and collated with the compounding record and master formula.

- The quality assurance plan shall include written procedures for scheduled action in the event any compounded drug product is ever discovered to be below minimum standards for integrity, potency, quality, or labeled strength.

### 1751.7. Sterile Injectable Compounding Quality Assurance and Process Validation

- Any pharmacy engaged in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall maintain, as part of its written policies and procedures, a written quality assurance plan including, in addition to the elements required by section 1735.8, a documented, ongoing quality assurance program that monitors personnel performance, equipment, and facilities. The end product shall be examined on a periodic sampling basis as determined by the pharmacist-in-charge to assure that it meets required specifications.

### 1735.8. Compounding Quality Assurance

- Any pharmacy engaged in compounding shall maintain, as part of its written policies and procedures, a written quality assurance plan designed to monitor and ensure the integrity, potency, quality, and labeled strength of compounded drug products.

- The quality assurance plan shall include written standards for qualitative and quantitative integrity, potency, quality, and labeled strength analysis of compounded drug products. All qualitative and quantitative analysis reports for compounded drug products shall be retained by the pharmacy and collated with the compounding record and master formula.

### 1735.4. Labeling of Compounded Drug Products

- In addition to the labeling information required under Business and Professions Code section 4076, the label of a compounded drug product shall contain the generic name(s) of the principal active ingredient(s).

- A statement that the drug has been compounded by the pharmacy shall be included on the container or on the receipt provided to the patient.

- Drug products compounded into unit-dose containers that are too small or otherwise impractical for full compliance...
with subdivisions (a) and (b) shall be labeled with at least the name(s) of the active ingredient(s), concentration or strength, volume or weight, pharmacy reference or lot number, and expiration date.

1735.5. Compounding Policies and Procedures
(c) The policy and procedure manual shall include the following:
(4) Documentation of the methodology used to test integrity, potency, quality, and labeled strength of compounded drug products.

1735.8. Compounding Quality Assurance
(a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding shall maintain, as part of its written policies and procedures, a written quality assurance plan designed to monitor and ensure the integrity, potency, quality, and labeled strength of compounded drug products.

1751.2. Sterile Injectable Labeling Requirements.
In addition to the labeling information required under Business and Professions Code Section 4076 and Section 1735.4, a pharmacy which compounds sterile products shall include the following information on the labels for those products:
(b) Name and concentrations of ingredients contained in the sterile injectable product.
(c) Instructions for storage and handling.
(d) All cytotoxic agents shall bear a special label which states “Chemotherapy - Dispose of Properly.”

(a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall maintain a written policy and procedure manual for compounding that includes, in addition to the elements required by section 1735.5, written policies and procedures regarding the following:
(1) Compounding, filling, and labeling of sterile injectable compounds.
(2) Labeling of the sterile injectable product based on the intended route of administration and the recommended rate of administration.

Environmental Quality and Control

Exposure of Critical Sites
† ISO Class 5 or better air.

State Law only addresses ISO Class 5 air for parenteral cytotoxic agents and sterile compounds made from one or more non-sterile ingredients.

4127.7. Compounding Sterile Injectables from Nonsterile Ingredients; Requirements
On and after July 1, 2005, a pharmacy shall compound sterile injectable drug products from one or more non-sterile ingredients in one of the following environments:
(a) An ISO Class 5 laminar airflow hood within an ISO Class cleanroom.
cleanroom must have a positive air pressure differential relative to adjacent areas. (b) An ISO class 5 cleanroom. (c) A barrier isolator that provides an ISO class 5 environment for compounding.

1250.4 Compounding Area for Parenteral Solutions. The pharmacy shall have a designated area for the preparation of sterile products for dispensing which shall:

1. In accordance with Federal Standard 209 (b), Clean Room and Work Station Requirements, Controlled Environment, as approved by the Commission, Federal Supply Service, General Services Administration meet standards for class 100 HEPA (high efficiency particulate air) filtered air such as laminar air flow hood or clean room. *Class 100 HEPA filtered air is equivalent to ISO 5.

5. Any pharmacy that compounds sterile injectable products from one or more nonsterile ingredients must compound the medication in one of the following environments:

• 5.1 An ISO class laminar airflow hood within an ISO class 7 cleanroom. The cleanroom must have a positive air pressure differential relative to adjacent areas.
• 5.2 An ISO class 5 cleanroom.
• 5.3 A barrier isolator that provides an ISO class 5 environment for compounding.

Note: For additional pharmacy mechanical standard requirements, see Chapter 5, California Mechanical Code.

505.5.1 Pharmacies: Laminar Flow Biological Safety Cabinet. In all pharmacies preparing parenteral cytotoxic agents, all compounding shall be conducted within a certified Class II Type A or Class II Type B vertical laminar airflow hood with in-bag out design. The pharmacy must ensure that contaminated air plenums that are under positive air pressure are leak tight.

†Preclude direct contact (e.g., touch and secretions) contamination.

Not Specifically Addressed
ISO Class 5 Air Sources, Buffer Areas, and Ante-Areas

†New representations of facility layouts.

†All compounding facility shall ensure that each source of ISO Class 5 environment for exposure of critical sites and sterilization by filtration is properly located, operated, maintained, monitored, and verified.

1250.4 Compounding Area for Parenteral Solutions. The pharmacy shall have a designated area for the preparation of sterile products for dispensing which shall:

2. In accordance with Federal Standard 209(b), Clean Room and Work Station Requirements, Controlled Environment, as approved by the Commission, Federal Supply Service, General Services Administration meet standards for class 100 HEPA (high efficiency particulate air) filtered air such as laminar airflow hood or cleanroom.

*Class 100 HEPA filtered air is equivalent to ISO 5

6. Any pharmacy that compounds sterile injectable products from one or more nonsterile ingredients must compound the medication in one of the following environments:

• Any ISO class 5 laminar airflow hood within an ISO class 7 cleanroom. The cleanroom must have a positive air pressure differential relative to adjacent areas.

• Any ISO class 5 cleanroom.

• A barrier isolator that provides an ISO class 5 environment for compounding.

Not Specifically Addressed

1735.6 Compounding Facilities and Equipment

(a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding shall maintain written documentation regarding the facilities and equipment necessary for safe and accurate compounded drug products. Where applicable, this shall include records of certification(s) of facilities or equipment.

(b) Any equipment used to compound drug products shall be stored, used, and maintained in accordance with manufacturers' specifications.

(c) Any equipment used to compound drug products for which calibration or adjustment is appropriate shall be calibrated prior to use to ensure accuracy. Documentation of each such calibration shall be recorded in writing, and these records of calibration shall be maintained and retained in the pharmacy.

1751 Sterile Injectable Compounding; Compounding Area; Self-Assessment

Not Specifically Addressed
(a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall conform to the parameters and requirements stated by Article 4.5 (Section 1735 et seq.), applicable to all compounding, and shall also conform to the parameters and requirements stated by this Article 7 (Section 1751 et seq.), applicable solely to sterile injectable compounding.

(b) Any pharmacy compounding sterile injectable drug products shall have a designated area for the preparation of sterile injectable products, which shall meet the following standards:

1. Clean Room and Work Station Requirements shall be in accordance with Section 490A.3.1.b of the California Code of Regulations.

2. Be ventilated in a manner in accordance with Section 505.12 Title 24, Part 4, Chapter 5 of the California Code of Regulations.

3. Be certified annually by a qualified technician who is familiar with the methods and procedures for certifying laminar airflow hoods and clean room requirements, in accordance with standards adopted by the United States General Services Administration. Certification records shall be retained for at least three years.

4. The pharmacy shall be arranged in accordance with Section 490A.3 b of Title 24, Part 2, Chapter 4A of the California Code of Regulations. Items related to the compounding of sterile injectable products within the compounding area shall be stored in such a way as to maintain the integrity of an aseptic environment.

(c) Any pharmacy compounding sterile injectable products from one or more non-sterile ingredients shall comply with Business and Professions Code Section 127.7.

1751.1. Sterile Injectable Recordkeeping Requirements.

(b) In addition to the records required by Section 1735.3 and subdivision (a), for sterile products compounded from one or more non-sterile ingredients, the following records must be made and kept by the pharmacy:

1. Certification of the sterile compounding environment.

2. Other facility quality control logs specific to the pharmacy’s policies and procedures (e.g., cleaning logs for facilities and equipment).

(c) Pharmacies shall maintain and retain all records required by this article in the pharmacy in a readily retrievable form for at least three years from the date the record was treated.


(d) Pharmacies compounding sterile injectable products from one or more non-sterile ingredients must have written policies and procedures that comply with the following:

3. Policies and procedures must address the following:

F. Use and maintenance of environmental control devices used to treat the critical area for manipulation of sterile products (e.g., laminar airflow workstations, biological safety cabinets, class 100 clean rooms, and barrier isolator workstations).

G. Regular cleaning schedule for the controlled area and any equipment in the controlled area and the alternation of disinfectants. Pharmacies subject to an
institutional infection control policy may follow that policy as it relates to cleaning schedules and the alternation of disinfectants in lieu of complying with this subdivision.

### 1751.4. Facility and Equipment Standards for Sterile Injectable Compounds

(c) All equipment used in the designated area or cleanroom must be made of a material that can be easily cleaned and disinfected.

(d) Exterior workbench surfaces and other hard surfaces in the designated area, such as walls, floors, ceilings, shelves, tables, and tools, must be disinfected weekly and after any unanticipated event that could increase the risk of contamination.

(e) Pharmacies preparing parenteral cytotoxic agents shall be in accordance with Section 1106(b) of Title 24 of the California Administrative Code, requiring a laminar air-flow hood. The hood must be certified annually by a qualified technician who is familiar with the methods and procedures for certifying laminar air-flow hoods and cleanroom requirements, in accordance with National Sanitation Foundation Standard 49 for Class II (Laminar Flow) Biohazard Cabinet, as revised May 1983. Certification records must be retained for at least three years.

### 505.5 Pharmacies: Compounding Area for Parenteral Solutions

The pharmacy shall have a designated area for the preparation of sterile products for dispensing which shall:

1. Be ventilated in a manner not interfering with laminar air-flow.

### Placement of Devices Not Specifically Addressed

‡ Placement of devices (e.g., computers and printers) and objects (e.g., carts and cabinets) can be placed in buffer areas and shall be verified by monitoring.

### Viable and Nonviable Environmental Sampling (ES) Testing

† Environmental sampling shall occur as part of a comprehensive quality management program and shall occur minimally when several conditions exist.

‡ The ES program should provide information to staff and leadership to demonstrate that the engineering controls are maintaining an environment within the compounding area that consistently maintains acceptably low viable and nonviable particle levels.

### Environmental Nonviable Particle Testing Program

† Certification and testing of primary (LAFWs, BSCs, CAIs and CACIs) and secondary engineering controls (buffer and ante areas) shall be performed by a qualified individual at least once every six months and whenever the device or room is relocated, altered, or major service is performed to the facility. Certification procedures such as those outlined in the CETA Certification Guide for Sterile...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compounding Facilities</th>
<th>CAG-003-2006</th>
<th>shall be used.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Total Particle Counts**

† Certification that each ISO classified area (e.g., ISO Class 5, 7, and 8) is within established guidelines shall be performed no less than every 6 months and whenever the LAFW, BSC, CAI, or CACI is relocated or the physical structure of the buffer room or ante-area has been altered. Not Specifically Addressed

† Testing shall be performed by qualified operators using current, state-of-the-art electronic equipment with results meeting ISO Class 5, 7, or 8 depending on the requirements of the area. Not Specifically Addressed

† All certification records shall be maintained and reviewed by supervising personnel or other designated employee to ensure that the controlled environments comply with the proper air cleanliness, room pressures, and air changes per hour. Not Specifically Addressed

**Environmental Viable Airborne Particle Testing Program—Sampling Plan**

† An appropriate environmental sampling plan shall be developed for airborne viable particles based on risk assessment of compounding activities performed. Not Specifically Addressed

† Selected sampling sites shall include locations within each ISO Class 5 environment and in the ISO Class 7 areas and the segregated compounding areas at greatest risk of contamination (e.g., work areas near the ISO Class 5 environment, counters near doors, pass-through boxes). Not Specifically Addressed

† The plan shall include sample location, method of collection, frequency of sampling, volume of air sampled, and time of day as related to activity in the compounding area and action levels. Not Specifically Addressed

† It is recommended that compounding personnel refer to USP Chapter Microbiological Evaluation of Clean Rooms and Other Controlled Environments 1116 and the CDC Guidelines for Environmental Infection Control in Healthcare Facilities-2003 for more information. Not Specifically Addressed

**Viable Air Sampling**

† Evaluation of airborne microorganisms using volumetric collection methods in the controlled environment shall be performed by properly trained individuals for all compounding risk levels. Not Specifically Addressed

† Impaction shall be the preferred method of volumetric air sampling. Not Specifically Addressed

† For low-, medium-, and high-risk level compounding, air sampling shall be performed at locations that are prone to contamination during compounding activities and during other activities like staging, labeling, gowning, and cleaning. Not Specifically Addressed

† Locations shall include zones of air backwash turbulence within laminar airflow workbench and other areas where air backwash turbulence may enter the compounding area. Not Specifically Addressed

† For low-risk level CSPs with ≤2-hour BUD, air sampling shall be performed at locations inside the ISO Class 5 environment and other areas that are in close proximity to the ISO Class 5 environment, during the certification of the primary engineering control. Not Specifically Addressed

† Consideration should be given to the overall effect the chosen sampling method will have on the unidirectional airflow within.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Air Sampling Devices</strong></th>
<th>† The instructions in the manufacturer’s user manual for verification and use of electric air samplers that actively collect volumes of air for evaluation shall be followed.</th>
<th>Not Specifically Addressed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>† A sufficient volume of air (400–1000 liters) shall be tested at each location in order to maximize sensitivity.</td>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>† It is recommended that compounding personnel also refer to USP Chapter &lt;1116&gt; that can provide more information on the use of volumetric air samplers and volume of air that should be sampled to detect environmental bioburden excursions.</td>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air Sampling Frequency and Process</strong></td>
<td>† Air sampling shall be performed at least semiannually (i.e., every 6 months), as part of the re-certification of facilities and equipment for areas where primary engineering controls are located.</td>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>† A sufficient volume of air shall be sampled and the manufacturer’s guidelines for use of the electronic air sampling equipment followed.</td>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>† Any facility construction or equipment servicing may require the need to perform air sampling during these events.</td>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>† The microbial growth media plates used to collect environmental sampling are recovered, covers secured (e.g., taped), inverted, and incubated at a temperature and for a time period conducive to multiplication of microorganisms.</td>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>† The number of discrete colonies of microorganisms shall be counted and reported as colony-forming units (cfu) and documented in an environmental monitoring form. Counts from air monitoring need to be transformed into cfu/cubic meter of air and evaluated for adverse trends.</td>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>† TSA should be incubated at 35°±2° for 2–3 days.</td>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>† MEA or other suitable fungal media should be incubated at 28°±2° for 5–7 days.</td>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pressure Differential Monitoring</strong></td>
<td>† A pressure gauge or velocity meter shall be installed to monitor the pressure differential in airflow between the buffer area and ante area and the ante area and the general environment outside the compounding area.</td>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>† The results shall be reviewed and documented in a log at least every workshift (minimum frequency shall be at least daily) or by a continuous recording device.</td>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>† The pressure between the ISO Class 7 and general pharmacy area shall be not less than 5 Pa (0.02 inch water column [w.c.]).</td>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>† In facilities where low- and medium-risk level CSPs are prepared, differential airflow shall maintain a minimum velocity of 0.2 meter second (40 fpm) between buffer area and ante area.</td>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Growth Media</strong></td>
<td>† A general microbiological growth medium such as Soybean–Casein Digest Medium (also known as trypticase soy broth [TSB] or agar [TSA]) shall be used to support the growth of bacteria.</td>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Incubation Period (For Environmental Sampling)

**Incubation Period**

- The microbial growth media plates used to collect environmental sampling are recovered, covers secured (e.g., taped), inverted, and incubated at a temperature and for a time period conducive to multiplication of microorganisms.

**Media used for surface sampling shall be supplemented with additives to neutralize the effects of disinfecting agents (e.g., TSA with lecithin and polysorbate 80).** Not Specifically Addressed

**Action Levels, Documentation and Data Evaluation**

- Sampling data shall be collected and reviewed on a periodic basis as a means of evaluating the overall control of the compounding environment.

**Competent microbiology personnel shall be consulted if an environmental sampling consistently shows elevated levels of microbial growth.** Not Specifically Addressed

- An investigation into the source of the environmental contamination shall be conducted. Not Specifically Addressed

- Any cfu count that exceeds its respective action level should prompt the re-evaluation of personnel, work practices, cleaning procedures, operational procedures, and air filtration efficiency within the aseptic compounding location. Not Specifically Addressed

- Table titled, Recommended Action Levels for Microbial Contamination should only be used as a guideline. Not Specifically Addressed

### Facility Design and Environmental Controls

- Compounding facilities are physically designed and environmentally controlled to minimize airborne contamination from contacting critical sites.

1735.6. Compounding Facilities and Equipment

(a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding shall maintain written documentation regarding the facilities and equipment necessary for safe and accurate compounded drug products. Where applicable, this shall include records of certification(s) of facilities or equipment.

(b) Any equipment used to compound drug products shall be stored, used, and maintained in accordance with manufacturers' specifications.

(c) Any equipment used to compound drug products for which calibration or adjustment is appropriate shall be calibrated prior to use to ensure accuracy. Documentation of each such calibration shall be recorded in writing and these records of calibration shall be maintained and retained in the pharmacy.

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1751. Sterile Injectable Compounding; Compounding Area; Self-Assessment
(a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall comply with the parameters and requirements stated by Article 4.5 (Section 1735 et seq.), applicable to all compounding, and shall also conform to the parameters and requirements stated by this Article 7 (Section 1751 et seq.), applicable solely to sterile injectable compounding.
(b) Any pharmacy compounding sterile injectable drug products shall have a designated area for the preparation of sterile injectable products which shall meet the following standards:
   (1) Clean Room and Work Station Requirements, shall be in accordance with Section 90A.3.1 of Title 24, Part 2, Chapter 1A of the California Code of Regulations.
   (2) Be ventilated in a manner in accordance with Section 505.12 of Title 24, Part 4, Chapter 5 of the California Code of Regulations.
   (3) Be certified annually by a qualified technician who is familiar with the methods and procedures for certifying laminar airflow hoods and clean room requirements, in accordance with standards adopted by the United States General Services Administration. Certification records must be retained for at least 5 years.
   (4) The pharmacy shall be arranged in accordance with Section 90A.3 of Title 24, Part 2, Chapter 1A of the California Code of Regulations. Items related to the compounding of sterile injectable products within the compounding area shall be stored in such a way as to maintain the integrity of aseptic environment.
(c) Any pharmacy compounding a sterile injectable product from one or more non-sterile ingredients shall comply with Business and Professions Code Section 4127.7.

1751.1. Sterile Injectable Recordkeeping Requirements.
(b) In addition to the records required by Section 1735.3 and subdivision (a), a pharmacy shall keep the following records:
   (3) Certification of the sterile compounding environment.
   (4) Other facility and equipment quality control logs specific to the pharmacy’s policies and procedures (e.g., cleaning logs for facilities and equipment).
(c) Pharmacies shall maintain all records required by this article in the pharmacy in a readily retrievable form for at least three years from the date the record was created.

(3) Policies and procedures must address at least the following:
   (F) Use and maintenance of environmental control devices used to create the critical area for manipulation of sterile injectable products (e.g., laminar airflow workstations, biological safety cabinets, Class 100 cleanrooms, and barrier isolator workstations).

1751.4. Facility and Equipment Standards for Sterile Injectable Compounding
(c) All equipment used in the designated area or cleanroom must be made of a material that can be easily cleaned and disinfected.
1250.4 Compounding Area for Parenteral Solutions. The pharmacy shall have a designated area for the preparation of sterile products for dispensing which shall:

1. Be constructed in accordance with Federal Standard 209(b), Clean Room and Work Station Requirements, Controlled Environment, as approved by the Commission, Federal Supply Service, General Services Administration, meet standards for class 100 HEPA high efficiency particulate air filtered air such as laminar airflow hood or cleanroom.

2. Have non-porous and cleanable surfaces, walls, floors, and floor coverings.

3. Be arranged in such a manner that the laminar airflow hood is located in an area which is exposed to minimal traffic flow, and is separate from any area used for bulk storage of items not related to the compounding of sterile parenteral solution. There shall be sufficient space, well separated from the laminar airflow hood area, for the storage of bulk materials, equipment, and waste materials.

5. Any pharmacy that compounds sterile injectable products from one or more non-sterile ingredients must have written policies and procedures that comply with the following environments:

- An ISO class laminar airflow hood within an ISO class 7 cleanroom. The cleanroom must have a positive air pressure differential relative to adjacent areas.
- An ISO class 5 cleanroom.
- A barrier isolator that provides an ISO class 5 environment for compounding.

Note: For additional pharmacy mechanical standard requirements, see Chapter 5, California Mechanical Code.

505.5 Pharmacies: Compounding Area for Parenteral Solutions. The pharmacy shall have a designated area for the preparation of sterile products for dispensing which shall:

1. Be ventilated in a manner not interfering with laminar airflow.

† Compounding facilities shall provide a comfortable and well-lighted working environment, which typically includes a temperature of 20° or cooler to maintain comfortable conditions for compounding personnel when attired in the required aseptic compounding garb.

† Primary engineering controls provide unidirectional, i.e., laminar, HEPA air filter airflow velocities sufficient to prevent airborne particles from contacting critical sites.

1751.3. Sterile Injectable Policies and Procedures. (d) Pharmacies compounding sterile injectable products from one or more non-sterile ingredients must have written policies and procedures that comply with the following:

1. Policies and procedures must address at least the following:
   (F) Use and maintenance of environmental control devices used to create the critical area for manipulation of sterile products, e.g., laminar airflow.
workstations, biological safety cabinets, class 100 cleanrooms, and barrier isolator workstations).

### 1250.4 Compounding Area for Parenteral Solutions

The pharmacy shall have a designated area for the preparation of sterile products for dispensing which shall:

1. Be in accordance with Federal Standard 209(b), Clean Room and Work Station Requirements, Controlled Environment, as approved by the Commission, Federal Supply Service, General Services Administration, and meet standards for class 100 HEPA (high efficiency particulate air) filtered air such as laminar airflow hood or cleanroom.

5. Any pharmacy that compounds sterile injectable products from one or more nonsterile ingredients must compound the medication in one of the following environments:

   - 5.1 An ISO class laminar airflow hood within an ISO class 7 cleanroom. The cleanroom must have a positive air pressure differential relative to adjacent areas.
   - 5.2 An ISO class 5 cleanroom.
   - 5.3 A barrier isolator that provides an ISO class 5 environment for compounding.

Note: For additional pharmacy mechanical standard requirements, see Chapter 5, California Mechanical Code.†

In situ air pattern analysis via smoke studies shall be conducted at the critical area to demonstrate unidirectional airflow and sweeping action over and away from the product under dynamic conditions.

Policies and procedures for maintaining and working within the primary engineering control area shall be written and followed. These policies and procedures will be determined by the scope and risk levels of the aseptic compounding activities used during the preparation of the CSPs.

State Law only addresses sterile compounds made from one or more non-sterile ingredients. Other risk levels are not specifically addressed.

### 1751.3. Sterile Injectable Policies and Procedures

(d) Pharmacies compounding sterile injectable products from one or more non-sterile ingredients must have written policies and procedures that comply with the following:

(3) Policies and procedures must address at least the following:

   (F) Use and maintenance of environmental control devices used to create the critical area for manipulation of sterile products (e.g., laminar airflow workstations, biological safety cabinets, class 100 cleanrooms, and barrier isolator workstations).

### 1751.7. Sterile Injectable Compounding Quality Assurance and Process Validation

(a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall maintain a written quality assurance plan including, in addition to the elements required by Section 735.8, a documented, ongoing quality assurance program that monitors personnel performance, equipment, and facilities. The end product shall be examined on a periodic sampling basis as determined by the pharmacist in charge to assure that it meets required standards.
### 1250.4 Compounding Area for Parenteral Solutions

- **The pharmacy shall have a designated area for the preparation of sterile products for dispensing which shall:**
  1. In accordance with Federal Standard 209(b), Clean Room and Work Station Requirements, Controlled Environment, as approved by the Commission, Federal Supply Service, General Services Administration, meet standards for class 100 HEPA (high efficiency particulate air) filtered air such as laminar airflow hood or clean room.

- **Clean rooms for nonhazardous and nonradioactive CSPs are supplied with HEPA that enters from ceilings with return vents low on walls, and shall provide not less than 30 air changes per hour.**

- **Buffer areas maintain 0.02- to 0.05-inch water column positive pressure, and do not contain sinks or drains.**

- **Air velocity from buffer rooms or zones to ante-areas is at least 40 feet/minute.**

- **The primary engineering controls shall be placed within buffer areas in such a manner as to avoid conditions that could adversely affect their operation.**

- **The primary engineering controls shall be placed out of the traffic flow and in a manner to avoid disruption from the HVAC system and room cross-drafts.**

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Original Document Date: March 2013
### Pharmacy Arrangement

3. The pharmacy shall be arranged in such a manner that the laminar flow hood is located in an area which is exposed to minimal traffic flow, and is separate from any area used for bulk storage of items not related to the compounding of parenteral solutions. There shall be sufficient space, well separated from the laminar flow hood area, for the storage of bulk materials, equipment, and waste materials.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HEPA-filtered supply air shall be introduced at the ceiling.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All HEPA filters shall be efficiency tested using the most penetrating particle size and shall be leak tested at the factory and then leak tested again in situ after installation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities and tasks carried out within the buffer area shall be limited to only those necessary when working within a controlled environment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only the furniture, equipment, supplies, and other material required for the compounding activities to be performed shall be brought into the room.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surfaces and essential furniture in buffer rooms, clean rooms shall be nonporous, smooth, nonshedding, impermeable, cleanable, and resistant to disinfectants.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The surfaces of ceilings, walls, floors, fixtures, shelving, counters, and cabinets in the buffer area shall be smooth, impervious, free from tracks, and crevices, and nonshedding, thereby promoting cleanliness and minimizing spaces in which microorganisms and other contaminants may accumulate.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The surfaces shall be resistant to damage by disinfectant agents.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junctures of ceilings to walls shall be coved or caulked to avoid cracks and crevices where dirt can accumulate.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceiling tiles shall be caulked around each perimeter to seal them to the support frame.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The exterior lens surface of ceiling lighting fixtures shall be smooth, mounted flush, and sealed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Sterile Injectable Policies and Procedures


3. Policies and procedures must address at least the following:

   E. Personnel access and movement of materials into and near the controlled area.

   S. Activities and tasks carried out within the buffer area shall be limited to only those necessary when working within a controlled environment.

1751.4. Facility and Equipment Standards for Sterile Injectable Compounding

(c) All equipment used in the designated area or cleanroom must be made of material that can be easily cleaned and disinfected.

1250.4 Compounding Area for Parenteral Solutions.

2. The pharmacy shall have a designated area for the preparation of sterile products for dispensing which shall:

   Have non-porous and cleanable surfaces, walls, floors, and floor coverings.

### Facility and Equipment Standards for Sterile Injectable Compounding

1751.4. Facility and Equipment Standards for Sterile Injectable Compounding

(c) All equipment used in the designated area or cleanroom must be made of material that can be easily cleaned and disinfected.

1250.4 Compounding Area for Parenteral Solutions.

2. Have non-porous and cleanable surfaces, walls, floors, and floor coverings.
### Place of Primary Engineering Controls Within ISO Class 7 Buffer Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Not Specifically Addressed</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any other penetrations through the ceiling or walls shall be sealed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The buffer area shall not contain sources of water (sinks) or floor drains.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work surfaces shall be constructed of smooth, impervious materials, such as stainless steel or molded plastic, so that they are easily cleaned and disinfected.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carts shall be of stainless steel, wire, nonporous plastic, or sheet metal construction with good quality, cleanable casters to promote mobility.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storage shelving, counters, and cabinets shall be smooth, impervious, free from tracks and revices, nonshedding, cleanable, and disinfecatable.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their number, design, and manner of installation of the items above shall promote effective cleaning and disinfection.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ceilings consist of inlaid panels, the panels should be impregnated with a polymer to render them impervious and hydrophobic.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dust-collecting overhangs, such as ceiling utility pipes, or ledges, such as windowsills, should be avoided.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air returns should be mounted low on the wall treating the general top-down dilution of room air with HEPA-filtered make-up air.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Presterilization procedures for high-risk level CSPs, such as weighing and mixing, shall be completed in a less than ISO Class 7 environment.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### 1250.4 Compounding Area for Parenteral Solutions

- The pharmacy shall have a designated area for the preparation of sterile products for dispensing, which shall:
  1. Have non-porous and cleanable surfaces, walls, floors, and floor coverings.
  2. Be located in an area which is exposed to minimal traffic flow, and is separate from the utility and traffic patterns that could disrupt the intended airflow patterns.

- All equipment used in the designated area shall be made of a material that can be easily cleaned and disinfected.

- Storage shelving, counters, and cabinets shall be smooth, impervious, free from cracks and crevices, nonshedding, cleanable, and disinfecatable.

- The buffer area shall not contain sources of water (sinks) or floor drains. Work surfaces shall be constructed of smooth, impervious materials, such as stainless steel or molded plastic, so that they are easily cleaned and disinfected.

- Carts shall be of stainless steel, wire, nonporous plastic, or sheet metal construction with good quality, cleanable casters to promote mobility.

- The pharmacy shall have a designated area for the preparation of sterile products for dispensing, which shall:
  1. In accordance with Federal Standard 209(b), Clean Room and Work Station Requirements, Controlled Environment, as approved by the Commission, Federal Supply Service, General Services Administration, meet standards for Class 100 HEPA (High Efficiency Particulate Air) filtered air, and be arranged in such a manner that the laminar airflow hood is located in an area which is exposed to minimal traffic flow, and is separate from the utility and traffic patterns that could disrupt the intended airflow patterns.
  2. Have non-porous and cleanable surfaces, walls, floors, and floor coverings.
### Cleaning and Disinfecting the Sterile Compounding Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Not Specifically Addressed</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>†When isolators are used for sterile compounding, the recovery time to achieve ISO Class 5 air quality shall be documented and internal procedures developed to ensure that adequate recovery times are allowed after material transfer before and during compounding operations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>†When compounding activities require the manipulation of a patient’s blood-derived or other biological materials (e.g., radiolabeling a patient’s or a donor's white blood cells), the manipulations shall be clearly separated from routine material-handling procedures and equipment used in CSP preparation activities, and they shall be controlled by specific standard operating procedures in order to avoid any cross-contamination.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>†Packaged compounding supplies and components, such as needles, syringes, tubing sets, and small- and large-volume parenterals, should be unpacked in an ISO Class 8 air quality buffer area, or rooms, before being passed into the buffer areas.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>†Demarcation designation between buffer areas or rooms and ante-areas.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>†Antiseptic hand cleansing and sterile gowns in buffer areas or rooms.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>†Packaged compounding supplies and components, such as needles, syringes, tubing sets, and small- and large-volume parenterals, should be unpacked in an ISO Class 8 air quality buffer area, or rooms, before being passed into the buffer areas.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>†Cleaning and disinfecting surfaces in the LAFWs, BSCs, CAIs, and CACIs shall be cleaned and disinfected frequently, including at the beginning of the day.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1735.5. Compounding Policies and Procedures

(a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding shall maintain a written policy and procedure manual for compounding that establishes procurement procedures, methodologies for the formulation and compounding of drugs, facilities and equipment cleaning, maintenance, operation, and other standard operating procedures related to compounding.

(c) The policy and procedure manual shall include the following:

(3) The procedures for maintaining, storing, and cleaning and disinfecting equipment used in compounding, and for training on these procedures as part of the staff training and competency evaluation process.


(3) Policies and procedures must address at least the following:

(G) Regular cleaning schedule for the controlled area and any equipment in the controlled area, and the alternation of disinfectants. Pharmacies subject to institutional infection control policy may follow that policy as it relates to cleaning schedules and the alternation of disinfectants in lieu of complying with this subdivision.
each work shift, before each batch preparation is started, every 30 minutes during continuous compounding periods of individual CSPs, when there are spills, and when surface contamination is known or suspected from procedural breaches.

Trained compounding personnel are responsible for developing, implementing, and practicing the procedures for cleaning and disinfecting the DCAs written in the SOPs.

Cleaning and disinfecting shall occur before compounding is performed. Items shall be removed from all areas to be cleaned and surfaces shall be cleaned by removing loose material and residue from spills, e.g., water-soluble solid residues are removed with Sterile Water (for Injection or Irrigation) and low-shedding wipes. This shall be followed by wiping with a residue-free disinfecting agent, such as sterile 70% IPA, which is allowed to dry before compounding begins.

Work surfaces in ISO Class 7 and 8 areas and segregated compounding areas are cleaned at least daily. Dust and debris shall be removed when necessary from storage sites for compounding ingredients and supplies, using a method that does not degrade the ISO Class 7 or 8 air quality.

Floors in ISO Class 7 and 8 areas are cleaned daily when no compounding occurs.

IPA (70% isopropyl alcohol) remains on surfaces to be disinfected for at least 30 seconds before such are used to prepare CSPs.

Emptied shelving, walls, and ceilings in ante-areas are cleaned and disinfected at least monthly.

Mopping shall be performed by trained personnel using approved agents and procedures described in the written SOPs.

Cleaning and disinfecting agents, their schedules of use, and methods of application shall be in accordance with written SOPs and followed by custodial and/or compounding personnel.

Compounding Policies and Procedures

The procedures for maintaining, storing, calibrating, cleaning, and disinfecting the equipment used in compounding, and for training on these procedures shall be part of the staff training and competency evaluation process.

Cleaning and disinfecting shall occur before compounding is performed. Items shall be removed from all areas to be cleaned and surfaces shall be cleaned by removing loose material and residue from spills, e.g., water-soluble solid residues are removed with Sterile Water (for Injection or Irrigation) and low-shedding wipes. This shall be followed by wiping with a residue-free disinfecting agent, such as sterile 70% IPA, which is allowed to dry before compounding begins.

Work surfaces in ISO Class 7 and 8 areas and segregated compounding areas are cleaned at least daily. Dust and debris shall be removed when necessary from storage sites for compounding ingredients and supplies, using a method that does not degrade the ISO Class 7 or 8 air quality.

Floors in ISO Class 7 and 8 areas are cleaned daily when no compounding occurs.

IPA (70% isopropyl alcohol) remains on surfaces to be disinfected for at least 30 seconds before such are used to prepare CSPs.

Emptied shelving, walls, and ceilings in ante-areas are cleaned and disinfected at least monthly.

Mopping shall be performed by trained personnel using approved agents and procedures described in the written SOPs.

Cleaning and disinfecting agents, their schedules of use, and methods of application shall be in accordance with written SOPs and followed by custodial and/or compounding personnel.

Compounding Policies and Procedures

The procedures for maintaining, storing, calibrating, cleaning, and disinfecting the equipment used in compounding, and for training on these procedures shall be part of the staff training and competency evaluation process.

Cleaning and disinfecting shall occur before compounding is performed. Items shall be removed from all areas to be cleaned and surfaces shall be cleaned by removing loose material and residue from spills, e.g., water-soluble solid residues are removed with Sterile Water (for Injection or Irrigation) and low-shedding wipes. This shall be followed by wiping with a residue-free disinfecting agent, such as sterile 70% IPA, which is allowed to dry before compounding begins.

Work surfaces in ISO Class 7 and 8 areas and segregated compounding areas are cleaned at least daily. Dust and debris shall be removed when necessary from storage sites for compounding ingredients and supplies, using a method that does not degrade the ISO Class 7 or 8 air quality.

Floors in ISO Class 7 and 8 areas are cleaned daily when no compounding occurs.

IPA (70% isopropyl alcohol) remains on surfaces to be disinfected for at least 30 seconds before such are used to prepare CSPs.

Emptied shelving, walls, and ceilings in ante-areas are cleaned and disinfected at least monthly.

Mopping shall be performed by trained personnel using approved agents and procedures described in the written SOPs.

Cleaning and disinfecting agents, their schedules of use, and methods of application shall be in accordance with written SOPs and followed by custodial and/or compounding personnel.

Compounding Policies and Procedures

The procedures for maintaining, storing, calibrating, cleaning, and disinfecting the equipment used in compounding, and for training on these procedures shall be part of the staff training and competency evaluation process.
1751.3. Sterile Injectable Policies and Procedures

(3) Policies and procedures must address at least the following:

(G) Regular cleaning schedule for the controlled area and any equipment in the controlled area and the alternation of disinfectants. Pharmacies subject to an institutional infection control policy may follow that policy as it relates to cleaning schedules and the alternation of disinfectants instead of complying with this subdivision.

1751.7. Sterile Injectable Compounding Quality Assurance and Process Validation.

(a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall maintain, as part of its written policies and procedures, a written quality assurance plan including, in addition to the elements required by Section 1735.8, a documented, ongoing quality assurance program that monitors personnel performance, equipment, and facilities.

The end product shall be examined on a periodic sampling basis as determined by the pharmacist-in-charge to assure that it meets required specifications. The quality assurance program shall include at least the following:

(1) Cleaning and sanitization of the parenteral medication preparation area.

† All cleaning materials, such as wipers, sponges, and mops, shall be nonshedding, preferably composed of synthetic micro fibers, and dedicated to use in the buffer area, or ante‐area, and segregated compounding areas and shall not be removed from these areas except for disposal.

† All cleaning materials are reused (e.g., mops), procedures shall be developed based on manufacturer recommendations that ensure that the effectiveness of the cleaning device is maintained and repeated use does not add to the bioburden of the area being cleaned.

† Supplies and equipment removed from shipping cartons shall be wiped with a suitable disinfecting agent (e.g., 70% IPA) delivered from a spray bottle or other suitable delivery method.

† After the disinfectant is sprayed or wiped on a surface to be disinfected, the disinfectant shall be allowed to dry, and during this time, the item shall not be used for compounding purposes.

† Sterile 70% IPA wetted gauze pads or other particle‐generating material shall not be used to disinfect the sterile entry points of packages and devices.

Standard Operating Procedures

Suggested Standard Operating Procedures

† All facilities are required to have these, and they must include at least the items enumerated in this section. The compounding facility shall have written, properly approved SOPs designed to ensure the quality of the environment in which the CSP is prepared. The following procedures are recommended:

1735.5. Compounding Policies and Procedures

(a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding shall maintain a written policy and procedure manual for compounding that establishes procurement procedures, methodologies for the formulation and compounding of drugs, facilities and equipment, cleaning, maintenance, operation, and other standard operating
procedures related to compounding.

(b) The policy and procedure manual shall be reviewed on an annual basis by the pharmacist-in-charge and shall be updated whenever changes in processes are implemented.

(c) The policy and procedure manual shall include the following:

1. Procedures for notifying staff assigned to compounding duties of any changes in processes or to the policy and procedure manual.
2. Documentation of a plan for recall of a dispensed compounded drug product where subsequent verification demonstrates the potential for adverse effects with continued use of the compounded drug product.
3. Procedures for maintaining, storing, cleaning, and disinfecting equipment used in compounding, and for training staff in these procedures as part of the staff training and competency evaluation process.
4. Documentation of the methodology used to test integrity, potency, quality, and labeled strength of compounded drug products.
5. Documentation of the methodology used to determine appropriate expiration dates for compounded drug products.

1735.8. Compounding Quality Assurance

(a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding shall maintain, as part of its written policies and procedures, a written quality assurance plan designed to monitor and ensure the integrity, potency, quality, and labeled strength of compounded drug products.


(a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall maintain a written policy and procedure manual for compounding that includes, in addition to the elements required by section 1735.5, written policies and procedures regarding the following:

1. Compounding, filling, and labeling of sterile injectable compounds.
2. Labeling of the sterile injectable product based on the intended route of administration and recommended rate of administration.
3. Equipment and supplies.
4. Training of staff in the preparation of sterile injectable products.
5. Procedures for handling cytotoxic agents.
6. Quality assurance program.
7. Record keeping requirements.

(b) The ingredients and the compounding process for each preparation must be determined in writing before compounding begins and must be reviewed by a pharmacist.

(c) Pharmacies compounding sterile injectable products shall have written policies and procedures for the disposal of infectious materials and/or materials containing cytotoxic residues. The written policies and procedures shall describe the pharmacy protocols for cleanups and spills in conformity with local health jurisdiction standards.

(d) Pharmacies compounding sterile injectable products from one or more sources shall have written policies and procedures for the disposal of infectious materials and/or materials containing cytotoxic residues. The written policies and procedures shall describe the pharmacy protocols for cleanups and spills in conformity with local health jurisdiction standards.
non-sterile ingredients must have written policies and procedures that comply with the following:

1. All written policies and procedures shall be immediately available to all personnel involved in these activities and board inspectors.
2. All personnel involved shall read the policies and procedures before compounding sterile injectable products, and any additions, revisions, and deletions to the written policies and procedures shall be communicated to all personnel involved in sterile compounding.
3. Policies and procedures must address at least the following:
   - Competency evaluation
   - Storage and handling of products and supplies
   - Storage and delivery of final products
   - Process validation
   - Personnel access and movement of materials into and near the controlled area
   - Use and maintenance of environmental control devices used to create the critical area for manipulation of sterile products (e.g., laminar airflow workstations, biological safety cabinets, class 100 cleanrooms, and barrier isolator workstations)
   - Regular cleaning schedules for the controlled area and the alternation of disinfectants. Pharmacies subject to an institutional infection control policy may follow that policy as it relates to cleaning schedules and the alternation of disinfectants in lieu of complying with this subdivision.
   - Disposal of packaging materials, used syringes, containers, and needles to enhance sanitation and avoid accumulation in the controlled area.
   - For sterile batch compounding, written policies and procedures must be established for the use of master formulas and work sheets and for appropriate documentation.
   - Sterilization
   - End-product evaluation and testing

1751.7. Sterile Injectable Compounding Quality Assurance and Process Validation.

(a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall maintain, as part of its written policies and procedures, a documented, ongoing quality assurance program that monitors personnel, equipment, and facilities. The end product shall be examined on a periodic and sampling basis as determined by the pharmacist in charge to assure that it meets the required specifications.


(a) All cartoned supplies are decontaminated in the area by removing them from shipping cartons and wiping or spraying them with a nonresidue-generating disinfecting agent while in the area. All personnel with specific responsibilities assigned to tasks in the compounding area.

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they are being transferred to a clean and properly disinfected cart or other conveyance for introduction into the buffer area. Manufacturer's directions or published data for minimum contact time will be followed. Individual pouches of sterile supplies need not be wiped because the pouches can be removed as the sterile supplies are introduced into the buffer area.

3. Supplies that are required frequently or otherwise needed close at hand but not necessarily needed for the scheduled operations of the shift are decontaminated and stored on a designated shelving in the ante-area.

4. Carts used to bring supplies from the storeroom cannot be rolled beyond the demarcation line in the ante-area, and carts used in the buffer area cannot be rolled outward beyond the demarcation line unless cleaned and disinfected before returning.

5. Generally, supplies required for the scheduled operations of the shift are wiped down with an appropriate disinfecting agent and brought into the buffer area; preferably on one or more movable carts. Supplies that are required for back-up for general support of operations may be stored on the designated shelving in the buffer area, but excessive amounts of supplies are to be avoided.

6. Nonessential objects that shed particles shall not be brought into the buffer area, including pencils, cardboard cartons, paper towels, and cotton items (e.g., gauze pads).

7. Essential paper-related products (e.g., paper syringe overwraps, work records contained in protective sleeve) shall be wiped down with an appropriate disinfecting agent prior to being brought into the buffer area.

8. Traffic flow in and out of the buffer area shall be minimized.

9. Personnel preparing to enter the buffer area shall remove all personal outer garments, cosmetics (because they shed flakes and particles), hand and wrist, and all visible jewelry or piercings that can interfere with the effectiveness of PPE.


11. Personnel shall then thoroughly wash hands and forearms to enhance sanitation and avoid accumulation in the controlled area.

1250.4 Compounding Area for Parenteral Solutions. The pharmacy shall have a designated area for the preparation of sterile products for dispensing which shall:

3. The pharmacy shall be arranged in such a manner that the laminar-flow hood is located in an area which is exposed to minimal traffic flow, and is separate from any area used for bulk storage of items not related to the compounding of parenteral solution. There shall be sufficient space and well-separated from the laminar-flow hood area, for the storage of bulk materials, equipment and waste materials.

The pharmacy shall be arranged in such a manner that the laminar-flow hood is located in an area which is exposed to minimal traffic flow, and is separate from any area used for bulk storage of items not related to the compounding of parenteral solution. There shall be sufficient space and well-separated from the laminar-flow hood area, for the storage of bulk materials, equipment and waste materials.


3. Policies and procedures must address at least the following:

E. Personnel access and movement of materials into and near the controlled area.

State Law Only Addresses Garbing Requirements for Sterile Preparations Made from One or More Non-sterile Ingredients and Cytotoxic agents.

1751.4. Facility and Equipment Standards for Sterile Injectable Compounding.

b. During the preparation of sterile injectable products, access to the designated area or cleanroom must be limited to those individuals who are properly attired.

State Law Addresses Equipment but Makes No Specific Mention of Essential Paper-related Products.
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<tr>
<td>12. Personnel entering the buffer area shall perform antiseptic hand cleansing prior to donning sterile gloves using waterless alcohol-based surgical hand scrub with persistent activity.</td>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
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<td>13. Chewing gum, drinks, food items shall not be brought into the buffer area. Materials exposed in patient care and treatment areas shall not be introduced into areas where components and ingredients for CSPs are present.</td>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
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<td>14. At the beginning of each compounding activity session, and whenever liquids are spilled, the surfaces of the direct compounding environment are first cleaned with USP Purified Water to remove water-soluble residues. Immediately thereafter, the same surfaces are disinfected with a nonresidue-generating agent using a non linting wipe.</td>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
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<td>15. Primary engineering controls shall be operated continuously during compounding activity. When the blower is turned off and before other personnel enter to perform compounding activities, only one person shall enter the buffer area for the purposes of turning on the blower (for at least 20 minutes) and disinfecting the work surfaces.</td>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. Traffic in the area of the DCA is minimized and controlled.</td>
<td>1751.3. Sterile Injectable Policies and Procedures. (3) Policies and procedures must address at least the following: (E) Personnel access and movement of materials into and near the controlled area.</td>
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<td>17. Supplies used in the DCA for the planned procedures are accumulated and then disinfected by wiping or spraying the buffer surface with sterile 70% IPA, removing the buffer wrap at the edge of the DCA as the items are introduced into the aseptic work area.</td>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
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<td>18. All supply items are arranged in the DCA so as to reduce clutter and provide maximum efficiency and order for the flow of work.</td>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
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<td>19. After proper introduction into the DCA, supply items required for and limited to the assigned operations, they are so arranged that a clear, uninterrupted path of HEPA-filtered air will bathe all critical sites at all times during the planned procedures. That is, no objects may be placed between the first air from HEPA filters and an exposed critical site.</td>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
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<td>20. All procedures are performed in a manner designed to minimize the risk of touch contamination. Gloves are disinfected with adequate frequency with an approved disinfectant such as sterile 70% IPA.</td>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
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<td>21. All rubber stoppers of vials and bottles and the necks of ampuls are disinfected by wiping with sterile 70% IPA, and...</td>
<td>Not Specifically Addressed</td>
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22. After the preparation of every CSP, the contents of the container are thoroughly mixed and then inspected for the presence of particulate matter, evidence of incompatibility, or other defects.

1735.2. Compounding Limitations and Requirements; Self-Assessment

(d) A drug product shall not be compounded until the pharmacy has first prepared a written master formula record that includes at least the following elements:

   (4) Quality reviews required at each step in preparation of the drug.

   (5) Post-compounding process or procedures required, if any.

(f) The pharmacist performing or supervising compounding is responsible for the integrity, potency, quality, and labeled strength of the compounded drug product until it is dispensed.

1735.8. Compounding Quality Assurance

(a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding shall maintain, as part of its written policies and procedures, a written quality assurance plan designed to monitor and ensure the integrity, potency, quality, and labeled strength of compounded drug products.

(b) The quality assurance plan shall include written procedures for verification, monitoring, and review of the adequacy of the compounding processes and shall also include written documentation of review of those processes by qualified pharmacy personnel.

(c) The quality assurance plan shall include written standards for qualitative and quantitative integrity, potency, quality, and labeled strength analysis of compounded drug products. All qualitative and quantitative analysis reports for compounded drug products shall be retained by the pharmacy and collated with the compounding record and master formula.

(d) The quality assurance plan shall include written procedures for scheduled action in the event any compounded drug product is discovered to be below minimum standards for integrity, potency, quality, or labeled strength.

1751.7. Sterile Injectable Compounding Quality Assurance and Process Validation.

(a) Any pharmacy engaged in compounding sterile injectable drug products shall maintain, as part of its written policies and procedures, a written quality assurance plan including, in addition to the elements required by Section 1735.8, a documented, ongoing quality assurance program that monitors personnel performance, equipment, and facilities. The end product shall be examined on a periodic sampling basis as determined by the pharmacist-in-charge to assure that it meets required specifications.

23. After procedures are completed, used syringes, bottles, vials, and other supplies are removed, but with a minimum of exit and reentry into the DCA so as to minimize the risk of introducing contamination into the aseptic workspace.

State law addresses disposal of equipment and materials but makes no mention of minimum of exit and reentry into the DCA.
June 4, 2013

To: Members, Enforcement and Compounding Committee

Subject: Agenda Item II (e) – Discussion Regarding Batches

Board regulations related to compounding are found in Title 16 of the California Code of Regulations, Article 4.5 (all compounding) and Article 7 (related to sterile injectable compounding).

On April 1, 2013, regulation changes went into effect that apply to compounding definitions, expiration dating, recordkeeping requirements, and labeling of cytotoxic agents. During this rulemaking, the board was asked what the board’s definition of “batch” is, and what requirements apply to batching – but these topics were not within the scope of the regulation change.

At this meeting, the committee will initiate a new discussion of “batch.” The following references are provided for the committee’s information.

Existing Board Regulation
§ 1751.7. Sterile Injectable Compounding Quality Assurance and Process Validation.
(c) Batch-produced sterile injectable drug products compounded from one or more non-sterile ingredients shall be subject to documented end product testing for sterility and pyrogens and shall be quarantined until the end product testing confirms sterility and acceptable levels of pyrogens.

(d) Batch-produced sterile to sterile transfers shall be subject to periodic testing through process validation for sterility as determined by the pharmacist-in-charge and described in the written policies and procedures.

United States Pharmacopeial Convention (USP)
“Batch” – More than 25 units

1 American Society of Health System Pharmacists (ASHP)
Excerpt:
Risk Level 2.
Risk level 2 sterile products exhibit characteristic 1, 2, or 3, stated below. All risk level 2 products should be prepared with sterile equipment, sterile ingredients and solutions, and sterile contact surfaces for the final product and with closed-system transfer methods.

Risk level 2 includes the following:

1. Products stored beyond 7 days under refrigeration, stored beyond 30 days frozen, or administered beyond 28 hours after preparation and storage at room temperature.

2. **Batch-prepared products** *without preservatives* (e.g., epidural products) that are intended for use by more than one patient. (Note: Batch-prepared products without preservatives that will be administered to multiple patients carry a greater risk to the patients than products prepared for a single patient because of the potential effect of inaccurate ingredients or product contamination on the health and well-being of a larger patient group.)

3. Products compounded by complex or numerous manipulations of sterile ingredients obtained from licensed manufacturers in a sterile container or reservoir obtained from a licensed manufacturer by using closed-system aseptic transfer; for example, TPN solutions prepared with an automated compounding machine. (Note: So many risks have been associated with automated compounding of TPN solutions that its complexity requires risk level 2 procedures.)
June 4, 2013

To: Members, Enforcement and Compounding Committee

Subject: Agenda Item II (f) – Compounding Questions and Answers

To provide guidance to pharmacies and others, the board has various “Questions and Answers” on its website in response to questions from practitioners. To reflect recent changes in the board’s compounding regulations which took effect April 1, 2013, the Board is amending some of its “Questions and Answers” as reflected below.

Proposed additions to the text are underscored, and deleted text is shown in strike-out.

7. Question: What happens in a situation where an IV is made to be used on a one-time basis for administration within 72 hours for a registered in-patient of a health care facility and the IV product is not used and returned to the pharmacy? Can it be reused?

Answer: No

The compounding regulations require specific records for compounded drug products. For each compounded drug product, the pharmacy records shall include:
(1) The master formula record.
(2) The date the drug product was compounded.
(3) The identity of the pharmacy personnel who compounded the drug product.
(4) The identity of the pharmacist reviewing the final drug product.
(5) The quantity of each component used in compounding the drug product.
(6) The manufacturer, expiration date and lot number of each component. If the manufacturer name is demonstrably unavailable, the name of the supplier may be substituted. Exempt from the requirements of this paragraph are sterile products compounded on a one-time basis for administration within seventy-two hours and stored in accordance with the standards for “Redispensed CSPs” found in Chapter 797 of the United States Pharmacopeia – National Formulary (USP-NF )35th Revision, Effective May 1, 2012) to an in-patient in a health care facility.
(7) The equipment used in compounding the drug product.
(7) A pharmacy assigned reference or lot number for the compounded drug product.
(8) The expiration date of the final compounded drug product.
(9) The quantity or amount of drug product compounded.

If all the information is not recorded [as provided by the exemption in (6)] then there is a lack of complete traceability and accountability for the compounded drug product and thus it cannot be reused.

Reference: CCR 1735.3(a).
8. Question: Our medical center’s policies and procedures have the initial dose of an IV admixture compounded in the pharmacy satellite to assure timely initiation of therapy, with all subsequent doses mixed in the central pharmacy. Is the initial admixture compounded in the satellite pharmacy subject to the recordkeeping requirements? 

Answer: Yes, with the possible exception of documenting the manufacturer, expiration date and lot number of each component of the admixture. Reference: CCR 1735.3(a)(6)9.

12. Question: What are the requirements for compounding documentation? 

Answer: The compounding regulations require specific records for compounded drug products. For each compounded drug product, the pharmacy records shall include:
1. The master formula record.
2. The date the drug product was compounded.
3. The identity of the pharmacy personnel who compounded the drug product.
4. The identity of the pharmacist reviewing the final drug product.
5. The quantity of each component used in compounding the drug product.
6. The manufacturer, expiration date and lot number of each component. If the manufacturer name is demonstrably unavailable, the name of the supplier may be substituted. Exempt from the requirements of this paragraph are sterile products compounded on a one-time basis for administration within seventy-two hours stored in accordance with the standards for “Redispensed CSPs” found in Chapter 797 of the United States Pharmacopeia – National Formulary (USP-NF) 35th Revision, Effective May 1, 2012 to an in-patient in a health care facility.
7. The equipment used in compounding the drug product.
8. A pharmacy assigned reference or lot number for the compounded drug product.
9. The expiration date of the final compounded drug product.
10. The quantity or amount of drug product compounded.

If all the information is not recorded [as provided by the exemption in (6)] then there is a lack of complete traceability and accountability for the compounded drug product and thus it cannot be reused. Reference: CCR 1735.3(a).

13. Question: When using the record-keeping exemption in 1735.3(a)(6) to compound a one-time Vancomycin IV with a seven-day expiration date and to be used within 72 hours, is the manufacturer, expiration date and lot number required? 

Answer: No.

The regulations provide for an exemption for sterile products compounded on a one-time basis for administration within seventy-two hours and stored in
accordance with the standards for “Redispensed CSPs” found in Chapter 797 of the United States Pharmacopeia – National Formulary (USP-NF) 35th Revision, Effective May 1, 2012
Reference: CCR 1735.3(a)(6)14.

14. Question: When must the manufacturer, expiration and lot number be recorded?
Answer: This information must be documented if the product is not for a one-time use for a specific patient to be used within 72 hours.
Reference: CCR 1735.3(a)(6)15.

23. Question: CCR section 1735.2 defines what must be recorded for each compounded drug product. CCR 1735.2(d)(2) states, “Equipment to be used.” Does this include tubing sets, spikes, needles, syringes, etc.?
Answer: No, equipment is defined in CCR 1735.1(a) as items that must be calibrated, maintained or periodically certified – TPN compounders, homogenizers, scales, etc. Syringes, needles, tubing sets, spikes, filters, mortar and pestle are considered to be ancillary compounding supplies and it is not necessary to document them on the compounding record. However, the ancillary compounding supplies to be used to compound a drug product should be identified on the master formula record.
Reference: CCR 1735.1(a) 1735.2(d)24.

25. Question: CCR section 1751.2(d) states, “All cytotoxic agents shall bear a special label which states ‘Chemotherapy – Dispose of Properly.’” This appears to give no wiggle room for the text of the message.
Answer: There are no exceptions. If a drug is classified as a cytotoxic agent then the special label must be used.
Reference: CCR 1751.2(d)26.

26. Question: Gancyclovir is a cytotoxic agent but is not a chemotherapeutic agent. Does the special label need to be applied?
Answer: Yes, the regulation does not provide for exceptions. However, nothing prevents the pharmacist from consulting the patient on the drug's classification and use.
Reference: CCR 1751.2(d)27.

25. Question: What type of auxiliary labels needs to be placed on a cytotoxic or chemotherapy agent?
Answer: CCR 1751.2 provides direction for sterile injectable labeling requirements. CCR 1751.2(d) states, “All cytotoxic agents shall bear a special label with states ‘Chemotherapy – Dispose of Properly’ or ‘Cytotoxic – Dispose of Properly.’”
Reference: CCR 1751.2(d)
June 4, 2013

To: Members, Enforcement and Compounding Committee

Subject: Agenda Item II (g) – Outcomes of Recent Sterile Compounding Inspections

Staff will provide the committee with a summary of outcomes from recent board inspections of sterile compounding pharmacies.
June 4, 2013

To: Members, Enforcement and Compounding Committee

Subject: Agenda Item II (h) – Recalls of Compounded Drugs throughout the United States

Between April 11, 2013 and May 20, 2013, the Board posted seven subscriber alerts related to compounding drug recalls and two subscriber alerts related to cease and desist orders issued. A summary of the alerts are listed below.

- Green Valley Drugs in Henderson, Nevada, voluntarily recalled all lots of sterile products compounded, repackaged, and distributed by the pharmacy due to lack of sterility assurance and concerns associated with the quality control processes.

- ApotheCure, Inc. recalled all lots of sterile products compounded by the pharmacy that are not expired to the user. The recall was initiated due to lack of sterility assurance and concerns associated with the quality control processes.

- NuVision Pharmacy recalled all unexpired lots of lyophilized compounds of HcG 5000IU-5ml and Sermorelin/GHRH6-5ml to the user. The recall was initiated due to the lack of sterility assurance and concerns associated with the quality control processes identified during a FDA inspection.

- Balances Solutions Compounding Pharmacy, LLC recalled all lots of sterile products compounded by the pharmacy that were not expired. The recall was initiated due to concerns associated with quality control processes, which present a lack of sterility assurance.

- Nora Apothecary & alternative Therapies recalled a multi-state recall of all sterile drug products compounded by the pharmacy that have not reached the expiration date listed on the product. The compounded products that are subject to the recall were products within their expiration date that were compounded and dispensed by the pharmacy on or before Friday, April 19, 2013. The recall was initiated due to concerns associated with quality control processes that present a lack of sterility assurance and were observed during a recent FDA inspection.

- The U.S. Food and Drug Administration alerted health care providers, hospital supply managers, and pharmacists that the FDA’s preliminary findings of practices at The Compounding Shop of St. Petersburg, Florida, raised concerns about a lack of sterility assurance for sterile drugs produced at and distributed from this site.

- Pentec Health, Inc. initiated a limited recall of in-date nutritional prescriptions for renal patients due to lack of sterility assurance associated with one of its laminar flow hoods used in compounding.
Southern California Compounding Pharmacy, LLC was issued a cease and desist order on April 19, 2013, for any and all non-sterile compounding.

Advance Outcome Management Pharmacy Services was issued a cease and desist order on April 29, 2013, from furnishing sterile injectable compounded products.